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PLEADII\ G 'Ai'!D Pl111 CTlCE--- ~)ELC..CTBD ULD EAR EXA}'f QJESTiuNS 
:)t-J ,Je;s 1. ftectio~ 43-17 of t110 Cod8 of Vircini .:J. provi d t;) S t i11.t no sui t to enforce a mechanics 
- oftt=f ,_ ._lien shall be br ought afte r six montiw f r om t ho t i me wh:::n t ho whole amount cove r ed by 
~ -;.Jli) •til such lien becomes payable . A brings a suit in c~qui t y !o ;;:n.f'o rc t: such a lhm s Gven mon· 
ths afte r · the timo when t he wnount COVi:.. r E:: d by the li<..n became payc?.ble . B, tho defend 
ant, 
.>, 
PL:D~AD ING i\ND PRACTICE: 
Jomurred to the bill on the grol,l!ld that the .right to enforce the lien was_ barr€d by tl 
six mo nths statute of limi~tions. Is the ;lomurrer proper in this _ca.so? 
The demurrer is proper.. Where a ri$ht ·is crea.te.d--by statuto till ex<;J c·· - he 
right within the statu~er1.od is of· the .. e~bfltonce of the ri ht nnc;L_t.he part~s 
plo ·-~Jir:t-~ must show affirno.tively tho.t he has · exercised his rir;ht within' .t.h{; time so 
lij-,;U t.B.C. or it does not eta to a cause of action and is d<:lmurrable. No-tes: (I) V'Cere 
shtute of limitations is . a matter oi' romeny and not of substantive law it must be 
_p l o~.dcd s pecially and. cannot be taken advantage of by demurrer. (2) The statute of 
lj_·nit ~ ~tions is ~ matter of .subst?-:0+.ive_)o.w1 (a) ·where tho right is ore-:1.ted by statut 
rrn:l a. timo limited within which the right mey be exorcised. Examples aro the mecho.ni 
lien 1.-;:v; mentione_%above, o.nd recovery for a doo.th by wrongful net of another 'ih whic 
the time limit is ~ yof:ll't.f (b) Where the running of the a.tatuto o.ctunlly passe$ ti tl 
o.s in d0tinuo o.nd ejectmen-t. 
- 2. Who.t is the object of the action of detinue, C\lld what aro ·the essentials t o mnin-
tsin the ac'i;ion? I .J.' .. • ..J 
The object of the action of detinu(~ o .recovvr ba ck specific personal property 
wrongfully lwld by rmother, or if _that is impossible, thr:. valuo · of that pr operty, to-
gether with clo.mo.ges for its wrongful detention. The es sentials to mo.intain tpe actic. 
are (1) Plaintiff must hu.v0 a r;unoral or sno · ' "o . o_pnr.:ty i :n tho ~~o ods sued for, (2) 
t ogether with the rj,_ght to tho ·ilm:-tcd irl.tu_p_gs q_pssiQll.• (3 ) The goods must be co.~.oble ai' 
i~smtificution o.nd 'indent.if.iacL,by tho plo.intiff' in his plen.cft'ings, ( 4 ) the goods must 
have somo,~e which must be stated, (5) 'l'he doi'0ndnnt must vo <.l otained or be dot-
a.in_inr; the goods v;rortgfulj.y prior to 0r t:t tho time suit is started. Pro co ure ~s now 
by notice of motion for jucl t,"mcnt, a.s per Rule 3:3. 
Notes-: (1) In Virginio tho c onrrnon l o:vr action of Hoplevin h::J.s boon nbolished • . Detinue 
t ook its plo.co nnd now, instead of brinf; ing detinue n motion for judgment is filod · 
with tho clerk o.s po r the Rulos o.t 1 flll'f. ( 2) Tho judgr.tEmt in detinue is for tho goods 
or thdr o. l't ernc.t o value . (3) In c ertain c:::ses cov ~S:~rod by V# 8·58,.? among which ure i . 
sol voncy of defoncl~.nt, chngor of nogloct or destruction of property by cl.ofendnnt, or 
Fl sworn statement tho.t nffif.mt be-l.iov0s himself ontitlod to tho goods, tho goods sho.L 
bo b .kun at onctS and de li'vored to tho plaintiff providod ho puts up a bond for nt le v.. 
doublG tho value of the t;oods ; hut the defondnnt mey got the proporty back by putting 
· uf a forthcoming bond of doutle thc vo.luo of the property. 
3. Wht:1.t a.ro the groun(~S in Virg inin for o. motion in o.rrest of a. judgment? 
A.mc,tion in arrest of judgmont lios only for mo..ttor-ia.l orror n.ppar ent on the face 
of wh ."J.t is per se 'n part of the r<::JCord. · 'rho court, in n. prope r cas ~ , riot only · grants 
tho motion but takes such addi tionn.l :lOtion as the c n.se demnncls. Exam:)les: ( n.) X sues 
B for n. tort. B p l eo.ds infancy by wily of ccmfessi on o.nd - n.voidnnce and asks· for n rop: 
X tr o.vcrses the infancy. T'he jury find s thr::-.t B was · un infn.nt. X should mo.ke · o. motio; 
in arrest of judgment. and. o.lso ns k f or u judgw:.'nt non ohst~;:mto verdicto. (b)' :x:' suos 
B for c onversion of l'l. hors e on De c. · 28, 1951. B donios ho stole tho horse on Doc, 28 
1951. Tho jury r eturns a v0rdict tho.t the horso was not stolen on Doc, 28,1951, X i, 
entitled t o a motion in on· est of judgment and u r cp le11dor as it is probably immater• 
in.l whether the horse wo.s t nken on Doc. 28~ 1951. Noto th nt the court in this co.so 
cannot t e ll for whom judgment should be [~ iven hut c an in (a). · Note also tha.t in (o.) 
the pl oadinr:. is. o.lwa.ys by wo.y o f confossion and o.voida.nce while in (b) it is by wo.y o · 
trn.verse, with no issuo boing joinod on tho m!\t<~ri a. l fnct, ( c ) X sups B. Tho plen.d-
ings · are corr ect but tho jury was improperly_ chosen o. s o.pponrs hy the record, or re-
turned an uncet·tnin, or i mporfoct, verdict. Either 11o.rty is entitl ed to mo.k:e. a motion 1• 7 in. arrest of judgment o.nd a ls o, o.sk f or .':\ vonirc f r:cin.s de nova. This results in a n m .,.)"'> 
trio. l but should no t bo confus ed vrith Fl. motion f or r-. n <:.w tri :::~ l. (d ) In o.ny of thEJ o.b \Vf ~v 
ove ca.sos if the dofect is cur fd ::,y the stntute •>f j eofo.ils, Yfl' 8-487, tho motion wou:j t.<'"' 
bo o:vcrrulod. Tho gist of this s t l;'..tut <J is tha.t no jurl[:;mont sho.ll bo o.rrested or rov- t.,;r- e/ 
ors ed for any C.ofect i n tho · r ec ord, or f or nny orr or committed upon tho trial where it\)ct 
plainly . a.ppea.rs from the r ocor cl O.ncl tho evi den ce given a t th o trial that the perti es 
ho.ve had n frtir tri al on the rnc rit.s o.nd sul1st nnti nl judtico ho.s bccm r eached. · 
Quory: SuE>OSe nn err or not a pparent on tho f ~c c o of th0 r e c•,rd is mr.tdo and not dis· 
c0ver·ed until nftor. vt,rdict. Viho.t c o..n to done th.:m? :... .• If not cur 0d by the statute 
of j eo ~nils, a moti on f or o. n r;w trb.l .rn.o.y be marJEl. ~:1w usu~l gr ounds for such a. motic.· 
n.z:o (1) E:ror or misconduct <;>f t he judgv (2) Of,jury (3) Of counsel (4 ) of a party 
(5) Df thnd persons (6) Acc~dent and surrn.so ~ 7) Inn.de qunte or excessive do.m~es 
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(8)Newly discovered evidence provided{a)the evidence has bean discovered since the ~ 
t :cial(b)it j_s material and probably w:i.ll change the result(o.)it is not merely cumul.::'.-· 
t i ve(d)it could not have been ciiscoll'er·ed before the trial by use of due diligence . h. 
all the above cases remember that a motion for a new trial is adaressed to the sound 
di scr etion of the court and is not a matter of right as are the motions in arrest of 
,judement. . 
5. If all l:,he counts in a motion lor judgment are good except one, and the defendant 
desires, before going to trial, to get rid of the bad count, what is the remedy? 
Interpose a demurrer to the faulty count or move the court to reject it and instruct 
jury to disregard it. Do not demur generally, for the demurrer 1>1ould be overruled be-
cause of the · good count. Note: Under Rule h:l the court might order the bad count 
stricken' at the pretrial conference. 
- -6. A, ail employee of the Hercules Auto Co,_ a Virginia corporation, the chief office 
of which is in Richmond, was injured on !'January 2,1957, in RQanoke County by the 
negligence of the company. He sued the company in Roanoke County by notice of motion 
for judgment. The notice vms served in Roanoke County upon B, the agent of the Compan: 
for the City of Lynchburg, who resided in Lynchburg. Is the service valid?Give reason 
The service is not valid. By Y#-8-6S_ serviQe on any person other than the Secretary 
of the Commonwealth(after July 1,1958 Clerk of the State Corporation Co~nission)in 
connection with service of process on a corporation "shall be by delivering to him a 
copy of the process or not.ice in the county or city wherein he r esides or his place 01 
business is, or the principal office of the corporation is located; and the return 
shall show this, and state on whom, and when the .service "'as; otherwise it shall not 
be valid." 
Query 1. What facts should be remembered about service of process on domestic cor-Se'"" ~ .. ~ porations? A. By V#8-59.(l)a cjty or town ~ay be served with process by serving its 
d mayor, recorder·, or any aldern:an .• ~ cour..cilman, or trustee of such eity or town; (2) 
fy, tA!.--~!'- if it be against any other corporation created by the laws of this State, on its 
~ president or other chief officer., or on its vice president, cashier, treasurer, 
~,o~secretary, general manager, or any one .of .its directors, or any agent of such corpora· (hrrt tion, if any such officer or agent be found in the cit or count in wh ch_tb5Lp~o­
c~eding is commence~, and whether any such of ficer or agent be so found or not, it 
may e sent'"'·- o the county or city in which is located the ~pal -Or registered 
offj.ce of such co nd be th · ·e_a-.e<Lo_n_the regi,ste_.r_ed ggent or on any officer 
or agent of such company found in such county or city. Note: V/ll3.1-9(corporation law: 
requires each corporation to have and continuously maintain in this State(a)a regis-
tered o:('fice which may be,bltt need not be, the same as its place of business; and (b) 
ru re istered agent, which agent must be an individual resident in this State w hose 
bu::1 ness office · s identical with such registered office and who is an officer or 
director of the corporation or a member of the Virginia State Bar, and by Y£13.l-~l 
this registered agent may be served with any process, notice, or dem~nd. If the Cor-
poration fails to maintain such an agent or he cannot be found with due diligence 
then process may be served on the clerlc of the Corporation Commission. Thi.s section 
is cumulative and dbes not limit the right to serve process under V#8-59(supra). 
(!.~) Substituted service is not valid on a corporation. 
Query 2. Where are actions usually brought and how are corporations affected by the vf.,~A- IJ... statutory provisions thex·eon? A. Th:i.s is governed by V#B-38, 8-39, 8- 0 ~
Suits may be brought unless otherwise provided(l)wherein any of the defendants reside. 
(?~~f a corporation be a defendant where-in its principal or r egist ered office i s, or 
wherein its mayor or chief officer resides;(4) if it be tQ; r ecover land or to subject 
it to a debt, .wherein such land or part of it may be:(5)if it be a suit to construe 
a will or for the direction of the court in the admi nistr.ation of the estate of a de-
ceased person, or a suit or action aga1.nst a perso nal representative, curator, 
committee, guardian, or other fiduciary, in the county or cpDporation w herein the 
will was admitted to probate, or such fiduciary qualifi ed;(6}if it be against a for-
eign corporation, .wherein its statutory agent res.ides, or i ts registered office is 
situated or, in case of withdrawal from the State where its last statutory agent re-
sided or its last registered office was situated or where it has any estate or debts 
owing to it within t his state.(6a)if it be against a non-resident and the cause of 
action arose because of t he operation of a motor vehicle on the highways of this Stat8 
wherein the plaintiff r esides, or wherein the cause of action or any part thereof 
arose; (7)if it be against a de- ('rhe next page is p.31.) 
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: ~ e i ~c~_21YiJ -c 1ho rer:;ic1.cs ~d .thout tllis rit<:.te, ulwr ej __ n r'c 1;1.a y i)O :_ O'..'_ncl <md sc:cvccl :r.i:U··-
~y-·occo s, o:,· net~,- ~.1C?Vc es·c0te o:c (~_ebts dne hira, ::_)l'ovit'.cc1., hoFeVel', t:1et no-~l1inc; sc·!·~­
::..:-.ine c.t 5.11 ·:Ollie: soc·cion shall be so cons-trn(_; d as ·::.o ~JCj~r,Ji t tho _jo ~_nin::; o::: g c~m.Jcr: ­
-~:: . c col')orc:l:.ion or residGnt __ ;L'1L.i'rld~'..al <:-.s codeiend2.nt l!i·0:l a f ore i gn cor;x:.:~·-:~ :i. on 
~j~" i:~:m-:::·c ::d. C..ent inC:i.vidual in a ju3~i sc'J.ction u:1erc S"~..1.cl1 c.:.o;;1cst:Lc corl)Or<e ·0iori o:c· 
,~ eh"'.8n·t il.K:iv:_ (ll~L c-ov.ld. not be sued; (G) if it be Oil bchal .i' of t:1e Gor.:: · 10n~ realth, 
, r:,c;.,>c::.:!." :.l1 "tSe--nar.lc o.i ·i:,he ilttorney Uoncral or othe::u:!.se , ii:, rnc:t:T be in the cit;;r cf 
. ~:L ch;,J.ond; (~· ) if it be an action or D on.i.t ili~hicll it i s nec1;;ssar y o:c· ~):rl o~•cr ·i:,o ·.:olce 
:::::7 .)::: tllC: :;:ollm Tin~ f!< -~blic ofl"ice::.•s a :~n1.rty CLO ::.'C;nclant , tu- u:i.t , ·~~:1e Cove:cnor, . . t-
t o1·n:.:7 Ce!K::.·c.l, Str:ce 'lroasurer, ~.lecretar:',r of the Conr,1om:eal t h, Cor,l:)·i:,rollor, Super-
~c!: -~r::ndent o::: :?1'~) l:l. c Jns·l:.ruction, or Co· ·1.1iasioner of Lcri cnl tu:co and lrm1i~r2:cion; 
oT 5.n ~,h:i. ch i ·i:, :nc-:," ~)O necessa:c~r or p3."0J)er t.o r.J.[1l~c '-'- ;xl"t ;'/ o~c?cmcl.a.nt the .'-)tate Doo:cd 
of ::_/l.ucat.i on , or other l)1.'blic corpox·e. -~:,_on c on1~)osed o:: o :~'ficc;;.·s of ·::.he ~ ;ovm·~1nent, 
o:~' tl-:e {unc:.f> .:'llt~ ~l:i."::>,;ort~T of ,ri1icll -~w Cor.1J:lom:s.:-.lt h is solo ouner; or in ~rbich it 
sl1o.ll be 2.·iJtenptcd -~;o enjoin or otheru:i.se st.:Dpenc1 oi· o. .o.fcct any judgment or c~_e croe 
on behalf of the Coi'l"lon~re.oJ .. th, or Dn;or e:~ccu·(Lon ~.o::mcd on st:ch juc'<''l':H.:nt or cl.ecree , 
i ·c shr.ll be onl:'.r in t~HJ ci·c~,- of ::.i chmond~ and 
(10) :Lf any juG.r;e o:J: a circ·pj:i:, o~· cor;:)ol'.~' ~ :i. on CO'l.1.l'·l:. be :: .l~terc s·ced ir1 2. c.:.se Hhich, 
in,_t for suc~1 :i_·,_tr;r cst ~ !onJ. c~ be ::ll'O~)or :"i.'o·.::- t:w j1'1'isc:~i_ctioE o~:· Lin court, the o.c-
·U.on or snit may be ~ll'O\l.c)rL in 2ny co1.U't i n ~-n cc~,joinj _n~; ci~·c,_,_j_t, Ol' c orpor2:cion. 
Any such actj_on or -snit I) J.."Ol'.~;h·c :i.n .:my comY~~r m·· co:;:·:)ol'<'' U.o:-:1 r::L·chin the territorial 
J.ir.1its of -~he jn:c:Lst:U.c:0:i .. on of such jucl~}') c~lt~:' .l, on 1~1ot.ion ol ~~n~r p2l"ty ·tbc1·eto_, bo 
removed to t: ~e c:i.rcuj: (:, O:i." COY)01"'-'-t:i.on cou:i.'"C o:·_, D. connt,y u:.· .... o:;:·pm:c. t ion in en ad-
joining circ1.1.i·0. 
Hote: len action o::.· su:i.t 1JJ J) 0-32 : l;: ::· ~)C :xcoF;- ~ ri:, j_n :- n;;~ cmmty o:;:· dt~r 11herein 
tlw cause of action or an;{ ~x· J·t ;bJiier oof c:>::osc, c.l·~Jwu::;ll no~- o£ -~l l(:: ck:::'cncl2.nts rer;iC:e 
therein . :u,,_t in this case as a :'/1' P(:·C.~ . c a.:. L·,ot·l;c:r one :~.<uD ·c :~o t se:::·v:i_ce o:i: l)rocess on 
·011e cl8i cnd.;-n·L 1:ldle he is i n t he cotmt:,· v ~' city i n <: l 1~.ch tl-,8 cc t'..SC u::· ;.tction .:-rose , 
unless (by V;; ~ G-l17) i"i;, 0e (I) an 2c·~:~ . on ag. <:\~\ .nst c:. co:;:·~)or.o·~.:Lon (II) an o.dj_on upon 
• • · , b ~-r. • - • • • · ·• • • • ( r ··r) ~ · · D ,.Jonc, ·co...:en :; Dn o.~.D.cer lme:er :::-. l'."~·:wr :t·cy o:·. SOl;'.e ~~-.:.t ul'."~G 1 . 211 [:c·uJ.on ·co recover 
c~.x.l.o .::;es :.C'or a Hrong (IV ) n1 o.ct:i.o;1 r.g£t: :Lm:d:. t1.ro or r:tore c!.cf cndo:1nts on one of' whom such 
:):.:·ocess ;l<:'.S been e:~ ecu-i:,ed i n cll.e ::ou;rri;::· Ol' cit:r :i.n -~ ;h:i. c ]o_ ·cl1C nc·i:,::_,on i s iJrou::;ltt , in 
11hich c; .:::ses 'Jl' occs::: " iJ.l is::me otr0 ·co ~Je so:cved on tl1e c'.:-. fnncl~·nt :.i.n t ;w c o1m·~y or cit;-/ 
in ull~.c l1 he r cr>i(es. 
7 . P cl o. ins fsoo o.nd <Y vcn·d.ict of $·100 is render ed . C<m P or c~ef~mdant apy-;eal? 
'l'l1e a "_) Jcal r··)le <:.:.; .:ount :i_;:1 ~1CC'L1.Di.:-t.r~r i:lr·c,·c.c:.'<;J :L::.: .3C/'! c:~nlusL·e of costs . Int,erest may 
be included to date oi ' jucJ.:;n1ent of trial court., Hence P' could app8al but cle:fendant 
could not. See Vi;lO-h64. 
9. ~ hen a s 1.1.ret;:r on a l) mlC: cmrt,e.:i.:' :!.n: · c. -,;-r:d.ver. 
1)ond, and t hen sues the principal t o collect t he 
the principal pl ead homestead <-2:c.inst tl1e ml.,r e ty? 
ot.JlU)!e:r:tctld. ~ c~ to..:,~1 the 
ebt .that. he-n ·ad paid for him., can 
Ho . V//34-22 pl"OVicles j_n ~)Cll't' ;;Ii' r:. c.ebt ul:ic;: :i..s S1.:pe:dor ·co tlc.e homestead, Ol' 
as to ;:h~o }10r,J.cst Gad is ,,,a,j_ved, be ')<'.:i_d o.Cf i)~,r. 3. ::mre-ty t~1crcon, the pr5.nc:Lpal 
sl1all not be alloued to claii-.1 t :_:e ~wr.:o s ·i:,c.s c~ 8. ::. < c;d.nst such s"t:ret:r. 11 
~:t.1.ery 1. : .~1at debts a:r-e m.qr :rior ·t;o 1;omcs\:.ecd c: :,~r.mtio!·ts'? A(l) :?urchase ~--;rice of 
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:!';:r:-oper·t;y in which exemption is clai~ed, or if it has been exchanged for other prop'" 
erty such property shall not be exemp·!ioo f1•om the ps.yment of such unpaid prueha.sa 
price.(2)Services rendered by a laboring person or mechanic (3)liability of a !iduci-
a:r.y fo:t• money collected (I~) taxes, levies, &6sesements (5)rent (6) legal or taxable 
fees of any public officer (7) no exemption may be claimed in a shifting stock of 
merchandise (8) nor in any property the conveyance of which by the hon1estead claimant 
has been set aside on the ground of fraud Br want of consideration (9) Since tort 
c1:1ims are not "debts" they are superior to homestead. See V#J4 .. 5. 
Query 2. What else should be remembered about the homesteaa exemption law? A.(l) It 
applies only to heads of families (2) the amount is $2;000 (3) It can be claimed only 
once. Property set aside by the writing may be exchanged for other property,but if 
the property set aside .is consumed there is no further exem.!)tion (4) It is claimed by 
a writing signed by the householder(if. alive) and duly recorded as deeds are recorded 
in the county or corporation wherein the real estate claimed is and/or if claimed in 
personal property where he resides. Each piece of property is valued. (5) The exemp-
tion may be set aside at any time before the property is subjected to legal process 
(6) The exemption may be waived. The waiver must be in writing. (7) The rent and 
profits of the homestead are also exempt and may be put back into the corpus. (8) A 
widow cannot claim her husband's homestead and also dower or jointure. 
Query ).How does homestead exemption differ from poor debtor's exemption? A. (1) 
Homestead exemption is in addition to poor debtors.' exemption. This latter exemption 
embraces among other items wearing appearel, beds and a few supplies, a farmer's work 
animals and implements~and three fourths of a wage-earner's wages but not more then 
$150 per month nor less than ~~100 per month. Three four.ths of everything earned in 
excess of $100 per month but not in excess of $150 per month is also exempt.(2)It may 
be claimed as often as needed, nead not be set apal't by writing, and cannot be 
waived (3) A non-head of a family is entitled to one-half of the exemption of a head 
of a family. (4) A non-resident has the same wage exemption as does a resident. 
10. John Smith verbally agrees to rent a farm from William B~own for a period of two 
years, agreeing to pay a lump sum of $h00 at the end of the two years. A few days 
later Brown informs Smith that he will not rent the farm, ha having been advised that 
the verbal contrac·t; was unenforceable because of the statute of frauds. Smith sues 
Brown, and the latter files a plea of the general issue. Can the defense of the. stat-
ute of frauds be proved under the, general issue? 
No. By Rule 3:5 the general i.ssue is no longer allowed ., The defense would have to be 
stated by defendant in his grounds of defense. 
11~ A person, not a party to an action at law, is in the possession of a ce~tain 
:paper that you desi.re to introduce in evidence. He refuses to deliver this paper to 
you or let you see it. Under our statute what steps would you take to compel ita . 
production? . 
V#~301 provides that when it appears by affidavit that any book, etc.,is in the 
possession of a person not a party and is material and proper to be introduced before 
a court, such court or a judge thereof in vacation, may order the clerk to issue a 
subpoena duces tecum to compel such production at a time and place to be specified 
in the order. Note: If the adverse party has possession and refuses to produce, the 
court, having control of tpe partiep befor~ it, maY: ,dismiss suit or give judgment by 
default. See Yf8-324. .) \!.e.- M s. (j f\ t.c-/ e_ i/, 9 
12. You are plaintiff's counsel in a damage suit against the Southern Railway Co.for 
personal injuries. The company files its grounds of defense,but you are desirous of 
being better informed of the exact nature of the company's defense. What steps,if 
any, could you take? 
Rule 3rl8(d) provides that on motion made promptly, a bill of particulars may be· 
ordered to amplify any pleading that does not, in the opirdon of the court,clearly 
inform the opposite party of the true nature of the claim or defense. 
Notea Under the Rules if defendant wishes to rely on the defense 'of contributory 
negligence he must so state in his grounds of defense unless plaintiff's own evidence 
ehowa that he is barred by his contributory negligence. 
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·_· ·: ... ~;:;;el for d.e:L'cnclarr~ in the ::·ore:;oing question clemUl"S to the evidence. He offe: 
c c.~ an :instn.d,ion settin2; forth v;:w.t he deemed to be the }.au r elative to the measure 
d.· ::c.·x<:.ar~es . The co1.tct overrule d ·t,he •iemmTer, ref used t;w :i.nstruction, and t;:le jttry 
;'U! .. ~_cred a verd.ict for $1, 000. t'h01.t ste~)S should be taken to bring the se rulings be-
:!.' or ·l:llc ~) i.1pre:c1e Cour:t of Lppeals? 
·r_lGre arc t1-ro e:trors alle3ed to lwvc been made (1) tho o··.rerrnling of the (el~l'l11'1'er to 
: ~ . o e viC.:ance &nd ( 2) an erroneous instruction. A c~em1.'.:c :.~er ·i:,o tl1e evic.:ence i s 2. TJl ea <.i-
::.c·. ~ ancl i s. per S8 a part of the re.cord. By p ,,Je 5:1 #3(b), w!lte;:1 ·che judr;e gives in-
'::tr·,,_ct:;_on3 to t~·1e jury he shall initial each instruction; and. they t lwreb3r beco;·.1e part 
of t h0 re cord, 11 and by sub-section (c) thereof, 11 I f the refusal ·co give an i :JStruction 
i s excepted to, the judge shall mark it 11 refused11 and inj:tial it; and ~-t tb.creby be-
co:· tes :9~rt of the record. 11 So the clei:'endant should ob.joct t o th e refusal of the in-
str:_;_c;tj_on, and Hhen the o'b,jection is ove1·ruled, cxcep·C. t o -l:.~te r efusal. This uould. nol'· 
-,,_c.~11y be clone in chambers and not in open court. The juc\;e ~rroulcl then marlc the i11s·l:.r-
uction 11 refused11 anc.1. ini·l;ial it and thereby r.w.ke it !.:O <::.rt of the record. If the delen-
•.lant c:.oes not except to ·che court 1s ruling he has 11aivGd h:Ls objection. An objection 
not insisted upon :i.n the trial court 1·1ill not be consideroci in the Su~1ren1e CotU't of 
Appeals. In Virginia tl:te triaJ. court need not be :·.i ven <:' chance ( othej: t11ru1 the 21 
day :Jcriod bei'ore judgr,Jents and C::.r: crees becorrte final) ·co correct its mm errors. Hence 
no motion to the trial cou:t"t f or v ne1! t1·ial or in arrest of judgrilent is a condition 
precedent to a riGht to seek o.n C".!_,~ )e<'-1. The rest o:f ·i:,ae r,d:.e!Js in outline form are as 
i'ollous: (a)Hal~e a. ;notion f or <m o:i"c1er .s:urpen(linc c~~8cution. J efore the trial cotU't 
uill c;rant such a mo·t;ion a bond u~:Lh sure·\.;~" .nn.1st be r.:j_ven. -:~h e snspension period or-
c.linarily is from 60 to 90 c.ia~,rs aJ'ld r:-tr.-,;,r te exte•~.:le:d,. ._, (~)) I>·c-iol' t o t i1e expiration. ·of 
60 days after entry of fim1.l ,judgment :I.:Lle Fith the clt.:rk of t.he tria.l court a notice 
of appeal and aGsi.8ni·lcnts oi' error. ' 'i thin lh days ther eaftel' cou~sel for C1.ppellee 
may fi.l e ui th the clerk hi~.:; ass1~~nmcnts of cross-error, if <my . J~ssignments of error 
must be filed by 'both lX.rties Dt this s t a ::::o, beca\~.S ·~ , until i'(, is !:nmm uhat points 
1-JilJ. be raised on appeal, it is impossible to lmou uhat ~x:.:l'ts of t.'le record Hill be 
mn terinl on a.?peal. (c) The clerl·~ o:J: the ·erial court malce s u:) the record and serrlsit 
to the clerk of the Supreiile Court of Appe alE: a s ~)er Scc·cj.on 7 of nule 5:1. (d) Appel-
lant Drenares his Petition fo:c~ 1 ~;YJe,;cl~ rCllis may s erve as l::is 'brief as l."J"ell. The at-
torney m~:st sta te that in ~ d_-s-ci9InT'On-thc c2 . . -:;e should be revieHcd. Any judge of the 
Supreme Court of j·.p)ealG m<.'..~.- 1; rant .all appeal, or, if he refuses to grant it, the pe-
tition may be, submi t tcc1 t o the court en bane. Opposin::; co\msel must be ;z:i.v.en oppor-
t,_mity to oppose the L;r<mtin;:; of -the petition. .A trans cript of the r ecord must accom-
pany the petition.. (e) If t~1c peti.t io:1 :i.G ~).·anted it in.c~j_cat,cs uhat bond must 'be f).le c1 
and ·Jhether or not supersedeas s~:all i s sue. (f) The Cf. SC i s docketed in the .Supreme 
Court of Appe.:lls. (g ) :Jriefs mus t be i.'jlc:cl. (i.1) '.t'h c Su::):ceue Cour·t, of il.ppeo.ls certi-
fies its decision to the loner cour ·t. Tho u:vper col.':rt uill 1~c:.lce a final disposition 
of -the case unless i t is ::.-er:,~mded for the de·l;cn·mina tion of issu.Gs clE;signated by the 
hi gh court. 
14o On ~Tanuary 1 , 1941~ , A e:~ectr~es 2nd ··1.eJ.i·lrt:rs to D }~is ~)1' <::1mi c> so:ry note for ~~500 pay-
J.ble on demand. On Ja.rmc.-.r y 1, 15l:7, A p<\{S t o :'3 t l1c Sl'm of $300 on this note. He dies 
: 'eb:cuor y 1, 1950, l eavi ng ·Gr.c 1:;a ::u::~.lce ul:.!):::>.:Ld . E:i. s ; clninisb'·u tor s oelcs yotll' adv:i.ce as 
t o Hhether or not hu s:10uld pay t :!e 1·csid,_,_e . ~ ::.;.c,t ~iO' .J.ld you <:)vis e? 
Do no·0 "'_)ay i ·c . 'i'~1r: st&h'.t c o~~ lil :rl.tc-~ticms on ur:. t; l:cn c ol'Lt:i:'<:>.~ ts is 5 _yee.rs; in Vir-
emia a partie.l ~ ,;;,yacnt docs :: ot str.rt the s t e tut e nu,nins over. A demand note is L1ue 
a.s soo:~1 e.s r:1o.c:.e . 
Query 1. \•Jll<::.t is t ::.r 3:tc::C.ntor;/ ner i od of liJ:ri.to. t.ions? fl.. Oral contract, 3 years; 
,r.ritten contra c-ID, 5 years, s e21L;d instrur:1ents, J.O ;rre2r s . B. R8cover :r o.f property (real) 
15 :'rears. c. Tort acti.<)'.1S t:~2t e·J.r viv.e , 5 ::rears; Tort acti r.ns not survi vi.11g, 1 yea.r 
ur::les s othe!"':rise proviL~ed. iJ~,r Y#B-24 os c~·c.1e~:dec~ i:·, 195!-l- t he s ·ce.tute of limitations in 
tllC case of an action fer pon :.::mc.,J. J.n .rc~ r :i.es ua.s c:'.nY;cc1 ·~o 2 ~re ars, This chanc;e is 
not a;_);_Jlicabl e to a ct i ons un()e:;," t:1e (};<.;.t!:. IJ:r 1-J~~on~;i\1l act c.:·l;c,tPtcs. 
s.:.J.~ . Define a super se deas a ~ nscd i n \~ :i . r _;j _nia. 
1 ~  A supersedeas as used in ifir1inia , is an ancillary process , <J.dd:t·essed to the of ficer 
.' - D charged with -tht:J e;~ecution of the judgment o:f· t Le t rial C!!.om·t, directing him to stop 
the execution of t i1e judGment belcH, .:md al s o diroc ting him t.o summon the defendant 1n 
.i)L"i::XLii JJ AriD i'i!!i~ l':~:CE Hcli j.:.> e.:-: u ~c:'J 1;56. 34 , 
error to. the appellate court, there to have a rehearing of the whole matter. 
16. The plaintiff institutes an action on a .contract for the payment of money;he ob-
tains pe;rsona.l service of process on the defendant, and files with his notice of mo-
tion for judgment an affidavit made by himself that to the best of his belief he is 
entitled to recover the sum of <;Ji300;that such a.inount is justly due;and that he claims 
interest thereon from Jan.l,l952. The defendant~.denies . all liability and employs :you 
to represent him. What steps would you take to protect your client's interests? 
A sworn plea(i.e., one denying by an affidavit)denying liability in whole or in part 
s4oul.d be filed. Unless this is done no defense would be allowed to a motion for 
judgment on an account where plaintiffs have sworn to the amount and justice of their 
claim unless plaintiff failed to object to. the filing of an unsworn plea within seven 
days.The object of the statute is to prevent delay by means of frivolous pleas. See 
V#8-5ll and V#8-721. Query 1. What pleas must be sworn to?(a)The one above(b)All pleat 
in abatement(c)Plea denying allegation of partnership or incorporation(d)Special plea 
of equitable set-off(V#8-24l)(e)Plea denying allegation .of signature(f)Plea denying 
allegation of ownership, operation, or control. 
17. State two rules of pleading which tend to p:i·oduce singleness of issue 
(!)Pleadings must not be double. That is the rule against puplicity. Example: Defend· 
ant in one plea pleads infancy and statute of limitations. In such a case defendant 
should plead two separate and distinct pleas instead of one double one. Duplicity, 
however, is a defect of form rather than of substance and under our present statutes 
would not be fatal(except in the case of pleas in abatement which must be technically 
correct.) · (2) The common .law rule that one cannot demur and plead to the same matter. 
This rule '-1as designed to prevent issues of l aw and fact q.t the same time. However, 
by Vl/8·134 nAny party in any action, at any stageof the pleadings, may plead as many 
several matters, whether of law or fact, as . .he s.ball think necessary." 
....-22. For what purposes are dilatory pleas available, and at vihat stage of the proceed-
ings must they be interposed, if at a.ll? 
Dilatory pleas or pleas in abatement are avai lable principally to contest the venue. 
A plea in abatement cannot be made by a defendant after he has answered, demurred, 
pleaded in bar, pleaded to the merits, no~ after the expiration of 21 days after ser-
vice of the notice of motion for judgment or the subpoena in chancery upon him.$Uch 
pleas, not being to the merits, and tending only to delay, are discouraged. Example: 
X sues D for a debt in the Circuit Court of Y County instead of Z County where D 
should be sued. HovJever, he ·alleged f~cts which D can prove are wrong l'lhich(if true) 
would show t11at the Court in Y County·· was the proper cou,rt. D should file a p+ea in 
. abatement if D does not wish to be tried in Y County. 
~3. You repreaent a client upon whose goods a distress warr ant has been. levied for 
rent which he claims he does not owe. How would you test t he validity of the levy, 
and mode of procedure? 1 
Replevin, the common law remedy, has been abolished in Virginia. The client should 
put up a delivery or forthcoming bond of double the amount for which the distress is 
made. The property is then delivered to the client. He fails to deliver the property 
as he agreed to;the bond is declared forfeited which has the force and effect of a 
judgment against the obligors. The landlord then gives ten days' written notice that 
on a certain day he will move the court for an av1ard of execlltion on the bond, and, in 
r eply the client may show his defense. 
If the tenant is unable to give bond, and yet has a valid defense,he may make affida· 
vit to these facts, and. the officer levying the distress warrant is required to permit 
the property to r emain in the possession and at the risk of the tenant,unless the 
l andlord is willing to give bond. (See Bur·ks #h04(4th Ed.)) 
-.....24. A client places in your hands fox· cullt:ction a clai m f or ·!H,OOO against B,a res-
ident of Ky. You learn that a carload of horses lias been shipped by B via the C.&O. 
R.R. from Lexington, ICy., consigned to a firm in Newport News, Va . ,for export to France. 
Can you sue B in Va.,and if so, how would you proceed? 
Yes, a judgment in ram by attacl~ent under V#B-5~ may be obtained. This has been 
held not to be an u·nreasonable interference with interstate commerce.However,if the 
cattle have been shipped under an order bill of lading no attachment will be valid un-
less the bill be first surrendered to the carrier or its negotiation enjoined. 
Ju1 V Quory 1. Ylhut aro tho groun~~E~~~N~n ·~-~t:::::::,~~ ( 1) Thnt dofendunt is e. foroi:· 
N"'~ c:or poration, or a non-resident, e.nd has estate or debts owing to such defendant in t h. 
• •.;<o.unty or city in which attaclunent procoEldings are brought, or is entitled to th o bon-
ofit of o. lien lEJgo. l or equito.blEJ. (2) Is removing or o.bout to remove out ofl stnto 
1v:i.th intent to change domicile. ( 3) Debtor is removing, or has r emoved, or int ends t · 
runevo tho sr:;eciul property sued fer out of the State so that there will probably not 
l)G enough in the Sto.tc to satisfy the judgment. (4.) Is about to, or ho.s converted his 
~ 'r oper~y into money, securities or evidences of debt with intont to hind0r, dolny or 
lcf;.· o.uC. his · oreditors. (5) Has, or is nbout to assign or dispose of hiG estnte with 
intont to hinder, etc., his creditors. (6) Ho.s e.bscondod , mr is about to ·ubscon(l .t'rorr 
tho State, or has qoncealod himself ther~in to the injury of his creditors, or is ~ 
fugitive from justice~ 
Note: vThore separate and distinct grounds of attachment uro str.\tod nnd o.ll o.ro r e -
lied upon, t~eymust bo ste.tecl conjunctively. 
c 25. Steps to be taken by u sub .. contr,::.ctor t() pnrfoct hi.s mochnnics' lien;wi tnin· what 
t-£,cJ~"""'-,~.-.> .Gimo. must suit bEl instituted to enforce it; oncl where funds in tho hands of the owner . • ..,....,- cluo to the general c ontractor aro loss th1.U1 tho aggrog;eto of all of the subcontactors ' '~ liens, what priority, j_f ::my> is tb)re botvreen them? · 
This is regulated by Vi~· 43-1 ot sog. Tho sub .. cor:h·n.ctor has tvw romedief?. (1) If 
the gEmeral contro.ctor has p0rfuctod his lien, tho subcontro.ctor may obtain the ben-
efit thoroof by n writton notice of his claiB n!ja.inst the genernl contractor to, the 
OWTIOr I Or hiS agent, before thO BlliOU!.'lt Of th o gener a l CODtr:.lctor f S liop iS pa.id Off 
or discharged. (2) Ho mo.y tnke: out o.n jn~.opl>ndont lien by do ing just who.t tho general 
contractor is roquir od to do, nnd , in a.ildition, give notice in writing to tho owner of 
tho property, or his fl.gent, of tho cunount an:i character of his cb.im but tho amount 
socu:r ed by this lien cnnnot oxcec1d tho n .iount in whi.oh tho owner · is indebted to the 
general contra.ctor at the time tho notice is given~ or sho.ll tho:ronftor become indebt-
ed to the general contr o.ctor. 
Note: The ste P,S that must be token by the generrtl c ontrn.ctor to perfect his lion 
are ( 1) Tho filing of a memorandum in th(·J clerk's office of tho county or city in 
which building i s l oun.ted at ~y time oftor the work is dono and b.aforo thEJ expirr.~.tion 
of · 60 days fr ()m the time tho work is t orrnin::t tcd. This memorand·um must contain (a) 
Name of owner (b) NUJ!le of cln.imant (c)' Am.:)Unt cln.imod (d) Cr:msideration (o) Time or 
times sumo will become or d irl become duo. It must be verified by oath, be occompnnioc 
by stntemcmt claiming tho benefit of the lien, nnd give notic0 thn.t clnimant intends 
t o perfoct his lion. It is roc ordod in the miscellnnoous lien b;)ok and indexed in th€ 
Deed Book. A copy of the notico is sent to tho ownor.. A liEm to.kos in t:ts much lo.nd 
as necessary to tho proper onjoymont of the building . (2). The lien must be . porf·ected 
by D. bill in equity within six months from the. time tho dobt bccot~Gs due. If the oYrrlr 
hr.s ®Y rlofense ho mr..y 1:: ~ko it 'in those procoedin~.s ·. 
Note 2 • A sub-contra.ctor ho.s profor- cnces ovor r.t {!Onornl contractor.. Thero is no 
preference as between sub-contr,~ctors of the sn.me cla.ss oxcopt that thoso furnishing 
l r,.bor are entitled to a prof.::::renco for not nor e th·m 30 dr::.ys i mmedir..toly preceding 
tho d~ of the p0rformo.n0e of the last lnbor. lit+ J(.,.,._... ~~r/ :t . .>' ~" ov 26.' ou o!·f'er a deed for recor d to tho clerk of the prop t:r court, ~nd tender the pror 
er t r..x r.~.nd fees for r ocord. ettion. The clork r efuses t o r ecord the deod 0n the nlloged 
ground tha.t a. hi r;ho:r tax shou ld bo p:-d.:t. How would you proc co;l to r oquir0 the dood 
to be admittod t0 record? 
To oompol the porformnnco of r.~. public duty of n ministoric.~l nature Mandamus is tho 
proper remedy. 
Notes a.s t o other extraordinary r omedios. (1) Prohibition is n writ issued by nn 
upper court to a. lower court or(lering it to ceuso its dot crmination .of a. cn.so because 
of lack of jurisdiction. (2) H~;\DC-lUS Cnrpus o.s su bjiciendum is a writ directed to ono 
who is i'llegc. lly r os tr.1.ining c.noth<:: r of his lliibe: rty u.nd dirocts him to cease therefrom 
or to· give the person so rcstro.inod t 0 a lsgal custodian Haboa.s Corpus o.d testific-
andum is a. writ directed to one ho.vin(s custody 9f o. person to produce <that nerson at 
a. certain time and pla.ce that ho may ::; ivo testimony in n judio:i.o.l pr octJo<iing.. (3) 
Certiorari is an orU.~r fr om a. highor court t o n lower court or r1Gring the record of the 
co.s e to bo cortific~ a.nd s:ont up to the hi r,hf:r. court. In Virgtnia, ·practicnll the 
only use made of th~s writ i s by the Su. ;_;romo Court of Appeals, to obtnin a fur{h or 0 r 
mor o porfoct record, when 0 completo rocord h·\s not boEJn furnished. (4) Quo wt:trra.nto 
3E.i, 
is '.'\. ·li~J crc;tiona:ry writ, given by a court, uron petition of tho attorney gonera.l, or 
Comrnumvon.lth's n.ttornoy, or, if thoy r ofuso, by apy one hnving a speci a l interes t, a;.:: 
':1.ir.st ( a ) a domestic corpora.ti.on ( othor than n municfpal one) for a misuse or non-u CJ ( 
A' .its corpornte ·privilogos and franchises (b) ·a. person for tho misuse or non-usc ·.)f 
':.r.:y pri;riloge conferred by b.w (u) eny person who sho.ll intrude into or .usurp any pu·o· 
Lc ( ff1.ce. 
No t.o nlso that nn extraordinary remedy never lies if th.Jro is n.n adoqunte ordinEI!'y 
r c::mody., 
2'/ • . A recov0rs a judgment against B for $2,500 in o.n action f or breach of promise t o 
nar ry . B a.ss erts :1 claim to his homestea(, oxE:-mption. Can he sustain it against the 
judg:r.wnt? 
No. A hreo.ch of promise to marry, while t echnically in the nature of a contract, 
is often regarded ns substantio.lly n. toDt. Thus exemplary dnmo.go s may be awardod, and 
tho action dios with tho porson. Since this claim i s not oubst.cntinlly contr'lctuul 
it is superior to homestead exemptions. J\nd the statuto of limit :1ti ons is one yen.r. 
28. A ontors upon" B's land und hauls n.wny o. l ot of building stone without pt:lrmission. 
JJ.re B' s rameCid.es in tort or c ontro.ct? ··' 
In either at his option. Thus B mny wc.ivo the t ort nnd sue on qunsi-contructual 
principles, or file a motion for ,judgment f nr the building stone • · 
The theory on which o. contra.ct o.ction is brought by e. n()tice of moti on f or judgment 
is tho.t in order to koop A fr om being unjustly enrichod the law will imply a. promis e 
to pay B f'or the proporty. 
29. · To an action for pers onal injuries not fo.tn.l, tho d ofendunt plo ':1.ds that the c uusc 
of action did not o.ccruo wi hin 2 y oc.rs. Soon ufter the inflictio~1 ef ~he in:fH:eti GR 
of the injury the defendant l oft tho Stnto in on1er. t .:J es co.pe hoin£; sued nnd did not 
r oturp until just beJfor.c• you sued. . IIow does this r}.ffoct his plea, and how would you 
r o.iso such nn issue on tho plc~Ylin gs? 
If dEJf'ondo.nt vrn.s a resident of this State un~l l oft nfter tho notion uccruod,. there~ 
by · obstructing suit, the time out of stn.to would nr.1t . he counted o.s any po.rt of the 
total time. See Y# 8-33. 
/ As to the method of raising such nn i s sue, Rulo 3:11 r ond.s in part, ·"If a. plea set 
~p new matter u.nd c onto.ins W()rds expressly requesting a r eply tho o.dverse party shall 
vyithin ·21 daye fil e n r eply admittin g or denying such new matter. If it does not con-
tain .such words the .nlleg:3.ti ons of new mnttor shnll be t".ken n.s deni ed or "tvoided with o~t further plemdin&;•" 
30. To .on notion on nn ordinary note not under sonl, th e. defondant ple<:tds thnt tho 
c011se 0i' uction did not accrue within fivo year s •. You wish t o pr ovo o. new -promise . in 
writing within that time. · How do y (J U raise this question on the plead ings? 
;rJ/: 8-26 .provides that if the ;jl n.intiff'' s action be on tho original · cause of action , 
and tho defenclnnt ploo.ds the stDtu.to 0£' limi t nt ions , tba y: lrdntiff shall be a llowed t o 
r oply ·s p0c io.lly such, promise, or ho may, without r eplying spociully, show such promise 
in evirlonce t o r opo.l tho bur of thu plcn , provi<.!.ed ho sh':1.11 hnvo gi ven the defendont 
reo.sonablo. notice before· tho trio. l of his intent i 0n t r:: r o l y on such promise . 
31. A fire insurrulCo 
own or, .. ..''loss , if any 1 
property for .$1~000). 
you sue.? 
policy f or 
payablo to 
The h•Juse 
$1,000 on a house worhh $1,500 i s i ssuod .to A, the 
B o.s h is interest mr:~.y a prou.r." (B holds a. lion on th 
ie t ot aUy dostr ~.Jyod by fire • . I n whose name would 
· By V=/J:. ·5'5-22 B mey bring th12J ucti on in his ovm nEJmo s i nco tho ccmtro.ct was meant for 
his ··bonaf'it in whmlo or in ':' c~rt. A c C~uld suo bccnuso h(; i s the ·pn.rty who mo.do the 
contra:c~ .. Thus .eithr:)r ( but' net both) c vuld su0• .and aoch would hold o.ny money rec ov-
. 11 ored: iC·j:>e.,l.mg.ing. t o the other CHJ trustoo for sueh othor. . . · & ~ ~ "' /i t~ u.. ..;..: 32..., -, to::c.Q.-·briefly when, .h aw and why fl gucrdinn ad litorn i s a~)po intod , o.ncl.. hLS duties. 
Whcmpn .. i.nfant or insane person f or whr:,:n no c :nnmitt oo ho.s bcon n.ppointed is sued, 
n. guordinn--ad . litem is · O.j)p0irJt orJ . How'? By cle.rk, juclgo 0r c ourt. Why?· BeC!U.lse tho in-
f'u.nt . or insanE> per s.on is not duomeclC'o.'pao l o of pr otecting his interO"Sts. Outies·? To 
d.ofend tho particular suit hr ~mght . in av<:: ry l et;itimnte ·mnnnor s o os to ·pr otect the 
rights o.f his ward. f~ 1~ua.rdian o.d litem i s under thu contr ol of the court in which 
o.ppo intod und ·may 1Je SWllJll...'Lrily d i cmi ssed f or cnuso. 
' f. cJ_, PLE.@D~G ~~'\fD PRJ'.CTICE 07,. 
j/f:1!f ;:- . ;~·~.,._ Y<Tho:t is a 11ext "friend and what o.ro his duties? 
~·>.n inf::J..nt, or insane person for. whom no committee l1as be.on appointed; suos by next 
.frLmd, His duties nre to -diligently pros..scute the suit,- l:l.nd to look out ft~r his 
ar,rd ' s iritorests therein. · · · 
:55. In nn notion for libel or slander, cc.n the truth of the defamatory words be prov-
0r, undo:r thu genernl is sue? .. 
No . T"h0 Rules abolish the general isslw. ~:..·At oommon law in Ul'l action on the Co.se 
'l.nything, mo.y te shown under the general issue of not~_guilty except statute of limitat-
11. J. ons, truth to nn a.otion for defamation, and dis.chn.rge in bnnkruptcy. 
/tf~ \~ . 
36. Up t 0 whnt time can a plaintiff in a.n action n.t law amend his notice of motion· 
for ,ju:lgmont as of right? 
Huh 3:13 provides that no amendment shall be mndc to c.ny ple ad ing after it is 
f'ilod s o.ve by le1.1V8 of court. f 
Note: By yjf B-119 a. .court may at rmy timo hi furbhf.lrance of justice, 'm1d upon such 
t0rmr.> as it may deem just, pe:rnni t any pleading to be :31Tlende(l. Tho court must 11t every 
ntage of the proceedings, disreg4rd any orr or or defect which does not o~ffect the sub• 
stantinl rights -of the parties. Of course no amendment will be permitted under this 
section which changes tho entire theory of the case. 
37. On demurrer, what d0i'ects in pfeadings f'.re not to no regarded? 
Except as to pleas in abatement, all defects of f orm are to be disregarded. By V# 
8-109 no clemurror shall bo sustained to . a declaration in neglit;once because the facts 
O"ftho negligence are not st :1.tod . · 
""--40. From what interlocutory decrees in cho.nceqr co.n on appeo.l bo taken? 
By V/f- 8-462 an o.ppeal is :1llowed from tho following int erlocutory decrees: (ij__DB.-
c..r.oe di:ssolving on injunction. · Example: pondint the conclusion of' o. hard fought div-
orce case tho court enjoins tho husbund from disposinG of cert :cin prop~rty. :Before the 
iivorce co.se is finally determined the court dissolves this in,junotion·. An appeal lie 
(2) Decree or order r:equ.irJ. mone to be aid · (3) Decroe or order requiring possess-
ion or title to propert;v.: to he cha."l "'ecl. Exrunple: Appo n men't o rece :Lver pending fino. 
detormino.tion of rit;hts. ( 4) j)ecr oo or order ndju.:liontine princj pl es of the case. 
Example: Court decidos case:' is not barred by ~uehos and p:rocoods with srune. 
1. The Court of Appeals of Virginia has bef~re it o.n apponl in a chancery cause, and 
::t writ of or or in a. suit ut b.w in which the ovi<lenco hils buon c ')rtifiod. What is th 
difference in the consid0r q.tion of thci evidence in these two cases by the- court? 
Barton's ChoncGry Practice 3rd Ed. r• Q71 roads, "Tho .findings of o. connnissioner 
will be given groo.t weight o.nd though not o.s conclusive O.'S _tho verdict of u jury~ they 
will be sustained unlecs plo.inl~r unvrorrunted by tho Qvidenco. This rulo opern.tes with 
particular force in on nppellntc court whero tho findin~~ s of the comm~ss'ioner have bee 
npprovod by the court below, but if the findinr,s u:ro diSi)pprovod by the chancellor, 
thoy will be rego.rded merely n.s o. circtLmstimco , . of mor-o or l oss weight, to bEJ consid-
ered with the evidonco in testing tho correctness of tho dGcision of tho court." 
In tho co.so a.t lc,w tho fi nd ings of fo.ct by the jury, or by tho judge ~r~ere there wo.r 
no jury, will not be <iisturbod unless plninly contrnry t o any rea.sonablo '"V:iew of the 
evidence. Everything not in c 0nflict with · the evid<:mce is o.drni ttod O.hd o.ll r en.sonoble 
inferences o.re drawn to su pport the findings of th<1 cqurt bolow. · 
43. A clr.dms his ex emptions n.s householder nnd h 1J :d of o. fumily in personal · property 
v o. lued o.t $1,500 and in n. hous o o.nd lot vo.lued t!.t $500. Ho consUI'les o.nd usos up the 
whole of tho personcll property s o sot o.pnrt us· his exemptions ~1 nd then aoquiros. othor 
personal property worth $1,200 . His creditors seek to subj oct this property to their 
debts, . and he cla ims it a.s cx er.1pt. Cru1 the creditors subjl~ct it to thoir dobts'l 
Yes, Once used U? th\:3 homestoucl exemption is cone f'Q r O'I!EJr. lhd he merely reinvest· 
od tho original exerapt proporty it woul.:l still havo boen oxernpt. 
45 • In Doc0mbor, 1949, Cho.r lus Jones 0:tecutes u.nd (]eli vr_.rs n de eel of trust on a flock 
of 100 sheep to secure t ho Bnnk of Eoxinf:ton in tho sum of $400. "There is an increo.se 
in the fl0ck to the .extent of' 75 lombs , o.nd on June 1, 1950, r.t judgment or oditor of 
,Jones levies o.n execution on tho lnmos for hi s judGment. Whoso ri ghts o.ro prior o.s 
betwEJen the bank und tho judgment cr0ditor? 
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Y!Jhful0 tlwrt! is a c 'Jnflict of authority 6n this ill~tt er tho Virginia view is that -the 
rr,or·cgat;c eovers thu flock in its gr aduil.ll;v c~o.nging chare,ctEi r both a s to increas e a.n c~ 
\.l ocro.ase . Thus tho bank's. rights are prior. . , . . 
'r.G8 Who.t is the offico of a petition in a pending suit in chancery? 
A potitj.on in a pending suit in chnncary may be filed by a person not a party who 
:'r..s intorvst;ed in tho results and wo.nts to bo roude a party, for the purpos e of ussert-
i.ng:. o. right or soelsing relief therein. V# s· .. l26; Rule 2:15. 
• l ' • 
· 
1±7. What principles :~·govern . a. court ~f equity in doter~dnin(i whether it will set as ide 
rJr c onr' irm a judicial s a le? · · . . 
Two apparently conflicting principles govern. One principl·:3 is that the property 
should bring a.s much a s ~~ossible so as to do justice to deffmdo.nt and his crEtdi tors. 
Tho othor principle is _that nothing should be dono to· di1Jcoura;:·;o . tho public fr om bid-
. ing at such . D a.los. If ov ary one who gets o: bargain is d<Jpri ved tho.reof by the courts 
thor O will soon be no bidders. So a ~ulo win ·not ·be s ot as ide , if it has bee:.n duly 
held, 1.mloss tho price is grossly inadequl\t.) ~ If sor.'loone c0mes along with a. higher 
. bid in tho mon.ntimo ( a.r1 up.set bid) the court mo.y, if tho bid is s ubstantially higher 
'illd tho upset bidder accounts for his failure to bid before, allow the. new bid, upon 
the new bidder giving bond that he v<lill keep his btd open, and after gi vinr, tho prior 
bidder a ohonce ·to meot the new bid. 
' . 
48. Tho Front Royal Nc\tional B:..\nk obta ins a · judgnent aglli na t William Reid in tho Cir-
cuit Court. of Rappahannoc k C ounty~ Reid bc irig a. rt~sill ont of· tho.t county. Roid owns no 
personalty, but he is the ownor of a ·tr <.:tct of l r:1.nd in War r en County. l'he bonk employs 
you t 'o subject tho l and t o tho lion of' its judgment • . Whore cuuld you proceed? 
Soe 6 Query 2, ( a ), (d). So tho answer is oithl:lr pbco as tho venue sta.tute is ctm 
ula:!:iivt~ in this situation. 
49. James Smith, William Lowis, · J ohn M•Joro r.nct Cho.rL:s J onos j oint ly execute c. bond 
for *1 ,000. Smith o.nd Lewis becc"Jme insolvent o.nd J ones is compollod to pny th~l entire 
s um. Jones employs you t o protoct hir:> rights. Sto.tos (1) How would you pro,.::eed? 
(2) From whom and.wlH~t amount w·,Juld. y ou r ecove r? 
The romedy e.t l aw is ine.doqunte becf.l.use at lr.1.w Mc.oro could. only bo held on an impl:i. 
promise to pay his pro•ruttt sh!:1.ro. So the proc edure shcul d b0 by bill in equity. 
Could r ooover $500 .from Moore :ln o. ~~ourt d' cc:uity. Soe O'lsos cited ·in 2 DigE)s t 945 • 
.... .. 50 • . Williron Johnson is on~c.god in the morcn.n.tilo husinoss, and his assets consist of 
o. s.took of .merchn.nd is o o.nd n debt owing him by .tho Southern R~ilw::ty C0mpo.ny. On Juno 
1st the Luro.y Supply Compmy obtains <..t jud gmont nl!; ninst him for $ 500, · upon whi.ch the . 
clerk ti.ssues an ox ocuti<;m nncl del ivers to tho sheriff tho sn.me day . On Junu 4th J ohn-
son mnkos et ge-ner e l dood of o.adr.;runont, conv<3ying hi s •Jntir o s t ock Fl.nd all his· debts 
tho.t mey b e owinr, hiln t o n. trust ·;; o for the . ::,onofi t of a ll his crcdi tors, . which n.s s i gn-
mont is f orthwith r ocordocl. On Jun.:; lOth the sherrif l ovics hi s execution on the stoc 
of merohfll'ldis c , o.nd on t he sarno (}ny ho gn.rnishoos tho R_;o.ilwo.y Compr.ny. What are the 
rights of' the · ju.igment crod :j.tor u.n rl the trustoe , r ospoctivoly? ).·,.,-r- The Luray Supply Comp 11ny wouic bo o.hcrtd o.s r og!.trds t.ho t .:.tn .;ihle J?rnporty, and the 
I: CJrv.,./ nssignee o.s regards tho riebt. At the moment the ox ocuti"n pr ooEJss wo.s pla.cod in the 
i'.J /), . shorif'f.' s hands he wo,s bound t o put th.c. dnte nn·:~ hour on tho bt\Ck th '-' ·:·oof • . At tho.t 
1 ' ' moment FJ. lien atto.ches on r.Lll t :m gi bl o an~l intanp.;i1) l e pers on1:1l pr :'l.porty. Wh en the 
·y levy is actually made thf) lion is c lim:hod , llr>.cl f' a iluro t 0 mo.ko tho lovy bof or o tho 
r e turh da.yof tho exe cution _l:'rocess annuls tho li en. 
The rule a.s ' t o prop .:: rty capo.blc of bEJ int; l evied Ui-"on is that the lion hEl.s pref or enc 
oven o.go.inst o. bonFJ. ficl o purcha.sor .foz:o vo.luo ~ · Cn.vo cl.t .emptor. · 
But clobts cannot be l e.viod UJ:.o rf. Tho ruio · us t o s uch property is that a.n a.ss ignmer 
.for va.luo to o. bono. fiU. o pur ch asor for v nluo .bofor o go.rnis hmont ·pr oceedings hnvo been 
t aken t ukos precedonc ~ over tho execution lion o I n Virs inin. u oonvoyan ce t o pny or 
soouro o. pro-existing debt i s one tor vc.luo . Soo Burks 4/=373 (4th Ed.) · 
51. Char l es Morris i s tho he,.,d. of' a f nmily o.nd o. r osi -:-lout of' J efferson County, W.Va. 1 
he owns o. ,farm situEl.ted in Clo.r ko Cc:unty, Vo.., vrr;rth rt1)out *1,500 , he o.lso owns person 
o.lty on ,the fo.rm wor.th ~.b 1) ~t $500. Hu ( JWns r!l) 0thci r pr opor tY. anywhere. Tiw Bunk of 
Cl a rka County eo.t ches h J..m J.n Clarke , s ues hi!::. on o. not e f or ~ 500 o.nd obt ains judgment.' 
He consults y ou as t c his right to c l aim the h .Jl1tCSb.l "ld oxcrn _!) t i on. Assumine; thnt the 
noto did not wo.i'tlo t ho homc st0f.\d 1 whnt would you ndvise ? · 
FLI;!JJIN"G AND PRL:; 'I'IG8 
He h.':\s no right to homestea.d exemption , a.s such ex emption is g ivE:n only to r -es i der: 
c•f' this State. . V4/= 34-4. 
-· . 
52o Frar,k Warner institute s an a ction .Ltg_ainst the .Norr-o-llcanC:: ·westo rn Ra.ilway Co:r.1pan; 
fnr ~525 , 000 f'or per sonal injurie;; allv ,od to· ·-rnrve·· b <"en ne(~ lip;ently sustained . Tho jur . 
r wturEs 11 v orrlict for $250 . What a.ro the rights of tho r esp0ctive parties to carry_ 
tho t:a.SiJ to the Supremn Court of Appeals ? · 
Plo.intiff only could n.ppeal. This is a pe cunia!'y matter o.n:l so fo.r as r.L)fondant 
is C:)!'C0rn(Y~ thoro is n~t $300. invol VOd. 
5·1 ; Yfillirun Jone s of W~ren County, holds a note executed by Frank Smith, of Fauquio1 
/ County, fo r the sum of ~ 200. Smith failing t o pay tho n ot e , J ones proceeds by notico 
of rnot i rm f or judgment, catnhos Smith in Warr en, ond . tho sheriff sorves a c6py of th0 
notice on him. When the caso is calle d. Smith 1 s nttorncy moves to d ismiss for tho l ad 
of jurisdiction. What should be the <!l r dor of the court? · . . 
Sin co .Smi th does not r e s i do in 'Pfi1:treu County1 that Count y doos n ot. c;et jurisdiction 
by virtue of V# 8-38, "First, W1wrein n.ny of the defend ants r es id e ." 
WJ.1.ero no pl a ce of ·payment is ·expressed in the not e the pl o.ce of payment by the wei .~ 
oi' author ity is the maker ' s r esidon ce - or ,pl uce ·::> f bus iness. 8 C.J. 567. But parol 
0videnco wou l d be admi ss ible t o es t ci.bl:Lsh th;~t it wn.s ngroed thnt it should be paid 
at the payee 's rosidcmce . Assmning s uch . IU1 agr eement, them the cause of action arose 
i n We.rron county and ur~J.cr V=//= 8-39 that .is a. pr op,~r c ounty i n which t o sue pr ovided 
s orvice ca.n be ob:ta.ined on Smith in Warren County as was done in this cas e . So Smith ' 
motion should be overruled . In the r.:tbso~lGe _-of D.ny agr eement as to t he p l ace of paymor. 
the pr oper venue would be Fauquier County. But t h is is a ma.tte r of venu e and not 
jurisd iction-i. e . Smith i s privileged to h ave· the case triod in Fauquier County pro-
vided ho insists on his rig:ht t o h avo it triod thor c . Wher o tho proper · vonue de pends 
..J.- as her e on n que.stion of fact tho pl n,intiff is· entitled to hav o that fact put in issuC' 
J>!t.a· _, b- J by a plea in abat ement. He nco Smith'S· r.totion t o dismi ss f or b.ck of jurisdiction 
"-~01.#" ~ ' should be dismissed o.s th::1.t would n <) t r.c tho r.r 0por way to t es t venue. Note: If tho 
(JJ'-""- matt er involved jurisd iction in the strict· scinso. r ath or thrm v onue only then a motion 
P,b- to dismiss would bo pr oper. Ex-:unp l e : X sues Y i n o.n actionof' e j e ctment in o. trial 
j ustice court. y mov e s t o disr.iss for l1\ck of jurisd i ction . 'rho motion should be 
gr unt ed . 
55 . A., B and C· are ,j c int t ort-feasors arrtins t D. The l ntter o l octs t o sue A and obt- . 
ains a j udgment f or ~ BOO. It l ater deve l ops that A is inso l vE-nt and tho judgment 
crmnot bo pai rl . Can D sue B nnd C or eith,, r of them? 
At com.rnon l aw a judgment a(r,a ins t ono j oint t ort-feasor r o l oo.sGd tho othe rs on o. 
theory that the ir li nbility W!;',s 0xtinguishod by m0r ger ip tho judgmont . In our 1919 
r oversi•)n Jir gini:'-_ chanl;ed the r ul e. Vi/: 8-3G8 prov ides tha t the pl a intiff may pr oceed 
O.(l;ains t to:fot-f0Qsors seVi)r ally or ,i oint ly, ~nd that sat i sfaction of the. jud,gment o.s 
<lictinguished f r om jucl.t;Eiont only, dischuq ;os th0 others. . 
Note : If one j o i nt tort-fc ~\sor i s fo rG ed t o pay tho ontiru ,judg1;10nt V=//= 8-627 pro-
vides t hat contribution among wron r;- doers mny be enforcod whor e ·th\:J. wrong is a mor e 
act of noglige;nce and involves no f1lPr et l tur piturlo . 
57 . Whon moy an i ssuo out 0f c[,r:nccry bo o:vr~rdod in nu equity suit? 
In any co.s e in which oith .~ r _rc· rt~' dom!ll1ds it wh en th0 e::vi don ce on o. materia l po int 
is in conf lict. FurthGr moro :i.f' tl:wr.o is (1, squ ar e conflict in tl-w ovidonce tho c ourt 
of its own motion should dir Gct a n i ssue vut l'f chur:cEJry. _.iil so whor e a plea is enter-
. od as a p l oa raises only on0 quostion . of fact , and wher o it i s n oc osso.ry to inquire 
as t o the amount of d~~agos o 
58 . '1JVho.t control h~s the court ovor V\:r <lic t of jury on nn i ss ue out ' t f · chancery , . and 
a l so a verd ict of jury in n comr:toll 18.' 1 cnse ? 
In theory the v erdict o f' a jur y which c1 ec i des nn i ss uo r)ut c f' ~hancery is purely 
ndvisory 1 but C.S a I'l3ttcr Gf r r rwt i oo it is nlmos t . O.l WflYG f ollowed. . 
In t he case of a conn,m l nw suit the V(.; r 0i.::t of the jury shouU only be ov erturuod 
when i t i s · clearly contr ary to t he evid t::::!Ce upon nny r e::son:1hl e view t o.kon . All facts 
not cover ed by the .euiden co unc~ ~~11 i n f erenc:os tha t C!.ll1 !-,e f~lirly drmvn from the ev-
i denc e n,ust· be c c ns i dcn·od to bo in favo r o f Hl(~ v "r d i ct. But if no verdict could poss · 
i b l y r oo.s:Jnc,bly bo s~stuinod t M cvurt rr. o,y ont or jucl[;J:i.Ol1t non obs tante VE:l r ed icto . 
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53 . V\Jhat _. pourts have juri6dict:Lon to entertain a ... suit for collection of a lost bond 
o1· note ?' •· . . 1. ., 
In absence · of statute only courts of equity, as no profert of the bond could be mac 
:,_ncl a lost note might be in the hands of a hold er in due course. By ·v=/f 8-517 courts 
af law are given jurisdiction and must reqUire .an indemnity bond the condition of whil 
:~s to save h.armle.ss the defendant .fr-om lass if he is compelled to pay to som~ other 
. ~ -~ . 
person. . . 
Note the principle or.ought out by the case of ' ic~bler v. Spe'nuer, 114 Va 589, 11Court 
of equity have juris~r(ction to enforce p·a::vmerrt of a lost bond, and althoug h courts of 
law· aro given .jurisdiction by ·this : soc~ion·, it is well :s'ottled that courts of equity, 
ha.ving . once . ac.quired jur.isdic..tion .never los e it b e cause juris-diction of the same matt· 
e:rs are g~ven to .courts of law, unless ·-the . statute conferring s uch jurisdiction us es 
pl"'11ihitory or- ·restrictive··words." · 
'- 60. What w:ould·y.ou say as to .. the-. co.nciu.s.:i:veness of record in the followfng cases: ( a ) 
A judgment in o.n action of debt was based upon process serv ed upon the defendantcts wif 
the return upon· which - proces s did not s t ate that the· d.o..fondant was not· found .at his 
usual place of '.lbodo. (b).In salo. of infant' s land in suit by his guardi.an , a decr e e 
of sale r~i't-6d · thnt· the gu.ar.dian _ ad litem f iled answer for tho inf ..tin:t.. and in.. pr-oper 
pers.on .. as required, but somo year s l ate r an a t torney exrunining ·title to the lnnd and 
looking "throu.gb.- tb.e ·p-ap-ers· ·in- the .. s.ui:t .(whi ch suit had been final .and .di.srnis.so.d fr om 
'bhe . . cioo.ke.t . f.or <:tt l on.st ten years), wa.s not ab l o to find crither a nswer among . the paper 
in the sui~ .Could . the -attnrncy examining the tit.le r e ly upon the r-eo±tal. in .t-l;le--d.e -
oree -t1\e;t the answers in questi on ha.d baon ... filed? 
(a) --Ass.urn.ing·-that .:this ·was. . a.jud.gment by default it· would be void~ fur ·· the dei'ect 
iS:~ appa.r-ent ·on .the f fice of 'tho 12rocoss... and ·tho service was--not .pers.onal., but. s.ubs.ti:t-
ut.io~. . . 
Note ·· 1. ~ -s:trppose-t-he. _o:ff'i-c·e r had··not· serve.d- -tho-·proce-ss ··at. nll, but .. ha.d... .. ond.ors-ed... . .it 
-so -t..hn.t .· .on -±ts f ace it seems to h ave beon r ogularly serve d'? · Tho_rule in Virginia is 
that tho reco:rd~..j;mparts... . .ab.s.oluta "-verity, _ and n judgment . bf.l.sed thDreor: . .is-·good.. . . Tho· 
rot.w:n..--cn.nn.ot b o diroctly or collatoro.lly ·attn.ckod . See Burks, p. 98,. .. 4th Ed. 
· . 'Note 2: :rt-the--wr-±t--±toolf is valid nnd the s ervice -per-sonal (i. e .. . nOt--s.ubsti:t.a:tion 
~gment-re.nc:Ler.ed on defuct±vc··~mce.. is . not void , but vo.i..dahl.e -<lnly~...and .cannot 
be-:.ccllat-orail.;y:.. ... o..ss.ai.lccL..._...Examp.l.o.: .An offic er .-s.e.rvos the ·-,.,rit on X, personauy--·but 
no'g) ec:ts.. to endor-s-e the time or man:i:ler- of ·e..orv:ico.. This .dc.f.oct must--be---takfiD-.ad:vantag 
of.:. if·--a.t-all.,.. by-- a:--ploa. .,. ..in_.a:but"'ment. . · 
. · ""Noto.. .3-:. Former-ly--if .n pnrty .. du.fuctive:ty·· s ervod....en'Wred-. .nn --appec:trance-- ottrerttrnn--a-· · 
¢pe.c.;lal- o.n.a._;t::or .. ·th.o-s.Q)..D· -purpos.0--.of obj e cting to tho defective sorvice , h e was deemod-
~o ho.ve wai.Yod--the·-<iB.f.e.ct. But Rule· 3·: 6 now r ciruls- in part, "A pl&a.._.;i.n ... .u.bat-enrent-or 
~rh:rt.iarr~s.s_ .nM.d. ... .not be fil od upon o. sp.e.cin.l ·nppenrance , and may~ be_£..i.l.Eui 
PR tho dc:C.ondout j n --pr opor pGi--s-On- or by · cou.ns...e.L." · 
'(b)~ .. a gonoral-prcrpori.ti.on...an-.. o.t torney oxo.mining -tills . .is--srrf.e ... in ·re'lying. .. npon 
~tut'OS" tho st~ps h av e b o..en -takon .When those steps.. · ore....all _tb..a:t __ are r e -
.q~ _ _Th.is.-..c.~ea.tfte-n.-p:r-es..umption ·-t.hat t hoy hnve-tak.on. . thelJ'l. 
' 6.~~1-er-to- t:ako. ..;!ldvanto:gc in --thG--·-appa.ll o.t~·· c ourt · o.f . o. wr(mg- ru.l.inC&f' ... the--t r±-ar 
c~,._ .in,. not porm~ t ting tho ~i tne..s.s . to rm:::wo:: ,n. qut7S.ti.on,.-what must the r ecord s how 
~one-m--ttr&-tr:t:a.l ..:co.urt WJ.th a .. .. JTJ: ew to -br~ngmg ··tho orror- -oofm-e-t~ 
'Note.....o.n_ex..ae'f:ltion . T!lk.o -witrres.s out of court room-a.nd ··find,_ ::ulS-wer he would have 
. ~~m-y so thn:t---it ··mo.y· nppe-ar whethor.-...or-not t be ·etr or-Of"""the::.:tr:i:al-
court, iLlJ,ny , wo.s prejudicin.l. St at e . whDt wo.s oxprJc t ed to- b&--provmi ... .by:..)lim. 
"Npjry> :..l:~en--~itness i s r-ejuct-od on account .. f his- in.comp0toncy, ..it .. is~ 
~--whut. it·- i-s·--ex.pactud.. to provr~ by· him . The objt;ction-to.::h.is=-·:campetency . 
'jmp] 1 fl4.mab:rr;j olttJL..,.....nnd tira:t.J1C> .. i s adverse . 11 · Burk~ -#305 .. . ~4th Ed.). · · 
( 
_ · 62. !~ _a_.dc.fo.n.dtll1t in . o.·ctio.n -Tf' debt d esired to offer pr oof' o-f peyment..-or-~:f:.r--· 
whubc must--n.a .d.o be'f'orv .. i ssoo is. j oined f or tho trinl of the c11so? 
_ ·~By Rul e 3:8 -ho . ..lD.llSt· within 21. d £.:.y s nftor s En·vico on him of thu- no.ti~c .of ·:motiolL..for 
j-udgment-p'lemLhis- set·-C'Jff n.s ·.1. countor c l n.im . If th.o defense is payment ho must plen.d 
/ \ ~t ._r~ocin.lly by fil.ing;_hie · grounds of dofens.o n.s per Rul e 3:7. 
'.}A'!- ~S. Who.t -is ·nooos so.ry to aup?ort n. ploo. of r os judico.t .ro,? 
(1)- That the i ssue i nvo l ved in the second pr oceeding v:o.s nocesso.rl ly involved- ·in- th 
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f i r s t • . (2) That former pro.9oeding was bofor:f:1 a court of' competent jurisdiction. (3) 
'l'hat the issue is· botweontho srune parties or. t,heir privi es. (4) That the re was no 
fraud or collusion ·in the former proceedings (5) In ·.the. -cas.e -of· a civil action that 
thO l'C was a final . judgment or decree. In a criminal case that the proceedings went 
a s f ar as impanelling and swearing of the jury and charging then with the . issue i.; o, 
fo r1:1o r jeopardy. . 
i 6 6~ What is meant by a case _agreed? And state the proceedings thereunder. 
It is a substitute for a s'l;ieci.al verdict and is treated in the same manner. It 
co.nsists of o.n agreed statement of facts and no facts are to be inferred that are noi 
set forth in this sto.tmnent. The duty of the judge thon is to apply the law to .the 
facts and render his decision accordingly. 
67. What is the leC'..ding difforcrice bet'vieen a plea in abn:~oment and a plea in b.ar? 
A plea in bar is a plea to the mf:iri ts 9f tho case whereas a plea in abatement has 
nothing to do w.ith tho merits of the case, and,· if successfui, only causes delay. 
Problem: What, if a~ything, is wrong with the following ·plea in abatSijlont? 
In. the Circuit Court of York County . \ 
c---c~----) . . 
) Plea in Abntement. 
n----.:.n~----) 
The saicl defendant comes and s ·o.ys thp.t thfs court. ought not to hn.vo or tako · o.n~ 
further cognizance of tho action !l.foresn.id. of the said plaintiff' because the said 
-defendant says that tho supposed cause of _the said n.ctiun did not, nor did any part 
thereof, arise in the s rdd c ounty of York and of this' the said dofendnp.t puts himsel5 
upon the country. , · . . ~ . 
lJIIherofore he pr nys judg:nont wheth0r this· court can or will take any further 
cognizQnc e of the action aforesaid. 
J.G.E., p.d. 
(a) It should conclude with "And this tho defendant is ready. to verify" and not 
with· putting himself upon tho country. . · ! 
(b) It s ijoilld nn gotiyo ol J ather g~~ of jurisdic·:t;.ion; in this case it should 
sta~e that defendant is not a rosidGnt of York · County. · 
(c) It should give plaintiff a better \vra __ i.e. it should set ·forth facts .that 
would show plaintiff . in what county he should proceod. 
(d) It should 'be verifi<;Jd by aff idavit n.s all pl oas' in ·abatement are required by 
statut0 to be so v erified. . · . . . 
Note: By Rule 3:6 a plea. in abatement iney be filed hy ·tho defendant in person or 
by counsel. · · 
70. In what c~unties' or corpqra.tions mny non~roi> :ident . def~nd ants · be sued1 
< In the case of non.:.residents suits may bo brCiught whoro ·over they can be ser.':vod 
:with prowess in Virginia. . in the case· of transitory actions.t or wher0vor h~ he.e prop-
/ erty or debt$: :hie_ -~ l:-il:;l : in this St::1.t0o :r·: :t: · . . ·~ 
72. A picks up .a loaded gun, believing it to be unloaded, and, though warned that it 
may be ·ioaded, points it at B. The gun goes of f a.nd kills ·· i. (a) What crirne,- if nn~· 
does A cormnit? (b) Suppose B to be merely wounded? V'lhnt crime if any ·does A commit? 
( a ) Manslaughter (b) Probe,bly none, but possibly assault and' battery on the theor; 
that the conduct of d·ef~mdant was rockies s n..''ld wont on o.nd hence equivalent to intent· 
ional. 
73. In the ln.tter cuse ( tho.t is, the wound.ing) suppose thnt the occurence was.-in F 
C~unty on February 6, · 1950, th::-.t A live d in 11 County, r..nd left F County right after · 
the o.ccident.· .If you advis Gd any proct:Jedings, whnt notion would you bring? 
Not·ice of motion for judgm(mt as p0r Rulo 3:3• 
74. In what court would you bring it? 
It might be brought in oitbor county. · Sinco n tort is involved servioe could be 
sont out . ofF County toR County. 
75, Suppose that you are employed on Tuosday, February 14, 1950, that a term of the 
cour t having jurisdiction begins on the fourth Monday in February (the 27th), und 
another on the fourth Monday in March (tho 27th). Which term could iVOU catch o.nd why 
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Since the defendant must be given 21 days in which to file responsive pleadings it 
will not be possible to reach a February term of court. If defendant files his 
grounds of defense within the 21 days the case will be sufficiently matured to be 
docketed for the March term. But if defendant pleads in abatement or demurs such plea 
would be disposed of in the March term of court and further progress of the s uit 
would depend upon what additional time the Court allowed defendant in which to file 
his grounds of defense. 
Outline of Speps in Trial ~ Case at Law 
·10 1. Preliminary to trial: . 
r A. Filing in clerk's office a motion for judgment and a copy for each def,endarit· pay 
ing the required writ tax and deposit against costs. Rule 3:3(a). . .. . . ·" 
B. Clerk prepares the Notices of Motion for Judgment <l:~:;..:,attaches a NO.~ice--·to each 
copy of the I'1otion for Judgment. These combined papers ''constitute_,:the-·motion for judg 
ment 1vhich the clerk delivt3rs for ser\ric_e .atr' p'laintiff !TlaY" direct. 
C. Service, and Return on a p~per. ,. styled "Proof o~·- S"'ervice11 within five days after 
___ . th~-~;r_!:j,~~:t;._~ervice l:l.POn -any- ·party as__p,eY Rule 3:4. 
D. · Within 2I'"'·~dayq-' Cir· service· geferictaiit must file his responsive pleadings. If this 
pleading is a demurrer oy~ ~l~~-~n abatement and is overruled in due course he must 
file his groun<:l~td>f- ·defense within whatever time the Court orders him to so do. 
E. C.ase.- dock'eted and set for trial. F. Pre-trial conference. 
. II. ·~trial. 
A. Case called. E. Instructions given Jury. 
B. Jury Impanelled. See Note l,infra F. Closing arguments-Plaintiff Defendant 
C. Opening Statements-Plaintiff Defendant Plaintiff 
first-then defendant. G. Jury retires. H. Verdict. 
D. Introduction of Evidence--See I. Judgment--Is ipso facto a lien on real 
Evidence, 19. property. 
III. After Trial. 
A. Execution-Lien on personal property as discussed in question SO,supra. 
B. Levy. C. Sale. 
Note 1. Each side has a constitutional right to a trial by jury, but the court may 
~ try the case unless a jury is demanded. "A common law jury was a ,jury of twelve, but 
. :J """~ I by the Virginia Constitution there may be a jury of not less than seven in cases not 
cognizable by a justice of the peace at the time the Constitution was proclaimed, or 
not less than five in cases so cognizable. Provision is also made for a jury of three 
by consent of the parties entered of record, each party to select one, and they to 
select the third, and it is provided that any two concurring shall render a verdict 
in like manner and with like effect as a jury of seven. · 
Note 2.Service of process on natural persons, residents of Virginia. This may be 
(l)on defendant . himself if found anywhere in the officer's bailwick, or(2)substituted f,u ._ns. service. This is of two kinds: (a)on the consort of the defendant or on any member of 
his family above the age of sixteen. If served in this way the fact that it was so 
served and the fact that the defendant was not to be found at his usual place of a bod 
must be endorsed on the process, and also the further fact that the purport of such 
process was explained to the one on whom the notice was served.(b)If no one is found 
above the age of 16 and a. member of the defendant's household then the process may be 
tacked upon the front door. If served in this manner the possibility of personal 
service, or service upon a member of the household over 16 must be negatived. Note 
_ w~l~ t~t these met2ods are not c~ulative but successive. #o D(, dAt-<i f/&rr/; c;/ ,·.,. Ji·'P . 
77. On the trial the court instructs the jury as follows:"Gentlemen of the jury, I 
instruct you to find for defendant." The jury does so, and the court in due course 
enters judgment. Was this proper procedure? 
No. V#B-218 reads, "In no action tried before a jury shall the trial judge give to 
the jury a peremptory instruction directing what verdict the jury shall render." 
But note well that there are .less summary methods to accomplish the same result. A 
demurrer to the evidence may be interposed; evidence may be stricken; · the trial court 
may set aside the verdict, and in a proper case give judgment non obstante veredicto; 
the trial court may. decline to give any instruction where the evidence would not 
sustain a verdict, and it may in substance direct a verdict by stating in 
. ...... ·· - .... , .. ... 
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an instruction e. · h.ype:__'thatfca:l_:~-tha...jJ.J.ry_~:Lf. __ t,h~_y __ S() __ _'~~l~eV-e_, to · .N.n::l 
otc. 139 Va 618. ~d Rule 3:20 provides that either party may file a motio'n 'for ·s .:. 
-~ary judgment at ~y time after the parties' .are at .issue. If it appears from t~e pl 
mgs, the orders. :1.f any,.. mad~ at the pretr.ial.c.anference. and .the admis.s~ons, ~f :an;, 
in a depositipn-. t!re:t' the moving party is· entitled to judgment, the court shall enter 
ju.dgmi:m:t in his favor. but that.no summary jtJdgmeqt shall be entered if tho amount o1 
dP ... ma ges or any · other material. fact is genuinely in dispute. · · ,-. ' · · ··-_ .. ,.,.,....;.,., 
78. Wbat papers consti~ute the record in. tho app~lla.te court? 
This is governed1by Rule 5sl, · seqtion (3)'e. The.po.pers are ·: 
1. All writs · 14. Opinions of -the judge. · 
2. Processes 15 • . Instructions both. gro.nt;~d ond . .re_fus..od 
3. Returns .. --·-·· --- ·-· .... ··--... when 'properly. initialed. 
4. Reports 16. Exhi.bits whothor admitted or reje~ted 
5'. Pleadings . when proporly initialed. · 
6. Grounds of"DefE~nse 1.7. Oro.l tef;timony o.nd other incidonts of 
7. Bills of Particulars ·the trial or hoo.ring transcribed by a 
8. Noticos reporter and 
9. Depositions . 18. Any _ writtonsto.tements ·of facts, test·· 
10. Stipulations · · imoriy or other incidents of _the case i 
n. Notices of Appeal . the trOJ.1SCript .or ·statement is signed 
12. Assignments of Error the end by Counsel for all parties and 
13. Original drafts of orders~ docrocs tendered to the judge within 60 days a. 
und ~Judgments signod or initialed signed by him within 70 days . a.rter fin 
by the judge. judgment and · 
19. A trn.nscr~pt or stn.tement not signed b 
·. Counsel for nll pn.rties as . per the pro 
isions of subsection (f). 
20. While the vordict of u jury is not 0xp 
ly mentioned it will most corto.inly. be 
part of the record. · 
Comment on· 17, 18 and 19 o.bover ThoBe provisions accomplish everything tha.t was ev' 
accomplished by .the most formo.l bill or certificate of exceptions. 
Que.ry 1. . Tho Court refused . to nllow a. corto.in paper to be o.dmi tted in evidence. D· 
such order- prevent it ·rrom becoming a part of tho record? No. Sub .. pa.rugraph . (a) ex-
pressly provides that nn order r ojocting, striking or ~uppressing a.ll or part of ~ 
paper lodged with the clork shull not h!lve ~he effect of. taking it out of the record 
on appeo.l. . · · 
query 2. What happens ·if the · judge who presided ut t~o trial dies? Sub·s·e.otion 
(g) provides that the :transc.ript may be tenderGd to or signed by any judge· hnving . 
authority to enter· orders ~n tho ca.se. · Comment by Judioio.l Council, ncode section 8-
342 provides for some bu-t not nll situo.tions ' in wh;i.ch the judge who tried the case is 
not o.ve.ilable to sign the transcript. ,The ··present proposal is designed to . (c-over all 
such cases). It allows the transcript to be tender ed to -one judge and signed by a · 
different judge. When~ver p6s~ible the transcript should, of course, bo signed by thl 
judge who presided at tho t'rial. The reo.son for not making it mo.ndo.tory that the tro.1 
cript bo signed by ·the judge .'whenever pas sil?le' is to a.void controversies over wheth( 
it is possible." · 
. ' i 
79. Suppose a caa:e is tevors o_d. and rema.nJ.ed f'o:r a. sooond tria.l. You diScowr that Y' 
principal witness has moved to o. qertain -o.ddress in New York City. How, if at all,; 
co4ld y<iu s.ecure the benefit of his knowledge of the fo.cts?. · 
.Take his d O.positiori after giving adverso pc.rtios due_ notice. 
80. S~ppose h~ ho.d di~d bef~re tho second trial. How, if at all, could you secure tt 
benefit of his knowludge of the fo.cts? 
Under the reported - t estimony exception to tho h oo.rsay rule testimony given by~ wit · 
noss in a formor trial is admissible in o. lnter proceeding which iovolves the same 
partie s and tho srJne issues. 
81. Suppose your client dies before the second trial. How, if at all, does it affect 
your suit, o.nd who.t woul.d you do? 
By Rule 3:17 if ~ pnrty booomes incnpnble of prosecuting or defending because of · 
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death or other cause his successor in interest(in this case plaintiff's personal r et · 
resentative) may be substituted as a party ~n his place. This is done on motion of 
the successor or of any party to the action. 
Note 1: If no suit had been started and death was due to defendant's wrongful act 
then the personal representative of the deceased ma#h;j:r.\W.tute an action for the ben·· 
efit of statutory beneficiaries for not more than ~~2~;ooo under the death by wrongfuJ. 
act statutes also known as "Lord Campbell's Acts11 • V :8-633 et seq. 
Note 2. ~.1 reads in part, "No cause of act1.on or injuries to person or 
property ~be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of 
action existed, provided, however, in such action no recovery can be had for mental 
anguish, pain or suffering,(and)provided(further)that no such action for personal 
injuries, except an action brought by any person under disability at the time of the 
in,jury, may be brought more than two years, after the injury occurred." 
. 82. Suppose the defendant dies b~fore the second trial,_ but the plaintiff does not. 
How, if at all, does it affect your suit, and what would you do? 
V#8-628 provides that any right of act.ion which may accrue by reason of any injury 
done to the person of another, and not resulting in death, by the wrongful act of 
any person, shall survive the death of the wrong-doer, and may be enforced against 
his executor, either by reviving against such personal representative a suit which 
may have been brought against the wrong-doer in his lifetime, or by bringing an 
original suit against his personal representative whether or not the death of the 
wrong-doer occurred before or after the death of the injured party. So the thing to 
do is to revive the suit against the personal representative by motion as per Rule 
3:17 quo·tied above. 
13. 
Suppose for the purpose of this question that the plaintiff dies before the second 
trial, and that his death does not affect the suit. Under what circumstances, if any, 
can the defendant testify on the second trial? 
At connnon law parties and person.<J interested in the result were incompetent witness-
es. Where one party· has died the common law rule as to the other party is still re-
tained in many jurisdictions. But in Virginia, by V#B-286, the surviving party is a 
competent witness but cannot recover upon his own uncorroborated te.s.timony. Note:In 
~h a case interested parties cannot corroborate each other. 
A business man, finding that his debts amount to ~50,000(none of them reduced to 
judgments), and his assets to only $2.5,000, makes a deed of assignment to a trustee, 
securing first two notes to his wife, and son, respectively, of ::plO,OOO each, and 
then, after. their payment, his other creditors pro rata, and authorizing the trustee 
to turn the assets into cash and distribute as above. You have reason to bel:leve that 
the debt '· to the wife and son are not bona fide. You are anployed by creditors vepre-
senting $30,000 to collect their debts. Assume for the purposes of the next four 
questions that the bankruptcy law has been repealed. 
84. Have the creditors any remedy1 If so, what? 
They may bring a creditor's bill in equity, for the purpose of setting aside the 
assignment as a voluntary or fraudulent conveyance. If the debts to the wife and son 
are not bona fide, a court of eqility would set aside the conveyance. Note that if the 
debts .were bona fide the fact of preference alone would not be a sufficient ground fo : 
the setting aside of the conveyance at Common Law. But by V#~-156 no preferences are 
allowed(except to the extent of the value of security given or secured debts) in 
the case of assignments for the benefit of creditors. 
85. If you advise any proceeding, state exactly what steps you would take towards in-
~' r stituting and maturing it from your employment until it is at issue. 
The steps are as follows:(l)File the Bill of Complaint(and copies enough for each 
defendant)in the clerk's office paying the required writ ta.x and deposit against costs 
(a)Clerk issues· subpoenas in Chancery attaching one to each copy of the bill Of comp-
laint{(3)Service of process(subpoena in chancery attached to copy of bill of comp-
laint)and return on a paper styled "Proof of Se.cvice" as set forth in Rule 2:.5(4) 
Defendants file their responsive pleadings within 21 days after service.Rule 2:7~· If 
defendant files pleas in abatement,demurrers or other pleas and these are overruled 
he has 21 more days in which to file an answer or within such st10rter or longer time 
as 
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the c our t may direct. ·Should defendant fail to filo any responsiv!OJ pleading within. 
t he required 21 days the bill is taken as. confessed ex~ept in divor ce cases. (5) If 
pl ai nt iff does .noting more he is d e emed :to havo filed · a. gener,al ropliqfltion,.··· .. i. c . · f:l 
. b ln.nkct .d.enio.l of. everyt.hing +n ,tno·f®sw-or·:'.of'···.pl.ea; Rule 2 :9~ .. 
. -··· ..::.. . . . ·-7-~ ·- ' : 
86 . In such c ases how is the evidence takon? 
It is generally taken by deposition o.fter di:te ' uotice to all po.rtios 'other than t L .. 
0.s to whom the bill is taken as confessed, arid b efore a conun.is.sioner in chancery to 
wh om the Chancellor has reforrod the e:;a:se foi- investigation and r e port, Rule 2:21 
however provides that. . ..:.evidonce may bo heard orally before the court in any cas e ; b\.lt 
if: thoro are d ef endants proceeded against by o'rder of publico.t i on wh9 . h ·ave . not appqar 
ed, suoh evidence shoJ.l be reduced t ·a 1n•iting and pres erve<l a s a pnrt :of the record. 
In other c as es . pres ervation of th0 evideri?e may · be required by the jl.ldge in his . dis-
cretion, 
B7. rs· there any methcd l:y which oh brin~ing your suit, you can secure priority f or 
· your c.lients in the distribution of the assetS in case the litiga.ti on is successful; 
if so1 what? 
A- party instituting such n suit in 0 qui~y g'ets a priority at the time of the insti 
tution of the suit• In order to protect ,hims elf he should filo 
cle~k' s offioe whicih should set f 'orth the namos of the parties, the objects of the 
proceedings, a.nd a description of. the property. · The theory is that one who discovers 
f acts that · r ~dound t o thE! ben efit of o.ll the creditors should, because of his superio: 
diligence ~ have a li en on tho ass ets so d iscovered or freed f1~om liability. 15 C.J. 
441~ Genera lly in other type s . of co.ses. b efor e one co.n r esort t o equity he must h e.ve 
first . gotten B. lien at lnw. In a. c n.so of d0c.th of o. c ommon debtor tho genera:!. cr edit · 
ots, if necessary, ma.y subj e ct the de cedent's r eal pr ope rty t o the pnyment of his deb, 
~ithout ·first getting a lien at l aw, but in .this latter c a.s o no priorities are ~:t;l.lowe r 
91. · Th0~a.lley Trust Co. plo:ce s -in your .hands a ne gotin.ble note , · executed by J ohn 
Smith, and instructs you to obta in judg~ont. Stnte the different r0medies, bo.th a.t 
coronion lo.w and .in Virginia, to which you muy r esort • 
... Debt, .or assumpsit .at c ommon l nw, If under . s eo.l · c ovenant a lso . Now the procedure 
in Virg~nia 'would be by notice of motion f or judgment pursuant to Rule 3:3. 
93. What is the e ff ect of a f aiiure to wnive answer unde r oath in n bill in equity? 
. , At common law it. gives the answer the forc e of evidepc~3 so for as the answer is · 
r e sp6nsive t o tho bill, 'l#.3-123 reads in part as follows, "Unloss .a complainant in 
a s uit in equity shall, in 1i:IS bill, r e ques t o.n unswor or answers under oath ·to cer-
t a in '$peoified interrogntories, t he answer of tho dofond,unt, though under oath, sho.ll 
not be Qvidcncc in his favor, · unless the caus e · be h eQTd upon bill and enswer only. 11 
94 ~ 1~at is meo.nt by marsho.llinG. of as s ets in a court of equity? 
Whore ·.no harm will o0 done t o ono ho l d i ng. a s or.i or i ncumbero.nce, a court of equity 
if it o.lre a.dy has .jurisdiction of the cas e , will r oquir o the holder tti~roof to s a.tisf· 
tha.t incumbere.nce in SUCh. a. WilY a s will do the l OflSt harm to thos e holdinf; junior in .. 
. . . . 
cumberances. 
-ss. In what cases has · the Su r emo Court . o f Appe ~, ls of Virglnin original jurisdiction· 
Mandamus, Prohibition, nnd Habea s Corpus . · Not e that "this jurisdiction, while 
original, is not exclusive.; 
'-96. In wha.t oivll cases has the Supreme ·Court of Ap?eals of Virginia appe llate juris· 
d'iction irrespective 0 ~ the amount i nvolved . in lit.i gati cn? . 
. Even in s uqh ca s e s the right of .o.ppenl i s dl sorotiona.ry. Cas os concerning title · 
.t o or boundar ·i es of land, the condem.1a.tic)n of. pr opo r t y, probat e of a will, a.ppointmeni 
of per~ onal repr es entative , guardian,: 'c ommittee, or curat or, or conc erning. a mill, 
· · r oa.dw:ay·, f erry, wharf, or l anding , or ~ight of· Stnto, county, or muni,cipal o<hrporo.tion 
t o l evy tolls or taxe s, or imrolving t ho c onstructi on of any s tatute pr ordinanc e im-
posing t axes, or by any fina l order, judgment, or finding of tho St nte Corporation 
Connni s sion, irr~ti.J:I:O.:...O f-the-tunount involved, ~ho interlocutory decrees. mentioned 
in question 40, r efU s nl to gr o.nt a writ of quo w~rranto, or by the final judgment of 
.~ sai d writ. Se o V# 8-462. 
'l'he Consitution nl so givos the Supr eme .Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction of 
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of cases involving the constitutionality of any act, and cases affeuting life and 
liberty. Constitution #88. 
97 u What is a bill of review? For what may it be filed? And when is leave of court 
not necessary? What is the limitation on filing a bill of review? 
(1) A bill of review is the only remedy to set aside a final decree in equity and 
ohtain a rehearing in the trial court, if the term of the court at which the ·final 
decree was entered has expired.(2) It may be .filed only in two cases(a)First, to 
correct some error in law apparent upon the record itself, (b)When some material fact 
haa been discovered or has occurred subsequent to the decree. (3) In (2)(a) leave of 
court is not necessary. In any other ease, it is. V#8-613. (4) V#-8-611 provides that 
no bill of review shall be allo·ued to a final decree unless it be exhibited within 
six months next after such decree, except that an infant or insane person may exhibit 
the same within six months after the removal of his or her disability. 
Note: If the proceedings are interlocutory and not final the remedy is not a bill 
of review but a petition to rehear. 
Note 2; Note well that a bill of reviel..r is not in an appellate court l:'U.t is a re-
view of the trial court's own final decree in equity. 
- 99. Can the statute of limitations be taken advantage of in Virginia, either at law 
or in equity, by demurrer? If any exception, state it. 
(1) Where a statu.te of limitations is a matter of remedy it must be specially plead. 
ed. Demurrer will not lie. This is the usual case. 
(2) Where a statute creates and limits a right within a certain period there is no 
right after that period has expired. Here it 1nay be taken advantage of by demurrer if 
the pleading does not affinnatively show that the action was brought in time. 
(3) In ~ny case where the defense of the statute cannot be set up under the plead-
ings, it may be taken advantage of by instructions. See Burks #236(4th Ed). 
101. Under the law and practice in Virginia, what are essential in a demurrer to the 
evidence both on the part of the demurrant and the demurree? 
(1) It must be in writing(2)Set forth the evidence introduced by each party(3)State 
the grounds re],ied upon by demurrant. (4) Must be joined in by demurree. 
102. For what will the court refu.se to compel joinder in a demurrer to the evidence? 
(1) No joinder will be required unless demurrer in writing, (2) where the inferences 
from the demurree's evidence are conflicting, or (3) where it clearly appears it is 
interposed solely for a delay. 
· Quf3ry 1. What is a demurrer to the evidence? A. It admits the truth of the demuree's 
evidence, withdraws the demuz·rant 's evidence in conflict therewith, and allows all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn in favor of demurree and against demurrant axcept 
where demurree's evidence is conflicting and doubtful in which case the issues should 
be submitted to the jury. A demurrer to the evidence takes the case from the jury, 
and leaves it with the court. Yd-8-JAO gives the demurree the absolute right to with-
draw his joinder in the demurrer and to introduce new evidence, or suffer a non-suit, 
at any time before the jury reti res from the bar, and the demurrant is likewise 
given the right to withdraw his demurrer within the same time. If the demurrer is 
overruled the damages are fixed by the jury, and the demurrant 1 s only ren..,Cy is to 
note an exception and ask higher court for a writ of eiTor. 
- ~.- ·, ..- e... F<L-e :-+-s - · r;_ e_.. p,',. c -rl li /:v ~:. 
103. A recovers ~judgment agiinst'B, and execution issues on the judgment within a 
year from its rendition and is returned "no effecto'lby the sheriff. ThBn B dies. 
What are the proper proc eed:Lngs to r evive this judgment against B 1 s administrator, and 
within what time must this proceeding be had to prevent bar of statute of limitations 
Generally the lien of a judgment may be enforced by a bill in equity at any .time so 
long as a valid execution mar be issueJon the judgment.(l)By Code ~6 execution 
can be issued br scire facias or action brought within 20 years from the date of judg 
ment. It can be kept alive perpetually by extending its life by scire facias or 
action brought within the 20 year period. (2 )vJhere the scire facias or action · is 
against the personal representative of a decedent, it shall be brought 
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wi thin five years from his qualifications, thus cutting down the life of a judgmenC-
against a judgment debtor who dies to five years from the qualification of his per,. 
sonal representative, unless within that time the judgment be revived by scire faci c:'.:3 
or action.(3) By V~B-393 no suit can be brought to enforce the lien of a judgment 
against lands which have been conveyed by the judgment debtor to a grantee for value 
unless the same be brought within ten years from the due recordation of the deed frv!r 
such judgment debtor to such grantee • . 
Applying{2)to qu~stion 103 no reviva+ would be necessary until just before the ex-
piration of twenty years or just before the expiration of five years from the appoint· 
ment of a personal r ·epresentative(whichever should happen first). 
109. What statutory substitute is provided in Virgirua for the bill of discovery? 
V#8- 32Q.to 8-326 provide that in any proceeding at law pending before court or 
coclmissione~ party may file interrogatories to adverse party. This does away with 
the necessity of a separate equity suit in cases at law though'pure bills of discover 
have not been expressly abolished. 
/ 111. What is the method of procedure to subject to payment of judgment. the following 
property of debtor;(a)Land;(b)Money in bank;(c)Growing crop of wheat on land_ leased 
for term of years by debtor;{d)Livest.ock(e)Shares of stock in a corporation. 
(a) The judgment is _per se a lien on the land .• A bill to subject the land to the 
judgment ll€n ·is··tbe proper method of. procedure. Note(l)that it is not necessary to 
·exhaust the personal property first in this case and(2)that the land cannot be sold 
if the re11.ts and profits will probably pay o.ff the judgment within five years. 
(b) Have an execution issued on the jud~nent. This becomes .a lien on all personal 
property tangible and intangible. Garnishrrient process is necessary to enforce . the 
lien on debts due the judgment debtor. 
(c) V#B-421,1 provides that no growing crop of any kind(not severed)shall be liable 
to distress or levy except Indian corn, after Oct.l5, and also except sweet and Irish 
potatoes over five barrels after same has been matured sufficiently to sever or to 
market. Hence the remedy nere would have to be by bill in equity. 
(d) Ordinary execution, levy and sale. 
(e) Issue execution. Garnishee the corporation, if it is impossible to get the stock . 
W/13.1-W-4 reads,"A creditor whose debtor i s the owner of a certificate shall be en-
titled to such aid from courts of appropriate jurisdictio~, by injunction and other-
wise, in attaching such certificate or in satisfying the claim by means thereof as is 
allowed at law or in equity, in regard to property which cannot readily be attached 
or levied upon by ordinary legal process." 
112. A sub-contractor's bill for lumber furnished for tha building of a house wa~ due 
January 1,1949. The house was completed July 1,1949. A mechani c's lien for the claim 
was filed ~July 1.5,1949. State whether t his lien could be enforced, and if so,how? 
~3-~7 provides that no mlit to enforce any lien shall be brought after six months 
from the time when the whole amount covered by· such lien has become payable. 
~13. A contractor, for full value, assigns to a creditor balance due him by city for 
pavine work. Before the as signment is presented for payment, another creditor holding 
judgment against the· contractor, has a writ of fi eri facias issued upon the judgment 
and then a garnislunent process sued out against the city. As between the first ment-
i oned creditor and the one having the garnisrunent process issued, which would be en-
titled to the funds in .the hands of t he city? 
The assignee because the lien of an execu.tion creditor on the debts due his judgmen1 
debtor is defeated by an ass ignment to a bona fide purchaser for value before the ex· 
ecution· creditor has perfected his lien by gar nishment proceedings against the judgme1 
debtor. See also answer to question 50. · 
ll4.What motions should be made befo re the trial court after verdict of jury where 
it i s desired to apply for a writ of er r or? 
None have to be made. But the various motions in a r rest of judgment discussed in 3, 
and a motion to s et .the verdict aside because contrary to the evidence might be made 
i f the facts j ustified it as this procedur e, if succ essful, would be cheaper than 
going up on writ of error. 
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1~6. A owns real estate, but no personal prqperty, and dies largely indebted. Give 
the character of the suit, parties defendant, and the several steps to be taken by 
t ha creditors to secure the payment of their debts. 
~reditor•s 1 bill in equity. May be brought by any creditor. Proper parties defend~ 
an~ would be any creditor who refuses to join, the heirs of the deceased, those hav·· 
ing claims to the property. The executor or administrator should not be joined unlesc 
land was charged or set aside for payment of debts. The steps are in the main those 
already considered in answer to questions 84 and 85. 
118. Give an illustration of special appearance and state how the right to appear 
specially may be waived. 
Plea in abatement to the jurisdiction. This would be waived at common law by asking 
for a continuance of the case or making any plea to the merits. This is all changed 
by the new Rules. 
In speaking of the changes made by the Rules in the case of pleas in abatement the 
Judicial Council wrote with refereence to Equity Rule 2:10, 11A plea in abatement bein; 
a dilatory plea must be filed at the outset. Equity Rule 2:10 prescribes the time in 
close conformity with the present statute, with a change made necessary by the al:cl$ .... 
tion of rule days. This .rule also abolishes all the technical confusion about how the 
special appearance must be made. It also enables the defendant to have an order of 
the trial court overruling such a plea reviewed on appeal.-(which could not have been 
done before the adoption of these rules) where the defendant has contested the case 
on the merits." And further, "I,aw Rule 3:6 removes the traps and pitfalls from the 
plea in abatement. If the plea is overruled the point can be saved on appeal even 
after a trial on the merits. At present(i.e. before the adoption of these rules) the 
rules of procedure frequently take away important rights that the venue statutes give 
because few lawyers have the nerve and cor~iden~e required to let final judgment go 
against their client and then appeal from an ~der striking a plea in abatement.n 
119. A makes B a deed to Blackacre and delivers it, B paying the price in full. B 
loses the deed and A refuses to execute another. What · can B do, if anything? 
File a bill in equity to set up lost deed making A and anyone else who appears to 
have title the defendants. See 6 Digest 908. 
120. A sues B for injuries caused by the latter's negligence, averring B•s negligence 
sufficiently, but omitting to aver that he himself was not megligent. Is his motion 
for judgment demurrable? Why? 
No. Contributory negligence is a matter of defense to be proved by defendant, and 
will not be presumed against the plaintiff since men ordinarily use due care for 
their own self-preservation which is the first law of nature. 
122. To suit by A, B pleads a special plea of equitable set-off. A wishes to defeat 
the set-off by showing that it is barred by the statute of limitations. How does he 
raise this issue in the pleading? · 
This is now governed by Rule 3:11. 11 If~'a plea, motion or affirmative defense sets 
up new matter and contains words expressly requesting a reply, the adverse party 
shall within 2l:days file a reply admitting or denying such new matter. If it does 
not contain such words, the allegations of new matter shall be taken as denied or 
avoided without further pleading." Take advantage of the statute of limitations by 
instructions to the jury. See also question 39. 
The Judicial Council has stated, "Rule 3:8 gets rid of the troublesome common law 
and statutory differences between set-off and recoupment, and allows the defendant tt 
assert them against the plaintiff,whether the counterclaim sounds in debt,assumpsit ~ 
trespass. Consequently it will no longer be possible for a non-resident to sue a 
resident without submitting to the jurisdiction as to any cause of action which the 
resident defendant may have against the non-resident plaintiff. Also a defendant who 
carelessly runs over and injures his insolvent debtor will be allowed to deduct the 
amount owed by the plaintiff from the damages assessed against the defendant. 11 
123. On whom is the burden of proof in an action by a servant against a master for 
personal injuries alleged to arise from negligence of defendant7Since negligence is 
not ordinarily presumed the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.He who affirms must 
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....... 125,. What is the statute of. limitations in the following cases: (a) A bond for ·'the 
peyment of money? (b) A ·deed of trust eoouring same? (c) A vendor's lien? (d) Abo. 
l):ven by an administrator? (e) How· is a judgmen~ lien kept alive? .. 
(u) 10 years from date of maturity. (b) 26 years. See V=lf. 8-ll. · (c) 20 years. 
(d) Goner ally 10 ye G.rs from accrual of the. right. (e) by succ.as.si:ve-TB"Vi vals by s c : : 
fac ias or action. 
127. (1) What is the doctrine as to the plea in abatement for too few defondo.nts whc 
A brings the following actions: (a) against Otl,0 only of two joint m;Dcer:,> of a promis· 
sory note , not negotiable; (b) o.gainst one oniy of two joint tort-fonsors? (2) If A 
get s judgment unde r (a) can he got judgment later against tho other joint maker? (3) 
If judgrmmt is obtained under · (b) can A got ·judgment later against the other tort-
fens or? 
(1) (a.) By statute no plea in abatement lies for non-joinder of parties. V# 8-96. 
Proper remedy is a. :motion to .add tho parties improperly oroittdd unless they aro non~ 
residents, or hnve defenses of statuto of frauds, or statuto of limitations. (b) 
Since joint tort-foasors llre jointly 6.nd severally liable plaintiff, both at common 
law and now, cnn suo one only, all, or a~y intermediate number. 
(2) Yes co V# 8-514, v/hioh' clinngos . tho ocomot.J. lav'• ren.ds, "Upon all contracts horo.-
af t er mo.de by more· thnn ono person, whothor joint only cr joint and several, an a.cti c 
or motion .may be maintnined and judgment rcnder~d against all liable thereon, or any 
one ·or any intermcdlate number, and ifl in an o.otion on any contract heretofore or 
her eafter roado, more th~D one p8rson be sued n.nd process bo served only on u purt ' of 
them, the plaintiff mo.y dismiss or pr.oceed to judgment as to any · $0 sor'ved, and oitlu 
discontinue as to .the others, or from time tc timo ns the prpcoss is served, proceed 
t o judgment against them until ,judgment be obtn.irtGd against r:tll. Such dismissal or 
disc.ontinuance of the ac tion c.s to ony d cfonda.nt shall not oporrtto as a bar to any 
subsequent action which rn<:1y be brought against him for the s rune causo." 
(3) Yes. V#= 8-368, which changes the common law, ro ads, 11ll judgment against one of 
sevoral joint wrongdoers shall not bo.r the pros o cutior.. of an action against a~y or ul 
of the others, but the injured party mo.y bring separate actions against tho wrongdo0r 
and proce ed to judgment in each, or, if sued j ointly, he may proceed to judgment ag-
ainst them successively ur..til . judgrrwnt has bC:Jon r<md cred against, or the cause. has 
been otherwise d isposed of a;> t o , all of the defenc',ants, ·and no bnr . shall arise t\S t c 
any of thom by reason of a ~udgment n.gainst another, or others, until tho ,judgment 
has bo<:Jn satisfied. ·rf thoro bo soparo.to judgments against different defendants for 
a j oint wrong, _the plaintiff shall elect which of them ho will prosecute .. but tho pey 
ment or satisfacti::m of any one of · such judgments sho.ll bo a discharge of n.ll, except 
as to the costs." 
128. (1) Wh0n is a. bill multifarious? (2) Vthat is mount by subrogation? Give en in-
sta.nc e . 
(1) A bill is niultifo.rious (a.) when it unitos s Gvoral distinct and incongruous 
matters between the. s~e parties • or (b) whon it uni tc s several matters, in all of 
which the plaintiffs on the ono sil!o , or all .tho def endants on tho otho.r, do not have 
a joint and c ommon intorost. ExrJnplo of (a.): X, ~n executor, brings a .bill against y 
in the l'lrurlEl of the estate, f(lr specific performa.nco o.nd jo~ns with this a. mutter on 
his cvm account. Example of (b): A bill stating two alt0rnl'lti vo claims, somo of tho 
plaintiff's. being intereste d in one cle.im a.ncl sumo in tho othe r, but not all in both. 
·· Note: Creditor's bills aro not multifarious :tn<.;rciy bocauso uil of tho creditors 
. . 
have diff erent interests • . 
(2) Where ono party pays monoy (not ~sa roor0 volunteer) which another pa.rty ' in 
equity and goqd c ons~icnce should have pn.id, the party so paying is entitled to. stop 
into t.he shoes of the party paid a.s a r a.inst the party who should have paid provided 
(a) he thereby gains s ome a.r:l.vanta.g;o h0 wc.uld not otherwis e hnvo (b) the party po.id 
will not be injured or possibly injur ed. 
Example: V.b cre general rule applicn.ble . A, a. surety, pn.ys o. bond. running in favor 
of tho u.s. Government which B shol,lld have paid. By law the u.s. Gove.rnment has a 
pr ··~ference in the distribution of B's assets. A, by subrogation, is entitled to that 
pr ef erence . 
Example (b): A is tho principal debtor on a note for $1,000. B and C each go sure 
ty f or $500. Aft er thG debt becomes due B pays tr.e holder $ 500. He is not subrogat ed 
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t o the ho l der 's rights to suo A on 'thG noto, bece.use the holder, in ca.so of pa.rtitt ~t 
ins·.)lvoncy of A, mi ght be injured bJ" any sudh s uit. 
"" l29.A c:o:mm:issione; is appointed hy a. deere~ in o. cha.ncE: ry case t o soll l a nd, 1)1''1' , r . . 
t o 2;ivo the bond r oguirod by the decr ee . · He sells the l und, collects the prico , ~ l · 
:i.t in bonk to his credit . as . commissioner. Bofor.e the I!'.a.kinf; of the doed of trus ~; t . 
tl:w purchaser, tho bunk f ailed. · Co.n the purchaser be made t o pay ngain? I f so , r.a ·. 
h ; n. r omerly over r.tgc..inst anyone , and if . so, whom? 
Since the commissioner· ho.d not given bond ho had no o.uthority to r ocoive the moP"' 
o.nd th0 .purcho.sor can be c;ompel;1ed . to pay o.go.in. He would huve a r emedy over ag'3.ir :.: 
the C0:1J111issioner for breach of his . implied warr anty of O.Uthority . 
130. If the re is n.n orror in final decree on the facts, what is tho remedy? 
.An o.ppon.1. If interlocutory instonG. of finul, n moti on t n rehear. 
- 101. (a) What is a demurr er to tho p1oo.dings? (b) lffuo cnn dcmm:- to tho evidenc:') · ~ 
(c) Is it necessD.ry tho.t n demurr er :to ple adir.gs , or to tho evidence, b(;) in wr :i.t i ·1g ~ 
( o. ) A d13murrer t o tho plca.clin f~S udmi ts for th0 so.ke of.' ar gument only tho.t o.ll .:':,;c 
:1ropor1y plea.dod aro true~ ancl ra:Lses o.n issue o f l o.w as to their suffioiencyc (b) 
Eithor party, but it is gonontlly the defendant" ( c ) V# 8-140 r equires a dernurror 
the ovidenco to bG in writing. By v=ffo 8-99 nll domurrcrs t o the pl eadings oxcopt ir. 
crimino.1 oo.ses must bu in ·writing . :::2:= 
132. At a judicial salo b.D nds with surotios o.r t. t r.,ker" by t he commissioner of. the 
court for tho deforred paynwnt;s on l and. \'I:.1u.t r emedy or r emedie s against the prir.tcJ. · 
and o.go.inst the sureties? · 
Motion for judgment unclor V# 8 -7J 7 · o.nct Rule 3:3. B0sic:~es , V/1= 8-664 provides f or , 
simple and er:~.sy method . Defondo.nt ptJ,rcho.s'er or surety is give n at l east 15 days n ot . 
ice by rulo from c ourt or clo!·k t o show c aus e why judgment shou1d not be entered o.-
gainst him· f or wha.tevor runount tho court sho.;i.l i'ind t o be duo . 
1:33. What o,r e the ri ghts of [ t purcho.s or of lt:'.ncl_nt o. jud icia l so.lo, when tit'l e prov( 
defective, nnd his rel o.tion to do ctrine of cnvcat omptor: (o.) Before confirmo.tion? 
(b) AftEJr confirmation? 
In gonoral, the doctrine of cav o.::.t om:t-'t C' r applies o Tho purohEl.s cr knov1s ho is on l~ 
buying the debtor 's i nterest , El.nd sh(Juld nalcc inquiry. But in co.se of non-n0gligent 
mistalco or fr o.ud, and boforo t\ ccnf irma tim1 a c ourt of equity v.fill r e liev e the pur.:. 
cho.sor. Afte r. confirmati on tho rule of' cc.v oO.t emptor is ()VOn mor o strictly· o.pplied. 
Sf1e :55 c.J. 76. 
134. ~ vTho.t o.re th~ usu o.l actions for th'o 
va.ch lie; and whore a.ncl in whut court or 
;i.n oa.ch . 
r ocovery of possessi on of · l Dndj when .does 
tribunal ·may end·, be brought~ . Sto.t e: the p1c[ 
.. ( o. ) Ej e ctment. Pl o.intif' f must rooovor on the strength of his own title a.nd not or 
wea.khOSS · Of one in possession unless nn est oppe l exis ts or whi l E:J in peo.coful possess:i 
ho has been ousted. the rofrom. A plo.intiff with c.>c le1~al title c o.n recover poss ess i on 
...from ono with 0.n equit a.b l e tit.lo only, unl ess (I) vendee is in possession under a 
wril;ten contract, not in .. dofauH ~ hn.s fulfilled a.l:l . ...conditio:oo pr e cedent to his righi 
to a dobd, ~-<-w- .. _ ..~.;.~ .. , ..••. ~J:· . . . ... , .. ·· . .. ... · · · or (II) 
tho party ir! possession iG the mortg.ager, or gr nrn:;or; of t\ -. oe d 0 1. trust , the conditi · 
of which havo boon f111ly perforJncd , ~:~ . . . To maintain ejoct-
,/mr;mt the plaintiff must bo out of ·j;:os s ossion o.nr~ rlofencfrmt e ithe r in or out • . This i .: 
· ~ 1.,~ o.n o.ction at ' law. ( b ) Unl a.•Nful d et c,inur.· This i s o statut•)ry r ea l action o.nd lie s 
• t( 'Vq ago.ins:t o. t ennnt who· cl•·-tain~ ro f;sE.:ssbn 0f l ru:vl aft (,r l·.:i s ri ght. ho.s expired , witho11t 
tho consent of him viho is ontitlcd to tho possession . V# 55-225. "If any tenant or 
l os see of premisEJ~ nnywhero usoJ. for r psidenti .:tl J.Wr posoc , nn'l not fo r fanning or nc· 
rioulture, being; in ·clofo.u lt in tho r·n.ymcnt of' :r ;mt sh£:.1 1 so continuo for five days 
o.ftor notice , in writing--such tE:nnnt shall thur oby fo:rf0it his right to the possess-
ion •• • • " ·c c) I f o. po.l·ty who i s i n possossi t.m i s ')US t ed in r.ny them tho l ego. l manne:r 
he mo.y r egain possossi0n oven a.s a[~D.int :tho landowner hims e lf ( oven if . ho l d inc ov0r 
,
1
, v·"'" o.nd not paying rvnt) i n lln action 0f' F'orciblo Entry . In o j odtmont title is in issu.e. 
cl 'f' In Forcible Entry only ri [!.ht t o poe; sos s i on. ·rhc st ~tu to of U rr.i tat ions is 3 years. 
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135. (a) Describo the ordinary procoodings in a suit to partition land from i 'ts irlB· 
t i t ution to !."1. fipal decree; and (b) st.ate hy who:n, whore' and undor what circttm:rcr·r~\, , 
o. suit to t,;ell an infant's land ma.y bo brought •. · . 
(a) Partition is accomplishtid by a :bill in equi-ty, If praotica.l, it is made b 
k i :1u . If not, ·tho property is sol,:.'\. , o.nd tho proceeds dividod. It is instituted o.:.t'. : 
n c:.turcd n.s ').ny r)ther suit in equi.ty. A cons, rt d~?es not ho.ve to bCTj15"1ned·,-and __ tho 
i nohoate right of' dowor · or curtesy is lost where property is sold and procoods dividl 
(b)(l) .By th\'• infant's guardian, or~ if held in trust by tho-trusteo, or by any 
L1torc~stocl p o.rty. Sao V# 8-675 o.nd 8-616 
'( 2) In the Circuit Cou;t of tho county in which tho lttnd is · si tuntod on the e quit;\ 
s i rlo therGof. 
( 3) Whero it will be for tho wo lfaro of tho infant • 
Note 1. (a) A specia.l guardian o.d ·litorn must b0 appointed. 
(b) If :!.nfwt is ovor 14 he sh0uld answer in person, but suit is not do-
f ~· o.tod by absolute refusal to so MSVlcr. 
(c) 'Ihe bill must sot forth the property tho infant ho.s and the reasons 
the sale will be for nJ.s benefit. 
(d) 'l'hose who would be the infant's heirs were ho doa.d. must be joindd as 
d efendants. 
(e) .Tho bill must be SV·TOrn to. 
(f) Decree of reference is rnt1Jo, etc. ·, o.s in any oth,:r equity suit, 
_ ......_137. {a) What aro plenclinr, s nnd thoir obj e ct? (b) Wh~t is process? Give an . illustrn 
tion of process, original, r:10sno o.nd fino.l. 
(o.) Pleo.dings o.re the ordorly o.nd loghlO..l sto.t0monts of tho pn.rti .;;; s to o. suit o f 
their claims o.nd defenses. . Thoir ob,iects uro ( 1) to [ i Y0 reasonable notice to th0 . a ::l_ 
verse po.rties o.f the nc.t.urc of' tho cl a im or cloffmse, (2) t r) produce ,;m j,ssuo or issuo 
(3) to prosorvo a record. (b) Process is a. writ r)r odor issued from a. court of c om·· 
potent jurisdiction ordering s c)mething t o bo dono. It is orig:ino.ll mesne or fino.l. 
A subpoena in chanc ery is o.n exo.mplc o.f ori{iino.l pr ocess, a subpoena. duces tecum of 
mesne process, o.nd a fiori facias (fi. fu.) of the .finnl proc<3 ss. 
138. 1i'Jhen ID!1Y r:\ bill in equity b 1.1 tukc-n fur c~mf G-SSOll nnd v. :'hJOr (Jo rondcr ed without 
procf against tho d efendant? 
Rule 2:8 reads, 11 If a rl. of on:.1 cnt f rdls t o file n plcorlinc; within 21 d o.ys o.fte r s or-
vico on him o f the subpo 0nn., tho cc'.us o is s ot fo r lvmring and docket ed a.s to such do~· 
f' enclant upon tho bill t r\kon f or oonfossecl n.s t o hit'. In ,·suits for O.llllulling o nor-
rirJ.C:c Gr for :il~orco~ hovr6'vcr•· the bill is not taken f or confossed. 11 
Note howev 0r th~t Rulo 2:23 r oads in part, "Tho tirno allowed for filing answers an 
other ple E~ding~ mny be ext0ndoG. (except plc:1~' s in aho.toment) b;:,r' the court for 'good cn.u 
showr-1 a.nd such e:1t t ensi<' l1 mo.y bo grnnted thou gh tho time fixed. hfl.s alr9a.dy expired." 
.141. \ How many pler. s t o a. notice of motion for judgment con be plEJ t'..r'fod a.t conunon law, 
o.nd how many unde r our statute ? 
·only ·one ple o. of law or f' a.ct could bo mado to the snme count · o.t conunon lo.w, the ob· 
ject of this rulo being to obt~in singlonoss of issuo. Undor V-# 8-134 any number of 
plea.s of l c,w or fo.ct ma.y be_ plc :.:.dod ~.t ·a.ny stage of th0 pl oc,dint;s • 
,___.142. .An ~:x;ecution goe s into tho hunrls of the sheriff t o bo levied on tho property of 
D. At the s cune time e.n o.tto.cru~cnt is l evied on o. chose in ctction pa.yablo to. D. .Sub-
·sc:;quently D ~ssigns th<J chos o in o.ction for v o. l110 and without n otice of eithor the ex· 
ecution or the attachment. Which oft tht> thnw, tho execution croditor, tho attsching 
creditor, or tho assignee, h as priority? 
As rogards the exocution cre:)di t (.) r tho lion or nated on i ntn.ngibl o property gives wa:l 
in favor of o. bona fid e purcha.s or unlos s o. lis pon<lcms ho.s b < Jc~ · filed. · Sef) vj{ 8-142.' 
If thv intangible proporty is a. shar (; of' stock vff: 13-178"· [lppli~s, "No attachment •••• 
upon shares of stock ••• s h•11l be v n.lid unles s such cortificn.t e be !:tctuo.lly sei.zed by 
tho officer making the tlttttchrnent or l 0vy, o r b o surr enc\or c. ·~. t o th.Fl GO!lporo.tion wh ~.c- h 
issued it, or its trcmsfor by tho ho ld or bo <mjoinod." 1'htj ·:-lo.;:trino of lis pend0;-~ ~ 
ho.s no o.pplioation t o n EJ gotiablc papor. 
\ 
.......... 143. (a) 1rithin wh at timo :.J.nd how ma.y a judgment by defi:\Ult qo corr octod? (b) v.n:" G 
dof ens e s mn.y be mo.do to a f orthcoming: bond t;ivon upo!'l a d istro.ss warrant for r E'~t / ', ~. 
'Sh a t when it is gi ven on 11 fi eri fn.cj.f.l.s? 1 
I 
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( n. ) At any timo ·within throe yoDrs by mot ion in the court that r endered the· ju.dgr '; 
:f 0r or r ors a ppar ont on the f a c<J or th<.:: record • . , Thor e will bo no :roh 0 ".1.ring on the rr ... j 
it: s . B4rks #416 ( 4th Ed.). (b) Ront not due :i.n who l e or in part, or bond othon vi :::.c 
illo1;a l. V://:~-4 Q3 ~ Also any de f ens e a:vailo.ble on any bond as . f~lrgory, cond i t i on::; 
per f ormed , s et-oi'f, otc. (c ) For gery, s atisfaction of origino.l judgment and costs 
since o.coruod, property levied upon was oxempt, .tcncl <.: r of· property as stipulated i n 
t h ._; bond , fr aud in the procurement of the bonrl, etc. 
/~145. How a.:::- e o.tt a chmorit stututes interpret ed? · , /\~\~ . ;,-t:; tr.J.chment st atutos o.ro construed strictly boc.nus e they aro in d or r)gntion of tho 
{I · cdtnnon low, ond provide f'or an execution by anticipn.tio~l , i. o . sD.tisfaction o.t the 
b~<:girming of tho suit ro.ther than a.ftor the right ·hr.l.S been decid.od. 
- -146. lr1 wha.t manner may " ~urlici n.l lien bo obta.i.n0d upo11 t h o l nnds, and a.ls o. upon the 
L,._./ chuttols o f u d ebtor; frouwhat tioo would such lion l::o off'ectivo (a.) bctweeo orodito 
~.... end del?tor; (b ) as to other creditors wh~J might be proc oeding in like manner; and (c) 
as to purchasers 4 · 
A .judgment crea t es i pso facto a. lien on lands. fill exe cution creates a lien upon 
the ch.r.ttels of a debtor as of t ho time of its de liv0ry t o th~:_, pr oper · officer. ( o.) 
From the moment it aris os (b ) i·.s regards ln.nd Y# 8-390 r eads. "No .iudr;ment shall be a 
lien on r eal est at e a.e against n pu!'ohuser th•.)r oof f .or ve'lua.blo oonsidoration wihltout 
notioe until and e:iccept from the t ime thP..t it is duly docke t ed in the proper clerk's 
offic e of the county· or city wh8roin such real ostat e :r1ay be . V# 8-378 r oads: "Every 
judgment shall, as s oon [ tS i t is dock0t od , ba indoxod by t he e l erk in the name o f oe.c: 
defendant--and s h 8.ll not bo r ocar dod ~ & dockotr:;d as t o DJJ.y defendant in · whos e name it 
is not s o indexod. " As b ct .ween croditors .do cketinf£. is not n0 ces sary . The first cr ed-
itor to get judgment as f a r as l and is concerne : has priority ove r later onos unless 
a:t tho 3 alll0 t erm of court o.nd other ~re clitors eoulrl have gotten judgment if their c as• 
had boon heo.r .d fir.st. Other creditor s mny i n pr oper cas es i nstitute b (tnkruptcy pro-
ceedings a gains t the jud t~m0nt debtor in whi ch c::ts e c.tll pr efo r once s obta.incd by l egal 
proceodine;s ·within f our months of tho filing of the pet:j.ti on i n l.Jo.hkruptcy a.ro vo id. 
149. ( a ) 'Jilhat is pe riod of limit~ti ons uy,:>o n onforcor'iont of.' accounts botw•3on merchant . 
(b) What disabilitie s sto p t h ·J running of - tho s t (I.UtG and fo r how long? 
. (a.) ~ provBos thc.t an a.ction by ono pa.rtne r !lg n.i nst his co-partner f or the 
settleme n of the p artn ~rship 8.C count, or upo n nccou:nt s conc()rning t he trn.de of me:rc h 
andiso between morchro:.t o.nrl mt-Jrch~mt may bo brour:ht within five yea.rs fr om: the c es s-
ution of the don.H ngs in· .which thoy are inter e s te d together, but not aft er. · 
(b) . Infancy and inse.nity "oxis t in l; nt tho t in:e the s b 1tute wo uld otherwise 'h ave com 
mencod running ~ Note that intorven.in[ infa i1cy or insani,ty does not stop tho sto.tuto 
fr om running; . A p~'l.rty ia e;i von tho somo l ength of timo n.ftor ter mination . of infancy 
or i nsanity as ho ha.d a.t fir s t · ex oept t ho.t in no ot\so sha.ll the t ota.l time be mbr e 
·bhon 20 years. 
151. A is s uod in ~o nnoko co unty by tho Armour I<'or·til i zor Works ,· upon ~ j~dgment ron-
dar ed agains t him in the St o.t e of North Cn.rolinno Upon th o t ri a l A pl eads, off ers to 
pr ov o a.nd is allowed t o provo. ove:r th o · obj Gction of t he p l a i ntiff, tho.t the. judgment 
o.~; ,.:tinst him in North ·co.rolin o. wn.s r cndor od without duo ootioa~ o.nd without s ervice of 
pro ces s upon him. Was t ho rulin [S of th ;:~ tria l court c orrect? Vfny ? 
Yes • Such o. jude-.. rnont would not b o vdV in N. c . and i f not valid ther fJ it i s not 
vnlid anywher e . I!J ue ·pr oc E: s s of' l avr r e quir es pro~or noti ce nnd proper ~ ervic :'l of proce1 
154. D a.nd h~s wife ha.vo boon cl ivor cocl , nnd D ·wc.s g:i.v0n t he cus t ody of his infant sor 
B, a boy t en yeo.r s ol d. . D' s v-r.l. fo lives i n Roa.noke·, wh ile D livoa i n Bedf or d count y, 
Virftinin. DurinG D' s O. ~)s onco f r on1 hcmr; , h i s wi f e k i dmtps B o.nd carries him to her hor: 
in o onoko , whe r e ho i s hvl r.l (\nd nr;t al l owod to communic11.te with h i s f nthor. D con;.. 
sults you. Whc~t course wou l d you O.ilVi Go him t o purs u.,; t o r o(~ain t ho cu st ody of h is 
ohilrl, o.nd to who.t cuu:rts eould yo u r.:;p l y f or r oliof !l 
Hn.bon.s corpus i s t he pr opor rorr.edy . Tho Supr umo Cour t of Ap.r-oo. ls has origi nal 
juris diction of cas es of hqb r:J ~s eor pus , mo.ri.,1runos, ~nd pr ohibiti on . But this jurL 4'! ct 
ion, whilo originnL, i s not oxcl us i vo . Vjf 8- 596 r oa.ds , " ·J~he wr it of habeas cor pus o.s 
suhjioi ondum shall bo gr ant od by uny circuit court or cor :;'Or '\tion cour t t o any per s on 
who ·s hn.ll n.:Jl p l y fo r t he S !U"lO 1)y i_)G t it i ( n, s howin[~ by . aff i rl e.vits or oth0r evidon co 1·,· 01 
able c ause to h0 lio v ~; th e.t h0 i s d ot oi LlOd without l 11wf u l t:tut hori ty." V# 8 · 59&8 1:Th:, 
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vr...-i:t-..s..b.ult be directed to thE~ person in vvhoso custody the petitioner is dotuined1 a:1• 
':w.do .:6:l'turnable us aoon as may be bofor0 tne couct; or judge ordering the sam<?. 11 Not ·~~ 
t hat if tho custody of the child had not alroagy beengrantod to one of the; parent& 
a bil:C.in Gquity~>. not habeas· corpus, is the proper remedy to determine custody. 
. ' 
c .' I 
155.. 1 'J'l'JO First No.tJonul Bank of Martinsville, Va., sues out an a.tto.chment o:go.inst ::' \ 
u.r on an o.ffidrwlt made o.nd si'gned by W as vice~pr es idont of tho bm1k, . without mon' • 
.;I~· tl:.o (tt':t'ido.vit. in the case .s~f~ic~e.nt ~o sustain the att~c~ent? . . 
: ' YiLB-524 rl:lquJ.res o.ll pet~twns ln atta.chment to ·be verlf~ed by o.ff1dav1t. V/1= 40 
.:~ 7 pr ovides that an affidavit by or :''or 0. ·corporation may be made by its prosident, 
.• 'f'vioc-prosident, general manager, cashier, treasurer or director without any special 
.., o.uthorizo.tion therefor. Hence, tho affidavit is sufficfuont. · 
156. M ovms o. mill on Goose Creek.t in Loudon county, 1.md desiring to incroo.se his 
wo.ter powor ro.~ses his dam eight feet.. This flCtion on · the part of M onuses the bC'.ck 
wo.t.er to flood the lund of L, the proprietor above and .. n.ls o rondors L's homo unfit 
· fc·r ha.bitn.tion by renson of tho str~gnant wn.ter n.nd mosqui tL>s br od therein. Will n. 
court of oquity interforo in ,a caso of this kind and H so. what remedy will it n:op l~ 
This act of M one13.t0s F.J. priiTnte nuisn.nco. L is entitled to o. mand.atory injunoti01 
:'..S he ho.s no ndoquute remedy o:t ln.w and tho injury is regnrdod o.s . lr.roparal;>le since 
o.11 lo.nd ( and es pee i aUy n man's home) . is rop,;nrded in oqui ty as unique. 
158. John J ones recovers ag.::dnst Wil:l.io.."!l Smith n judgm<mt f or the sum of $200 on nn 
oren account. At the: time of the rcc:)Vory of the judgment Smith wo.s. r.t singlr:! man 
with no family, owning n. farm in Bedford County, vrorth $2,000. Aftor the rooovory 
and docketinr, of tho judgment Smith marries_ nnd iHtrrte:.d iatoly filos o. homestead deed, 
setting as ide the fo.r !!'1 a.s his hornoston.cJ . Is the clo.im of home~teo.d good against 
Jones' judgment? 
The present 1·ule i n Virgi nb ( ctft or conflictinG clecisio!lS) is thnt the homestead 
mo.y be clo.imed by o. householder agr,irwt a judgment obtdnEJ:l against him before he 
·became r.. hcuscholdor , Vi& 34-17: 11 The real or pcrs ernul c:;stc.to, which o. housoholcler, 
his widow, or minor childr en o.ro entitled t o holJ. c.s exempt mey be set nside a.t any 
time befor e the sumo is subj e: ctod by sr.tlo or othurwiso under judgment, decree, order, 
execution, or other l ogol proccss'.u 
160. A city council :;:nsses un ordir:onco r "'qu1r1nrr, a r ailway compo.ny to station a. 
flaf;mnn nt n atroot crossing. The ro.ilwo.y c ompany. r efuses t o c omply with the ordi-
nance. What would be the legal J? r oceeding to com~:r:l l compliance? 
Since this is a duty of a pu1:; lic nu.ture and ministerial in its nature m(\ndrunus 
is t he ~r oper re~edy . 
161. A decree of 'court orders· one of th0 parties ·~o the couso to execute a deed. He 
refuses. How, if at r:tll, co.n he be coMpe lled to obey? 
If he refuses he is guilty -J i' contompt of court. Soe V# lSt-255 (Fifth). 
~162. The limitation for contr a.cts n:j.t s 1ec,'ially . provided for is three ye:1rs. Tho 
limitation for personal injuries is one ye::l.r. A ;:-urr-ho.f.eS a ro.ilroad tickot, nnd 
while traveling on it is injure,:! by the rnilrond' s noglit~enc e . 'I\vo yeo.rs thereafter 
he sues in as s umpsit on tho breach _->f contrnct to carry safely. Vllhich limitation 
applies . and why? · 
Burks =/f234 (4th Ed. )-"If tho injury sought to be r odresserl is merely personal, 
whether resulting f r om broach CJ f crmtr::tct or t od;, th0 n.ction dies with the person 
o.nd tho tort limito.ti on applies." Where thr::ro would be no duty to use due care but 
f~r a contrnct then the contrnct limitati on w0u ld o.pplyn 
163. A brings an a.ct:i,.on f0r 'lll c\sso.ult aguinst B. It tur ns out thut C nnd D po.rtioi 
pated in the o.sso.ult. Can he sue B without j oining: tho others? 
Yes. Tort liability is jcint m:d sevor o.l. Hence cne or ull could ho.ve been su~;;~d 
at common law. Note: At common lnw jude;mont O.f:ainst one tort-feasor merged the c b:' m 
o.nd hence resulted in tho dis charge of' the o:taor joint tort-feasors, but by V-#8-368 
the judgment must b~ s o.tisfied in order to· have this rEJsult •. 
164. A bill in chnnc(lry .. charges that dvi'endant h0lds $1,000 in trust for oomplninnr.t. 
that the trust is ended and said mnount now due, rend pr ~ys thc.t ho be compelled to pn; 
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it over. Is tho bill demurrable, o.nd if so, why? 
T'he bi ll is n6t demurrablFJ. Equ :i.ty always h rd juris9-iction over the sottlomo!1t o 
trusts • . . The fo:t::t that a court of · l c.w would now allov.r un adequate r enrod;y is irnmn.to~ 
t s oquity do0s not give up its judsdiction ~ecuuse law caurts later seo the licht . 
o.la o grant r ,o lief unles s a statuto so · rcquires. . . . 
-· 165. l'.n. answer in chancery is insufficiont in la'i.'l •. . How do you mQke the point of i t 
insuf ficir:nJ.cy2 
Do not except as exceptions to answons f6r insufficiency al' <'J abolished. Yi~ 8-122 . 
Do· not demur, as a demurrer in equity lies only to of'f\:ms ivf!l pleadings. Move to set 
down the ca.so for hearing on the bill and answer. The effect of this is to admit t he 
truth of o.ll ma.ttors of f. net sufficiently ple~.~ ded in th f:J onswor, and to aubmi t t o t h -: 
Ol':l\lX't tbfJ decision . of the question whether on the fncts · o.s they appear from the nnsvN 
t1w decree. should not go in fo.vor of the plaintiff·. The result is decisive for one 
or the . other of the p~U"ties. 
A S·till . safer procedure would be to. mo~re to strike out th.:J P.nswer. V#S-122,. roa.df 
in prlrt: 11 The test of sufficiency . (of nnswer) shnll be mn.cle by motion to strike out; 
if found i nsufficient, but r..mendc~ble, tho court mn.y nllow amendment on terms • . If D. 
Second OJlSWer is n.d judged insufficient, tho dofendr.mt moy. be OXQ..TJl.ined Upon interrog~1.i 
aries 'and cor~itted until he nnswors. thbm, cir,9n 1:1otion of tho plointiff the court 
moy strike out the F.~nswer arHi t uke the bill · for · confosser:J.·. See Lile #228 tlu-ough 23 ~. 
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166. When will an uwa.rd in G.r bitr 'ltion proccoclin1ss · bl; n good defense t o a suhsequer.t 
suit touching; tho s mno mf;\.ttor bot;woon tho sl',m0 p•1rt es ? 
An wra.rd prop(~rly mo.cle bar s 0.-ot:Lon on the uricin~ l cnuso. Unles s an award is ex-
pressly made a condition pr<;OoC',ont ho may brini~ an .action on tho original claim even 
if he has promis ed to submit!) tho othor ;,i:trty' s only r et!ledy being to bring an indep-
ondcmt action for brE:lllC h of contract. Equity will mot ~ro.nt Sj)OCific porformatwe of 
o.n r.l.grr~ero.ont to urbitrato . Howuver, aft ,;r an nwurcl, or i f tho submission is unJ.er 
rulo of court thor o cun l1e no r r:;vocation. Burks 4/;1 6, .#20 (4th.J!;d .. ) 
. .. 
168. B ·depos its with the First No.ti •:mD.l Bank ·for ~·,fo kooping ~~5 ,000 of Virginin. 
Sto.to Bonds 1 p£Lyablo to bD c~r cr. 1\.ft ~l:r B' s d.o~.1.th , C pr os erlt s to tho bnnk a.n order f ol 
the do livory of the; bonds t o him duly si r;no~l by B. This orclvr B's EJxocutor instruct: 
the bunk not . to honor on tho l.l.llogod t~r ound that it W'\S obtn.ino<l by fraud . C then 
su0s ·thu bank for possossion of the- bon s. How shoul d tho biOlnk proceed in order t o 
prot0ct itsoli"? 
V#., B-2.2..6 (which f.l.pp lios only !7,ft ur un o.ction i s institut0d ) pr ovir'J.os that upon 
a.ffid~vit of' Q, dofondo.nt in any e.ction th•.::.t h o cl11ims no tncorost in the, subject mat· 
of tho a. ction, but. th f: t some third: p ~;trty ho.s c. ol~.ill1 thoroto, o.nn tho.t he does J;l.Ot 
e-:;llucle with s uch t hird p r.rty, but is rondy to . pay or disr,os8 of the Gubject matter 
of tho action as the ctm·ct may d jroct, tho c ourt mr..y mo.krJ an or der r equiring such 
third party t o appe o.r und r. t r.\,to tho rwturo o.r. his c lcdm, and ma.into.in or r .elinquish 
it. This is called· statutory into-r p1ondor . 
169. Motion for judf.Jl'.ent for $~ 1,000 is ir!stituted in tho Cor por ntion Court of Char,. 
lottesville , Va ., ar.;ainst tho C & 0 RR Co. The r r ocess is served on the pr esident O! 
th6 comp!.Uly on Mn.y 25th a t h i s r(:)sidonce in thEJ c ity of' Richmond just l:l.S he is l eo ve 
the c!hty. He forr.;ets :.1.b out it , f' rli ls t o notify the ntt:)r ney f or tho company of the 
:i.nstitutj.on of tho s uit , o.nd judt~mont 1; c.. CJ s flf:'.O.irw t tho comprmy by de~· o.u lt. Is the 
judgment valid , nnd ror1e -:m ? 
. Y-ff 8•59 provideS tha:t if' tho CC1.S G bo. llCOi ~1s t ::1. domestic COr j!Or ~ttion pr ocess mo.y b. 
served on its ·pr os id ent, vi c: o ;; r o::li·J. E.mt, c o.s1'd. or, t r oa.sur er, socr ... d.w.ry, gen0r a l mo.na., 
or·, gonor c\1 superintendent , or r.my ono of its dir• otors, or <:~ny a.gent of such corpor · 
a:tion, if o.ny such •Jfficer or ar cmt be f?und in th e city or county in which tho o.cti•. 
io corrmoncod, o.nd whether so f ound or not, it mr1y be sent t. o thEJ c ounty or city,i:: 
which is l ooo.ted the principal offi ce 0 f s uch comp::my an.'\ b G thor e sorved on any off 
icer or agor:t of such oomtH1l1Y found in such county or city . Assuming; thn.t C & 0 is · 
dnrnu :>tic corporation w:ith its .. . Principal office i11 Hi c}unourt tho serviue would be good 
and t ho jud[jm rant valid. 
170. A is tho p n.yeo of c.$·500 bond with · e;'onditicn atta chod ex eoutod ~ P. A i'ilos r 
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1nr:-tion for judgment· on ·the bond ·without alleging pe_rf.or;ma.nce of thEI condi t ·ion. P G. · 
not demur, but pleads set-off, issue is jol:ned on said· plea, and on that issue th:l ', 
find~:: for plaintiff.. W{iat can P do, :i,.f anythin:g, tp avoid the a.ffect of the verd:u.· ~-
. p should make a motion in arrest of judtlllen ·b _as. the error i s one ·that is appa.rer. ,. 
,;n tho fac~ of the record and is one of substance not cured by tho s·taute of j oefa:'t :' 
'l'he court would then o.llow A to amend setting; a.side all pleadings back to· e.nd,,J.nclur' 
;ing the fa.ulty one and allow the parties to·f>lea.d over. 
::1.:71. Willio.m JonEJs, brings a.n action for· $5,000 ' da.-nages a.gainst th0 N .& W. R .R.CO .• i' 
porsonal injury. After the trial has begun you, _as Jones' attorney, are informed th 
the witness on whom you_ chiefly rely to estubliuh your clu:im ;is too Ul tQ attend t h 
trial. What can you do to avoid losing your case? 
Ask for a continuance. Under those circurnstanoes it woulC. probably be · nn r.1.buse o. 
discrEltion for the court t.o r e fuse it., ·or I could take a volunto..ry non ... suit. 
172. p r e cov ors judgment ::tgo.inst S for $500. Executi cm is s-u.es tho,roon and the sher 
iff, without taking nn indemnifying bond, levies tho t:xeoution upon .n horse in th<:l 
possession of S, ·but roa.lly the property of B. V\-na.t redress has B, and against whom 
B may bring the statutory ogui v-alent 6:£ n.n action bf trr)ver against the sheriff, or 
ho may levy o. j:lossessory u.ction to ro covor the pr operty from the oxeoution purch~ser. 
By V:/f ~-22.9 the ,sl}oriff (if he- has reason t o suppose tho.t thoro is some question r-ts ~ 
the title of mc0cution debtor) ma;y r-ofuso t o make. a. levy unless the execution credit · 
will enter intc .~an ind urnnifying b ond. 
173;, Where no s uit is . y et pending ( n.lth~ugh one may be nnticipo.~ed)nnd thero is dnn· 
gcr of losing the t es timony of _o. mo.toriul-witn0ss from do~th or absence, how may his 
testimony be pr ose:rvcd f or subsequ~nt ur;c,) ? · 
V# 8-317: "11. pers on dosirou$ of p to:: rp <Jtuating t he; t(Jst).mony of witnesses o.s to a . 
matter in rospGct t o which there is no suit, mo~,r file with a cmmnissionf~r in chancer:> 
of n. court wh er o i n , if thcro wore (1. bill t o porp0tuo.t0 tcstimon;y-, such bill might bo 
f ilod, a. petition adrlressod, to such oorr.missi.on:.:.:r stnting s uch mu.ttor, and -what porsor 
ma.:r bo affected by the t estir.10ny, 
_., J-74, What is tho diff co ronce b <.r';wo on th~:; m0thods employed by o. court o f ln.w o.nd of 
osuity, in t aking Of 0"!1dOnce 'lnJ th~ dGt (l :rmino.tion of thfJ i SSUeS made by the plendi" 
ros pect iv0ly? 
In gonoro.l 0-vi donco i n equity cas os is t r... lwr~ out of' oourt by deposi-t; i ons, and the 
issues o.r o docidod by th~ .. o,)urt, ur by u col7UlliBsion(; r in chru1cery subj oct to tho coni: 
of tho court, whilo o.t l nw tho ov5.de.rwo is genor~.~lly givon in opon court and the part 
i es ho.vo n right tc n jury trinl on tho issues. · 
/ 175 . Vfuo.t is tho e:f:foct of a f a ilure to swear t o ~l pler.t in 'lbo.t ement? 
By _E,\l1o .5.: 14 objocti0n t ho.t a. plou. r t!quirod to bo sworn t o by statute has n'.ft b eE 
swor n to !!lust be rno.de wi thi~~ 7 days aft ·Jr the plonding is f ilod by p....motion to. strike 
ot her wis e t ho obj oct i on is_wo.ivod. 
----· 
177. Sta.te briefly the p:r. esont ·I!odo ' f pl"oc<;d ur fJ 
Burks #199 (4th Ed,): 11App licu.t i on shall be on 
po.rty ngo.ins t whom the writ is prvyed hns baen s u ··( ith a Or,!.pY- . ~ a.nd 
not ico of tho int cJ:1clod npplicatLm o. reas onable tirno b0forfl 3ueh ~p-p li cation is mado . 
·The petition is t o st2to pJ a. i1al~ ~md con oi.a&l.Y- t :C.o gr ound for tht': o.p;1lice.tion , and co, 
e l~dc with a pr.Q..yor ~vr th:;; ~it .. If no d0fons o is nl!ldo o.nd tho petition states n ca. 
pr opu r !'or tho wr i t, n ~eromr:tory writ i s o.worded with cc,sts . If the defendant o.ppea.· 
and makes dofonse, tho c.et'onso i s to t o by clerr.urrt~r, or rmswer on oath , or both." 
178. You des ire to insti tuto o.n o. ctin{l ut lo.w '-LC~inst nn in sane ;Jcrs on for whom n o 
c ommi tteo has been af poirJ.;od . 'WilG!:1 · .-ul.. ;{c'u s uc and. by whoru iould such nn action be 
riofonded ? 
Actions ag,Unst an i ns o.nv pGrson when no eolllr:J.itt oo hns boon appointod a.ro agains t 
him pors ona.lly, but tho c oun; wi ll appo i nt rt f,U'l.rc i n.n ad J.i tum t o l ook out f or tho 
inte r osts of the ins('.no purty. 
180. J ones brings 1:'.n a ction at 1 w; ugninst brovm in tho Circuit Court of tho City of 
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Richmond. The court did not have jurisdiction of the ~ubject matter but neverthelm~" 
Bj:-own appeared, demurred and filed several SIB cial pleas. The court overruled the 
demurrer and struck out the pleas. After losing on the demurrer and special pleas, 
Brown moved the court to dismiss the proceedings because of lack of juricdiotion. 
What should be the court's ruling on the motion? 
If the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of a suit not even consent 
oan give jurisdiction. Thus a trial justice court has no jurisdiction to try a felony 
case and consent cannot give it. Consent can waive venue but cannot give jurisdiction 
using this term in ita technical sense. Hence the motion should be granted. 
181. What are the exceptions to the householder's right to claim homestead against 
execution? , 
Homestead exemptions cannot be claimed as against torts as it is allowed only a-
gainst debts. It cannot be claimed against rent, or against a claim of a laboring 
person or mechanic for services furnished. It cannot be claimed in property that has 
been conveyed in fraud of creditot:s and the conveyance set aside, nor can it be 
claimed in a shifting stock of merchandise, nor for the purchase price .of property 
in the property so sold, or in property exchanged for such property. For complete 
list see Burks #445(4th Ed.) · 
--182. Doctrine in Virginia as to breaking outer doors of dwelling houses to levy dis-
tress or execution? 
This is allowed by statute after demand has been made for admittance. v~ • 
.... 184. nA", of Buckingham, sues 11 B.,, of Richmond, in Buckingham county, upon a contract 
made and to be performed, and breached, in Richmond. "·B11 files a plea in abatement, 
stating that no part of the cause of action arose in Buckingham county, and also that 
at the time of the service of the writ 11 B11 was in Buckingham solely for the purpose 
of defending another suit brought against him by 11A11 , all of which was true. Is the 
plea good? . 
Assuming that it is correct as to form, both contentions are sound and the plea is 
bad far duplicity. Since the cause of action did not arise in Buckingham county the 
action will not lie there, and even if it did the defendant was privileged from 
service of process while attending court as a party to the proceedings. See headnote 
8 of 28 s.E.910. Pleas in abatement are still subject to special demurrer for defeets 
of form, although special demurrers have otherwise been abolished. 
- 185. How long must the parties reside in Virginia before a suit for divorce can be 
maintained? 
At least one of the parties must have been dJomiciled in Virginia for one year·. V# 
~· 
lB6. John Jones, Thomas Brown and William Smith own, jointly, a tract of twenty acres 
~ of land in Chesterfield county. Not being able to agree upon a division, Jones bring~ 
euit against Smith and Brown for partition. He does not make Mrs. Smith or Mrs. Brown 
parties to the suit. The Court, ascertaining that the land cannot be conveniently 
divided in kind, orders it sold for division. Does the purchaser get a good title as 
against the dower rights of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Brown? 
Yes. V#8-695t "A sale of land so made by order of the court shall operate to bar 
the contingent right of dower of the wife in the share of her husband in the land so 
sold, and to bar the right of curtesy of the hutlband in the share of the wife in the 
land so sold, whether the said wife or husband be made party to the suit or not." 
187. Can an administrator, as such, maintain a suit for the sale of his decedent's 
lands for the payment of decedent's debts? 
Harrison #460: "In Virginia a personal representative may not file a bill to sybjeot 
the real estate to the payment of the debts of the decedent, unless he is specially 
authorized by the will." The title to real estate vests in heirs or devisees and not 
in the personal representatives. If the land must be taken to pay the debts the prop-
er procedure is for the creditors to file a creditors' bill in equity. 
- 188. w, a citizen of Franklin county, Virginia, gives c, of Henry county, his note, 
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rx.1;yable at a bank in Henry County. He fails to pay the note, and C brings action in 
t h e Circuit Court of Henry, proceedir:g ·by notice under section $-717 f.~· _t qe, Code. Th ,?. 
notice was served on vl in Franklin liounty. Is the service good? · •t• ··~ ~c. 
i:Jo . vJhile the cause of action arose in Henry County, process w ill not issue out of 
Henry County since this is not a tort, nor is the defendant a corporation, nor is it 
a suit on an official bond, nor is it a case of joint liability where one of the 
par·ties has been served in Franklin County. 
- 189. John Brown, an engineer on an N.&w. train, engaged in interstate commerce, is 
killed by an accident in Roanoke county, Virginia. His administratrix sues for dama-
ges under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, bringing her action in the Circuit 
Court of Roanoke county. Ha,s the court jurisdiction, and, if so, how much may she 
r ecover? 
Congress has given State courts concurrent jurisdiction over .cases arising under the 
Federal Employer's Liability Act. If plaintiff ir~titutes a suit in the State court 
defendant (under this statute) cannot remove the case to the Federal court. The · 
Circuit Court of Roanoke county has jurisdiction. See h5 U.S.C.A.#51 et seq. 
Under the Virginia death by wrongful act statute :~25,000 is the mrodmum amount re-
coverable but under the Federal Employer's ,Liability Act there is no maximum limita-
tion. She may recover a reasonable compensation f or loss of hUsband's support, but if 
her husband's death was due to _his contributory negligence that may be shown in miti-
gation of damages under the Federal Employer's Liability Act unless the injury was du1 
to the railway's failure to comply with t he requt:::·ements of the Safety. Appliances Act, 
in which case the employee's negligence in assum:i.ng the work cannot be shown at all. 
190. A, of Charlotte, N.C., while passing through Vil~ginia in his automobile, neg-
legently runs into B 1 s car on the high,.Iay in Roanoke county and damages same to the 
extent of ~500. Bat once sues out an attachment for this damage, which .is levied on 
A's car before the car leaves Virginia. Can B maintain this attachment? 
Yes, since-A is a non-resident. However if B wants an officer to take possession of 
the car B will have to give bond conditioned upon his winning out when the case is 
heard for trial. 
191. A bill of exceptions i n the year 19L~9 shows that a prop3r question was asked by 
the exceptor in the lower court and ruled out, but fails to show what answer the ex-
ceptor expected in reply to the question. Will the Court of Appeals consider the ex-
ceptions? 
In 41 S.E.(Va.)307 it is said: "~~~here a question is asked a witness and he is not 
permitted to answer, and exception thereto is taken, th~ bill of exceptions must 
show 'irhat the party asking the question expected to prove, else the appellate court 
cannot tell whether or not the witness had any knowledge on the subject, or the -· 
question was relevant or material. Under the Rules, there is no need for a formal 
bill of exceptions. Rule 5:11 se~tion 3~ subparagraph (e) and (f) provide that oral 
testimony and other inCident s of the trial transcribed by a reporter, and any wl"itten 
statement of facts, testimony or other i ncidents of the case . become part of the recor: 
when delivered to the cler k, if the transcript or statement is tendered to the judge 
within 60 days and signed by him withi n 70 days after final judgment. In this case 
the transcript or statement would be valueless unless it indicated what the witness' 
answer would have been had he been permi tted to answer. 
192. John Hardy, an employee of t he Blue Ridge Hica Co., a Delaware Corporation, hav-
ing its chief of fice in Dover,D.el., but operati ng a mine in Henry County,Va., is in-
jured there by the company's negligence . There i s no off icer or director of the 
company residing in Henry county . The company has a manager t here who looks · after the 
mine. ;{ou wish to sue for Hardy 's injury. Can you bring suit in Henry county, arxl 
if so,how would you serve t he process? 
Yes, Process can be served on the r~gistered agent of the fore i gn corporation, or on 
any director, offi cer or agent, or, i f none can be f ound, on the clerk of the Corpora· 
tion Commission. If such foreign Corporation does business in Virginia without a 
cer t ificat e of author ity it is deemed to have thereby appo:i.nted the clerk of the 
Commission its attorney for service of process. Since the cause of action arose in 
Henry County, t he acti on i s maintai nable t her e , and since the defendant is a corpora-
tion(also since t his i s an acti on f or a wrong)process will issue out of Henry County 
under V#f\-Lt 7 • 
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~93o What is the usual method of trying title to an office, or of removal of an 
cff ic9r for malfeasance? 
Headnote 16 to case of 96 S.E.819 reads: "The usual common-law method of contostin~ 
title to an office is by writ of quo warranto or a writ in the nature of a writ of -
qu.o warranto, which procedure is available in Virginia." 
Not.e: Headnote 17 reads: "'While generally the title to an office cannot be tried 
indirectly by a writ of mandamus, the availability of such remedy is settled in Vir-
ginia as affording a simple, expeditious, adequate and complete remedy." 
194. I·V.hat is a writ of procedendo? A writ of procedendo is a writ commanding an in-
ferior court to proceed to judgment. See 50 C.J.424. 
~ 195 • In -wh.a+;·cou.rt· aOO.._ v.§nue( exclusive of the Supreme Court of Appeals )would you 
bring prohibition? ·-- -··-- _ _ 
y#&.42: n Jurisdiction of writs oFma1'l.dCl1ll:t.lft";--pr.ohi.~j:.ion and certiorari(except such 
as may be from the Supreme Court of Appeals) shall be in "'the- Gi.xc.ui~-..Cou.r1_ of the 
county, or in the circuit or corporation court of the city. 11 ----
196. Give an instance where consent can confer jurisdiction and one where it cannot. 
Where jurisdiction is u.sed in the sense of venue consent gives jlj.risdiction as ven· · 
ue is merely the privilege of defendant to have the case tried in a certain county if 
he desires to have it tried there. When the word 11 ju.risdiction" is used in its strict 
sense(that is the po·wer to hear, decide and enforce its decision)jurisdiction is 
given by law and not b<y consent,. Thus consant cannot give a trial justice jurisdict-
ion over felony cases, nor State courts jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. 
197. Defendant moves to dismiss a bill-(l)For lack of proper service;(2)For lack of 
equitable jurisdiction over the subject matter. Assuming that the first point, if 
madt2l independently, is good, and the second bad, what should be the action of the 
court? 
A motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction w.here(as here)if such a motion is 
granted it would be a bar to a further prosecution of the same case in any Virginia 
court of equity amounts to a general appearance and hence would waive any irregular-
ity as to service of process. However, under the Rules, the defendant could file a 
plea in abatement within 21 days of the service of the subpoena in chancery upon him. 
If this plea is not sustained he no longer waives any rights by contesting the case 
on its merits. See Rule 2:10~ 
. 198. The return on a valid surmnons is defective. How should the defendant avail him-
self of this defense? 
In 48 S.E. (Va. )899: "Where the matter relied upon to abate an action is a fact not 
appearing on the record, or the retu.rn of an officer, it must be pleaded in abatemeni 
so as to give the other party an opportunity to traverse and try it, but where all 
facts relied upon appear by the record, including the return of the officer--there 
the action may be dismissed on motion11 • Burks p.lOl(hth Ed.) 
199. Robert Taylor files a bill in equ.ity in which he alleges that he is the owner of 
Blackacre and has good legal title, that William Harris is in pc.ssession of said 
land claiming title thereto under an invalid deed, and praying that the court estab-
lish the plaintiff's superior title, oust Harris, and put plaintiff in possession. 
Is the bill demurrable and reason? The bill is demurrable as it shows on its face tha 
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at ~aw,i.e.the preser~ equivalent of ejectment. But 
V/18-138 provides that no case shall be dismissed simply because it ;,ras brought on 
tne wrong side of the court,but whenever it shall appear that a plaintiff has pro-
ceeded at law when he should have proceeded in equity or in equity when he should 
have proceeded at law,the court shall direct a tr81B.Sfer to the proper forum,and shall 
order such change in,or amendment of,the pleadings as may be necessary to conform to 
the proper practice. 
200.0 recovers a judgment against B and execution issu.es thereon within the year,re-
turned "no effects" and B then dies.What are the proper proceedings to revive this 
lfudgment against B's personal representaUve,and within what time must this proceed-
ing be had in order to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations~ 
• 
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lBurks p.66(4th Ed.) reads: i\lhere the scire facias or action is against the pers::>n 
aL representative o.f .a-decedent:, it shall be brought within five .years from his 
qualification, thus cutting down the life of a judgment against a judgment debt-or vo.~: 
dies to five years from the qualification of his personal representati~e unless wi"): 
i n that time the judgment be revived by sci:pe facias, or action be brought · thereon. a 
202. What are. the jurisdictions of the various lower courts in Virginia? 
The ·lowest court.s are not cou ts o r lr.d and have only the jurisdiction given / 
them by statute. They are as ,follows: In cities over 4.5,000 by l ast census polici 
courts pres.ided over by .f'olice ~ustices, and c:l.vil courts presided over by civil 
justices • . The former. have jurisdiction over misdemeanors, violation of municipal' 
ordinances and preliminary hearings in felony cases but not the trial af the felony 
case itself. The latter have jurisdiction over all 1civil matters fo~erl ,llen tp 
justices of the pe~, anq in addition have2 concurre t J~~ia~c~i~itlL the circuit 
and city courts of an~ claim t damages for anY inj~r~ done to the P.erson i waul 
be recove-raoi e . i n an action at law J if such claims do not exceed $300; . hav-e- jurisdic 
tion over att'aorunent s w ere the ~ount of the claim does not c ea. e general juri 
diction of said JUS ~ce; and have ~nt ·· risdiction with the circuit courts ar. 
city courts of general jurisdiction in actions at law where the amo · co.ntrev er 
sy doe not exceed .,l;2 000 exclusive o · nt er.est.,. costs an attorneys fees contracted 
for, but if it exceeds ;ip300 the defendant may remove the case to the proper circuit 
or city court. See VjtJ,6.1 ..::Z7 ~ ·· . ... .. . 
In towns from 10,000 to h.5,000 t here is a ci vil and police justice who combines tht: 
two jurisdictions mentioned above. In all other localities there are trial justi ces. 
The j urisdiction of t hese courts is in general the same as the combined jurisdictior 
of Police Courts and Civil Courts in' c i ties of over 4.5,000 as described above. Ln 
apP.eal lie o all these courts where more than ,;- i s · ~ad. exclusive of 
interest;. costs, and ~ttorney's fees contracted for. V#-16.1-106. 
The courts of record of general jurisdiction are t he circuit courts of the countieE 
the corporation courts of the cities, and some special courts as Husting Courts, an 
Courts of Law arrl Equi t y . In their own special fi elds the Industrial Commission and 
the State Corporati on Commission are on a par with these courts of e;eneral juris-
diction. If the olved is ·'2D o ess only cou.rts ot of record have 
j uri sdi ction. 
Note: Since July 1, 1956 the. name of the trial just i. ce courts has been changed 
to t .1at of County Courts. The Police courts, civil cChurts, arrl civil and police 
courts are now also called municipal courts. 
A . H;~;J\LING MTD PRAG'i' ICE Instruoticna 587 200 Va.l79. 
D ran into P, a pedeS'tr 1.an, while driving his car. The evidence was conflicting as 
"\i') whether or not D was crossing at an intersection. The cour'11 instructed the jury 
:·· tha.t the pedestrian's right of way extends from one side of the street to the ot her. 
It does not begin at any point in the intersection or does it end at any particular 
point. It begir~ on one side of the street ~~d extends until the pedestrian has 
negotiated the crossing.n There was another instruction which stated that pedestrians 
had the right of way at intersections. and motorists had it elsewhere. Verdict and 
judgment were for P for $8500. 
Held: Reversed and remanded. The instruction in quotes was taken from a Virginia 
case out of context and is erroneous as given since it could reasonably be inter-
preted as always giving the pedestrian the right of way. It is not cured by a later 
correct instruction as there is no way to tell whethe:r:-. the jury relied on the wrong 
or right instruction. Only the jury knows that. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Criminal Procedure--Constitutional Law 200 Va.341. 
A warrant which charged only unlawful and reckless driving was issued against D.r~~~~ 
As a matter of fact D had been convicted during the preceding twelve months of thel~ 
same of:fense. The County Court Judge could have amended the warrant so that it 
would have charged a second offense(for which there is a greater penalty) but he ·did 
not. D appealed from the County Court and demanded a jury trial. Over objection 
evidence was introduced of his prior conviction and instructions were given as to 
the penalty for a second offense occurring within twelve months of the prior offense. 
D was found guilty and fined, and also assessed with the costs of the jury. 
He contended that he could not be tried as a second offender unless the warrant 
stated that he was being tried for a second offense. 
Held: This contention is correct. A man charged with a less serious offense cannot 
be tried for a more serious offense whether the prosecution is by indictment or on a 
warrant. 
He contended that his right to a , jury trial is impaired if the costs of the jury 
are to be born by him in the event of a conviction. 
Held: This contention is wrong. The Oommonwealth is only being reimbursed its costs 
which his wrongful act has caused, and V#l9-·296 which provides that the clerk shall 
make up a "statement of all the expenses incident to the prosecution" and issue an 
execution therefor is valid even though it includes the costs of the jury. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 106 S.E.2d 618, ·200 Va.597. 
P filed a bill in equity for the specific performance of an oral contract to con-
0 1e- J vey realty. By agreement of counsel·~ an i.ssue out of chancery on two questions was 
t / 1ft 1 submitted to a jury who found the matters in favor of P. Despite this finding the . 
o _.L#dYChancellor dismissed the suit on the ground that there was not sufficient part per-
~~· formance referable to the oral contract that could not be adequately compensated in 
money. p appealed on the ground that the Chancellor's decree was contrary to the 
evidence, but he did not incorporate the evidence into the record on appeal. 
Held: p failed to comply with Rule 5:3, #J(e) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal{:! in that he did not incorporate into the printed record so much of the evi-
dence as was necessary for the Supreme Court of Appeals to give full consideration 
of the assignment of error. Under the circumstances it is impossible to pass on the 
point that the decree is contrary to the e'Vidence. Since the decision below is pre-
sumed to be right it is binding on the Supreme Court of Appeals in this case. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE · 588. . r2 00 Va. 804e 
P who was X's personal representative,. paid J $6,,000 for injuries .Jreceived in 
an automobile wreck. Pis now suing D for contribution on the ground vhat D was,~ 
egligent joint tort feasor. D denied that he was 'negligent and that even if he 
~~~ ere that his negligence was a proxunate cause of J's injuries. D moved the court 
~/~~' or summary judgment in his favor and the court granted the motion. 
~~\ Held: Error. Summary judgment should not be granted where, as here, material facte 
' are genuinely in dispute. A motion for summary judgment is not a substitute for a 
demurrer, nor should the court grant such a motion when pleadings can properly be 
amended. Hence if P fails to allege that D's negligence was a proximate cause of 
J's injury the Court should not grant D1s motion for summary judgment for that 
reason for P may wish to amend. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Rule 5:1 section 3(f) 200 Va.850 
r · _,... In the course of atte~pting. to perfect an appeal ~ppellant 1 s counsel delivered to 
R 0. ~,l appellee's counsel at h1s res1dence at 7 P.M. a not1ce that he would that day pre-~ 1 sent to the judge at his residence a narrative of the evidence. This was done 30 J~ ~ minutes later. Eight days later the judge signed it. The judge stipulated that 
;v . I ~ppellee' s counsel had an opportunity to examine it. Appellee's counsel declined to 
~amine it on the ground that thirty minutes' notice was not the reasonable notice 
ur~ 1 ~required by Rule 5:1, section 3(f), while appellant contended that appellee had Q~~ eight days to examine it. U Held: Not sufficient notice. The rule reads "* * * Counsel tendering the trans-
cript or statement sh•Jd g:i:,re fOpPosi:ng-e-e1:1.flsel r eas.onabl e written not1ce of' f:he_ time 
and place of tendering it and a reasonable o o unit to examine the ori inal or a 
trUe copy o nee the ru e plainly requires counsel to give the notice it is 
immaterial that ~he judge gave appelleeJs counsel a reasonable opportunity to ex-
amine the narrative of the evidence~ Appeal dismissed. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Adequacy of Damages 201 Va.348. 
p suffered a quite severe whiplash injury to his neck and back when D negligently 
ran into the rear of P1s car while P was stopped for a red light~ He suffered a 
wage loss of $872, a hospital bill of $649, a doctor bill of $318 making a total 
of about $18hO. He suffered great pain for many weeks and while now probably cured 
he will be more susceptible to injury in the future. The jury awarded him $2500 
Which the trial judge set aside as clearly inadequate. At the next trial the jury 
awarded $8,000. What result on appeal? 
Held: First verdict re-instated and judgment entered thereon. $2500 was not gross-
ly inadequate. It even gave him over $600 for pain and possible future discomfortl 
The damages are not subject to exact measurement. There is no evidence that the 
verdict was the result of passion, prejudice, corruptj_on, or mistake. It does not 
shock the conscience. Hence all proceedings subsequent to the erroneous setting 
aside of the verdict should be treated as null and void. · 
l PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Constitutional Law-( 201 Va.448. !'/ ~ 1\I(:F;. _p obtained a judgment against D in 1932. At that time the judgment could be kept 
J tD &" yi ~N:d,ive by the issuance of successive writs of execution(fieri facias} within the 
, 1 ·>~l 1 ~1btatutory period, but in 1948 the law(V#8-396) was changed so that judgments, past 
yt eA~ s well as future, could only be kept alive by scire facias or action within 20 
\ "- f)(DL years from the date of the judgment(5 years when against the personal prepresenta-[) Un $5 tive of a decedent). P Continued to attempt to keep the 1932 judgment alive after 
~~ 1948 by the old procedure on the ground that the legislature could not deprive him 
of his vested rights so far as judgments obtained before 1948 were concerned. 
Held: Against p. How judgments are enforced is a mere matter of procedure. No one 
has any vested rights in procedural rules ~s long as a reasonable time is given to 
protect his procedural rights. An ordinary act of the legislature does not become 
effective until 90 days after adjournment and the purpose of the 90 days is to give 
everyone a chance to learn about the change and govern himself accordingly. Hence 
the executions issued after the 1948 law took effect were inoperative for the 
purpose desired. 
. / 
\ r~LEADING AND PRACTICE--Mandamus 589. 201· Va.$33. 
,~-~-d . ~he. State Highway De~artment took possession of 30 feet of P's land mistakenly 
,,\w·-~~~hiplung that it had tJ.tle thereto. P brought mandamus to compel the Commonwealth to 
· .~ ~ondemn the land. The Highway Commissioner defended on the merits. The latter now 
· J fi claims that mand~mus was not the proper remedy. ~~~ Held: While this contention is correct since the extraordinary remedy of mandamus 
r~ does not lie when there is an ordinary remedy{such as by declaratory judgment or 
motion for judgment in ejeotment)available, this is a purely procedural matter, and 
when the defendant acquiesced in the mandamus proceedings and had the same opportun-
ity there to develop his case as he would have had if a technically correct proceed-
ing had been brought defendant has waived his rights and the error is cured. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Criminal Procedure Former Jeopardy 201 Va.552. 
D was tried before a police magistrate on a charge of reckless driving. He was 
t/"\found guilty as charged. The magistrate then wrote on the back of the warrant 11 ---
{/r1educed to fail to give right of way". D appealed to the Circuit Court of the City 
rb o Hampton where he had a trial de novo. He was again convicted of reckless driving. {e--D By V#19.:.154 and 19-158 no plea is necessary in a misdemeanor case. D was granted a 
r. writ of error. He now contends that a conviction before the magistrate of a "failure 
to yield right of way" was an acquittal of the charge of. reckless driving, and hence 
the Circuit Court should have dismissed the case against him as he could not be 
tried for an offense of which he had been acquitted. 
Held: D is wrong for two reasons. First, he failed to plead the special defense of 
former jeopardy in the Circuit Court. While he did not have to plead, a failure to 
plead is not a special plea, and when he made no such plea he waived any such de-
fense. He cannot make such a plea above when he failed to make it below •. Secondly, 
he was not acquitted a£ tbe charge of reckless driving. Failure to ;vield rigbt of 
W!J.Y when the lives of others were endangered is a s~fic.a.tion.-o£..__the-t.ype-o£ reck-
1~~ drivinji for which h.e-Was_rumvic.ted. 11 The question on appeal is not whether 
the judgment of the trial justice is correct; but whether the accused is guilty of 
the offense charged." 
\ PLEADING AND PRACTICE 201 Va.693 
It later decided that it 
court was correct in the 
t~ I. In the case of P v D the court directed a verdict for P. b"•J t;\.K should not have done this, and granted D a new trial. If the 
, \~' first place, is P entitled to a writ of error? 
V Held: No. writs of error lie only to final judgments. There has not been any final 
judgment as yet. 
II. Assume that P made out a good case and D a poor one. What action must the court 
take oefore directing a verdict for P? 
Held: By CPEz B-~8 a verdict should no · cted unless the court has first 
stricken the evidence in ro u a_par.t_.y: against who!ll hl die ~-to be 
o.._· 
LEADING AND PRACTICE 201 Va.699 
p brought ejectment to enforce the power of termination provisions in a deed where-
~\' y he had conveyed a site for a church to the trustees of the G Church. He alleged 
C.,~ -0 \ in his motion for judgment that since 1958 said real estat? had not been used as a 
. / b' place of worship by the members of the church, and that saJ.d real estate is now in 
(J_- \\ \ .. !(?the possession of a congregation whose beliefs are foreign to those of the G Church, 
~J' r both of which violated the conditions of the deed. Defendants asked for a bill of 
~~ particulars with reference to the latter allegation only. The bill of particulars, 
~ when filed, failed to support P1 s contentions so summary judgment was entered for 
defendants. 
Held: Error. The bill of particulars need not state a cause of action. The first 
allegation was still to be disposed of, and no issue has yet been joined on it. No 
summary judgment should be entered where any material fact is genuinely in dispute. 
If the bill of particulars was insuff icient, the court should require a sufficient 
statement rather than entering judgment on the insufficient one. 
\ 
590. 
J:'L:1ADING AND PRACTICE-Equity--Venue 201 Va~ 747. 
C?mplainants, who were beneficiaries under a second deed of trust executed-. by the 
X Corporation on land owned by it in N County, bought the land for $25,000 when the 
f i r st deed of trust was foreclosed. According to complainants the trustee of the 
first deed of trust. is about to make an immediate settlement under an accounting 
t hat is improper and excessive, and that if this were done numerous suits would have 
to be brought to recover the improper payments from the persons so paid some of whom 
were probably insolvent. Complainar1ts seek to enjoin the settlement. They brought 
this suit in N_County though none of the defendants resided therein. 
Held: (l)Equity has jurisdictio s tlement o ooant.J? whsm 
co an s ~~uat~~~e fact that the legislature has 
provided another remed b settin up a commissioner of accounts before whom ob-
je_ tiona may be made does not Lt.._e_q~1 o rent urisdic · ,hat 
~t tute does not expressl de rive courts of e uit of jurisdict!gn. If equity once obta1ns ur1sdiction it keeps jurisdiction notwithstandi ng the fact that other bodies may also be given jurisdiction unless the legislature expressly deprives ourts oT equity of their old jurisdiction.(2)Since the land was situated in N 
County, that county was a proper venue despite the fact that none of the defendants 
were residents of that county. The real estate in question was situated there and 
the trustees' accounts could only be settled in that jurisdiction. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Final or interlocutory? 201 Va.934. 
r- J or Pursuant to contract D const,ructed a sewer. P, a Sanitation Authority, filed a 
r~~ . ~~JEill in equity to requireD to convey' the sewer toP. The trial court adjudged that 
./ ~~~ ~he ownership of the sewer line was in P, and directed D to execute a deed to P 
~ ~ ~ therefor. The decree provided that if D refused to execute the deed by a specified 
./'(
1 date, a special commissioner would be appointed to execute it •. After more than four 
• ~JY' months had elapsed D appealed. P claimed that under Rule 5:4 and V#8-489 it was too 
late to appeal. 
Held: Not too late. Rule 5:4 and V#8-489 set a time limit on appeals from a final 
decree and have no application to interlocutory decrees. The present decree adjudi-
c~d the principles of the case, so it is a 2~alable, but_.since the ase was .ratain-
eq or possible further action of a discretionary:_natur.a..by_the_ it \oras not a 
:t.:inal decree. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Rule of Couxt 202 Va.40 
D was sued by P, a 20 .... months old infant, who was struck by D's car while toddling 
acros~ Ocean View Ave. unattended in fairly heavy traffic. The jury found for D and 
p appealed. During the trial improper instructions were given without objection and 
J. · c-1'7 p failed to make a motion to strike D's evidence. Within 21 days after judgment was 
~~~· entered on the verdict P moved the court to set aside the verdict because of the 
I.V' erroneous instructions, and he also asked that the verdict be set aside as contrary 
to the evidence. He also failed to designate the instructions to be printed as part 
of the record which he considered erroneous, but such instructions appeared as 
\ addenda in the briefs. 
Qb~& Held: Under Rule 3:21 all judgments are in the breast of the court for 21 days, tv and since the first two matters set forth above were presented to the court within 
that period they were presented within time for the lower court's consideration and 
hence not waived. While P could have made a motion to strike the evidence~ch a 
mo:tion is opti ollal ,"' and -1 ll 1 j eu. thereof h9 may, if-he_w.ishe~it. and ;~ve that 
the v ·ct if a ainst him)be set aside as contrary to the ev~~e. Rule 5:1#6(f) 
(which rule deals wrtfi e es1gna 10n tne par s of the record to be printed on 
appeal)reads, "'However, t his court may, at the instance of counsel or of its own 
motion, consider other parts of the record" not printed. Since the instructions 
were in the briefs as addenda thereto and were erroneous it was proper to consider 
them even though they were not designated as pru·ts of the record to be printed. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Partition-Necessary Parties 591. 2:02 Va.22J. 
A O'Vmed a third undivided interest in Blackacre. She died testate, and after mak-
\_~.r:'~.n.g some bequest~·., she provided that all the rest of her property should be used 
t \\" 1 1' as· a fund to aid. Salvation Army". Partition proceedings were instituted. by the 
\~' 0ther owners but the Salvation Army was not made a party thereto. Blackacre wa.s not. 
su&ceptible to partition in kind. The Salvation Army petitioned the Court to be 
allovJed. to become a party defendant • . The other parties to the partition suit de-
murred. 
Held: Demurrer sustained. The Salvation Army was not a co-owner of the land nor 
did it have a lien thereon. Its only interest is one in a fund(if there is such a 
fund)afte!' debts, expenses of administration, taxes, and legacies have all been paid . 
It has no interest in Blackacre and hence is not a necessary party to the partition 
proceedings. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Rule 5:1 #6(.a) 202 Va •. 260. 
In the suit of P v D judgment was rendered in favor of P on June 2,1959. Within 
&J days thereof(Ju.ly 31) D filed notice of appeal and assignment of errors. On 
the same date a narrative ttstatement of the facts" was presented to and signed by 
the trial judge which statement was filed in the office of the clerk of the trial 
court on Augu"t 5. On Sept. 9 D filed with the clerk a. designation of the parts of 
the record he wished printed as per Rule 5:1,#6(a). He designated only the motion 
~or judgment, the judgment o~der, the order overruling his motion to vacate or 
\,~thodify the judgment, his notice of appeal and assignment of errors. Twenty five 
·~~ days later D asked that the record be transmitted to the clerk of the Supreme Court 
~e?'\ ~of Appeals. The assignment of errors relied upon was that the judgment was contrary ~ \to the law and the evidence. Note that neither the narr&tive statement nor any ~ t.~fportion of the evidence was designated to be printed. After the designated portions / ~.~· of the record had been printed and while the case was being argued new counsel 
'i:.t·,.., moved the Supreme Court of Appeals to pez:mit ·(,he statement of facts to be printed 
~ and received as a portion of the record. 
Held: Motion denied. Rule 5:1 #6(a) requires that, a designation of the parts of 
the record to be printed bemade not less than twenty days before the transmittal. 
"This is mandatory and jurisdictional. Compliance with it is necessary for the 
orderly, fair and expeditious adminictration of justice." Since there is no evi-
dence in the record, the Supreme Court of Appeals has no way of telling whether the 
judgment below was contrary to the evidence so it must be affirmed as it is presumed 
to be right. · 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Mandamus 202 Va~335 . 
f7 A,D,C and D contested an election for four county offices pursuant to the prOYis-
~~ ions of Vh-24-419 et seq. A special three judge court i s provided for, and no appeal Nl f(f lies. V#24-434 provides that a complaint shall be filed in the clerk's office and 
['. a copy served M a notice is served under V#8- 51 within ten days after the election, 
on the person whose election is contested. V#24-436 provides that llin judging of 
such election the court shall proceed on the merits t hereof and decide the same 
according to the constitution and laws." The copy of t he complaint was served on 
A,B,C and D in the morning of th~ ninth day and the complaint was filed in the 
clerk's office on the afternoon of that day. The special court held that a copy of 
the complaint could not be served before the complai nt itself was filed and dismiss-
ed the proceedings. What r emedy, if any, have A,B,C and D? 
Held: This is the type of c~se for which mandamus clearly lies. It was immaterial 
that the copy of the complaint was served before t he compl aint was filed. V#24-436 
requires a determinati on on the merits and not on a technicality. This is not 
granti ng the writ of mandamus to control discretion but, to force the special three 
judge court to exerci se t he discr et i on t hat the members t hereof alone can exercise. 
Si nce by statute, no appeal l i es ther e i s no other r emedy. Writ granted. 
---~ --
.P:U.ADING AND PRACTICE--Statute of 592" · Limitations 202 Va.~5l.!.3 " 
n:Jte: Bef'ore reading this case surmnary., ~ad 195 Va.82.7 as summarized on page 573A 
of these notes as the instant case relies on that case and follows it. 
P' took out sprinkler damage insurance in 1954 through D, an agent of X J.nsur~nce 
Co. D told P that he would be protected from any loss by water escapL~ from the 
f~ prin!cler system. However, tho policy containoci an express exclusion if the water 
es~ap<:~d as a result of a hurricane. La·lier in 1954 Hurricane Hazel blew off the roof 
of p1 s bu.ilding and activated the sprinkler systerri causing great damage. P sued D 
for these damages on the th3Qry that he negligently misrepresented the terms of the 
policy. This action was instituted more than four years after the drunage. 
Held: ' Barred by the one year statute of limitation~ because this action would not 
survive, and there is no other statute of limitations applicable. V#8-24 and 64-135. 
Since the pr.operty injury by D was an indirect one it would not survive. Had it been 
a direct injury to property the five year statute would have been applicable. But 
here D did not cause the hurricane which was the direct cause of the sp~inkler leak-
ageo 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Waiver of Service of Process 119 S.E.2d 337,202 Va. 
P was entitled to certain righ*s under the Virginia Uninsured Motorists Law against 
his insurance company, D. Before this policy expired the legislature modifieu the J Uninsured Motorists Law by requiring process to bG served on the plaintiffs 1 insur-
~\rl ance companies as though they were defendants whenever suit was brought against un-
' insured motorists. After this modifica.tion of the lm-r became effective P was damag-
ed by an uninsured motorist e~nd brought suit a.gainst him. D actually knew of the · case 
and sent one of its lawyers to the trial as an otserver. P recovered judgment against 
the uninsured motorist, and, not being able to collect it, sued D who relied on the 
defense that it had not been served as if it were a defendant. 
Held: Defense is valid. The provisions of the statute are mandatory. P has not been 
deprived of any vested rights he had under his policy as the changes made in the la.1-w 
are mere matters of procedure. The fact that D had a~tual notice of the proceedings 
and had an observer in court is not a waiver of se:n.rice of process. To be a waiver, 
it .would have been necessary for it to have taken part in the proceedings. fresence 
and observation al O~Q B::l"e ne'b enottgh-. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--I~urance--StatutG of Limitations 119 S.E.2d 497 1 202 Va. ~ 
A fire insurance policy was not worded as per the actual contract due to fault of 
Insurbr. A loss occurred and Insured in good faith brought an action at law on the 
policy as it should have read. This action was commenced within the 12 months allow-
ed by the policy. When the case came on for trial the co~t told Insured if he want· 
ed to collect at law, he would have to bring his case on the policy as it was 
actually written, and that if he didn't want to do that, he should ask for reforms- . 
tion in e uity. So Insured dropped the law case and proceeded in equity. When he did 
this, the twelve month period had expired. Insurer claimed that the suit .was barred. 
Held: Not barred. Where the Insurer was to blame for the defects in the policy,and 
there has been no decision on the merits, the equity case for reformation is, in 
reality, a continuation of the original case, and since that case was instituted in 
time, proceedings were comme~ced within the 12 months as required. 
?.LEADING AND PRACTICE 593n 202 Va. 753n 
'lhe jtt<iga of the Circuit Court of Fra..."lklin Co1 nty gave an erroneous instruction 
-~.-) the jury. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff in accordance with the 
nx·:c·bneous i!lstruction. Defendant. moved the Court to .::;et aside the verdict as being 
·Yn;t-ud.ry to lalf. The Court sa•: its error, and rendered judgment for the dofGndad,. 
Plaintiff now claims that an erroneous instruction is binding on the trial court and 
i .s t.he law of that case and that defendant's only remedy is an appeal. Is Plaintiff 
-; r.lrrer. t.? 
Held: No. l'l'hile attorneys are not permitted to argue before a jury that the in-
. ._~~~~~*-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~==--~~ 
.s,t_1·ucbons are vrrong, that prinCJ1p1 e has no a.ppllcat:ton to tfl.e thai jUdge. As soon 
as he realizes that he has erred he should correct his mistake. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Evidence--Rule 1:8 202 Va.835. 
P was injured when she slipped on some grapes on the floor of an A&P store. The 
attorney for the defendant called its manager as a witness and asked him "during the 
~~~ear preceding P's fall how many people fell in your store on any debris?" pas 
G~oR !3-ttorney then said, nyour Honor, I object, I don't see what relevancy there is to 
· \j the issue. There is no doubt P fell". 'r.he court overruled the obje~tion and the 
trial proceeded without any further action on P 1 s part with reference to the ad-
missibility of such evidence. On appeal P now claims the evidence was erroneously 
admitted a 
Held: Unless P not only gave his grounds of objection, but also, when these 
grounds were overruled, said, "I f.X;!ept 11 or 11 I wish to save t..he point." or something 
similar, he is -deemed to have a~quiesced in the court's ruling. In the instant case 
P did not object to the ruHng of the ·.;ourt, but only to tr..e proffer of the testi-
mony. Hence he hasfo.iledto-satisfyRule 1:8 which requires that thegroundOfob-
jec tion to the ruling of the cour.t be stated wi t.h reasonable certainty. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Mr:mt~~on of Amount Sued for in L1st::1)\3t.ions. 121 S.E.2d 379 
~ 202 Va.926 • 
• .,- 'b If. P sues D(say for $50,000) is an instruction t~lling the jury that in no event J\J · bshall they find damages in ex~Bea of $50,000 proper? The Sup:t•t)me Court of Appeals 
l'' t-.u!' ~tate~ t~at the:e nis a · }onfl~c:t of authorit.y on this point, and that trial courts 
t..j, ~" ~n th~s uta te d~fr er anong tt ;.:.!Jrr.s Gl.vee. l'''( Held~ This should not be done ( a::~cept where the amount. of recovery is limited by 
' · ~ statut.e as is presently done in de~th by wrongful act case['). Since the :i.nstructions 
come f::om the court the ,jury are apt t0 attach too mu~h importance to a plaintiff's 
extra-...ragant claim. Rather. the jury should be told that they should restrict re-
cover ~ if any, to the"o.mount claimed in the leadings. Some states do not even 
allo~ e event the verdict exceeds the amount sued 
for., 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Venue 12:!. S.E,2d 817 ,2CJ Va. 
X w.bile driving a car negligently injured P. X -vms hurt, too, and died from his 
injuries. D qualified in Montgomery county as X' s per·sonal r9presenta ti ve. Subse-
J 
~quently D moved to Roanoke and P sued D in Ro~noke. D filed a plea in abatement on 
p,#IJ-e../ the ground that the suit should have been instituted i n the count.y where D qualified. 
f The statutes rflad
11
.#8-38 ~ Venue gent-'.."ally.-:·Any action at l aw or. suit in equi ty,ex-0 ~'cept where it is otherwlSe especially pronded, may bs b:-ought ~n any county or 
V eh· V corporation: 
"(1) Wherein any of the defef'dants mc:.~r r esicl a ; 
"(5) If it be a S'lit ~(-~(-*or action against a personal representative*** or 
other fiduciary, in the c-ounty or corporation wherein the will was admitted to pro-
bate, or such fiduciary qualified. 11 
p contended that the Yenue statut·3 above was cumulative and hence he could sue • 
either in Montgom0ry County or in Roanoke. D cor1te nded that (5) above notherwise 
especially providedn and heP.ce t hat Montgomery County was tM only proper County 
under #8-33 although both sides a~itted that. u.nde~ V#S-39 the action was maintain-
able in the county or city in which th~ cause of a c tion arose. 
594o 
Held: Plea in abatement sustained. "In the case of an administrator of an esta.te 
Gi' a deceased person, the most convenient and fa:nilia.r jurisdiction is, logical ly 
ar;d legally, that in vihich the admini:.>trator qualifies, since it is a fortiori t he 
place of last residence of the deceased, in whose place and stead, f-;;r thepurr>ose 
of actions or suits aeainst the estate, the administrator stands, and is at the sam8 
-L ime t he source of the administrator's aut.~ority * * ~<-. His official residence for 
purposes of venue, is in that county or city. 
11 \rJe are of the opinion that it was the plain legislative intent that /18-38(1) 
sh,ou.ld apply to an action or suit against the defendant solely in his individual 
capacity, and that in enacting V#8-38(5) the legislature has otherwise especially 
provided for the venue of an action or suit against an administrator in his official 
capacity. 11 
, ~LEADING AND PRACTICE--Rule 3:2 amended Advance Shee t 203 Va.43 
Cl \t_.i'"J). The second paragraph of Rule 3:2 has been amended(effective Jan.l,l962)by adding 
,,"'-' thereto the underlined words below so that the second paragraph now reads: 
11A wri t returnable to rules under any statute shall be returnable in the clerk's 
office to any day within the time allowed by statute: and, if the time within which 
any writ shall be returnable is not provided by statute,thensuch writ shall be-
returnable within ninety days - ·after its date .. r- - - -- - -
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Reopening c co.se after resting 203 VaQ86 
p sued D for personal inj uries suffC;red by P when he came into contset with a live 
uninsulated wire left o.n his premises when D dismantled a r::ompressor. P proved t hat 
he was injured, but through an oversight, failed to show that D had any connection 
- Awith the wire. After P had. rested his case D moved to strike his evidence on the ~ J:JI"' \;round that P had failed to sho1-1 tl::at D 1-ms responsible f or the wire. P then re-QJ\ _ 1 quested that he be allowed to re-open the case. The Court r efused the request and r~e; P excepted. 
V' Held: Exception sustained. While the re-opening of a case after the party has 
rested is within the sC'und dj_scr·etion of the court, this discretion must be exercis-
ed in a reasonable maru ,er and not arbi trarily. If the re~opBning will result in 
undue dela;y or in surprise to the other side the court need not re-open. But here 
P's witnesses were present and D was surprised, not by t he fact that P wished to 
re .. open, but by the fact that he had overlooked present ing such evidence. It was 
an abuse of discretion for the court to reftlse the r equest to reopen for a mere 
inadvertent error under the above circwns tances . 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE·~-Summary J udgme nt 203 Va.275 
S, ~ fugitive from justice, wished to buy a second hand car from X, a dealer in 
cars. He did not tell X he was a fugitive from justice nor was he asked. X showed 
him a car and S said he would t ake i L He further stated that he did not have 
sufficient money on him and asked permission to drive t he car to a friend's house 
· /\ where he would borrow the balance needed. S left the car he had been driving with X. 
/) This car had been obtained by S by a t.rie;k. S r1egligently injured P who obtained a 
judgment against him which was uncollectible. P then sued D who was X1s insurance 
carrier. P relied on the omnibus clause i n X1 s insurance policy. The evidence was 
in conflict as to whether or not S obtained the use of the ca r fraudulently from X. 
The trial court granted D's moti on for summary judgment . 
Held: Reversed and remanded. The evidence [lhould be vi ewed as favorably as 
possible for the person agai ns t w~1om summary judgment was entered o When so viewed 
ther e was a jury question as to whetner or not S secured the car fraudulently. 
Note 1: S was under no duty to volunte er the information that he was a fugitive from 
justice . Note 2: If S did procure t he use of the car by fraud, then fraud vitiated 
consent and S became a conver ter and D would nut be liable . 
::Lc.;ADI NG AND fi\ACTICE Mandamus 595. 203 Va.316. 
The State Highway Department and E both claimed ownership of a piece of land needecl 
,.,7 ':c. r highway purposes. P filed an original petition for a vll'i t of mandamus in the V :u:fJr;eme Court of Appeals to compel the State Jiighway Commissioner to institute con-
~t.t"" u.emnation proceedings for the taking of his property. 
\\\7 Held: Mandamus denied. Mandamus ·will not lie to determine the title to realty. The 
• ::JG.preme Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to try land titles. 
Besides P has an ordinary remedy at law namely a declaratory judgment, and an extra-
ordinary remedy will not lie where there is an adequate or·dinary one. 
PLEADING AND FRACTICE--AHernative Pleading .. 203 Va.382. 
D agreed to be responsible for the delivery of deeds to l a nd made by P, a real 
estate development company, to the purchasers of land, and to account for the pro-
ceeds whether they were paid to him or to the X Corporation i-Jhich v;as P 1 s sales 
agent. The deeds in question were sent to D, c/ o the X Corporation. The money re-
ceived therefor was not paid to P who does not know whether this dereliction was the 
X Corporation's or D•s. P alleged that the money was received either by the X Cor-
poration or by D. The latter demurred on the ground that the facts should be stated 
directly and positively and not in the alternative. 
Held: Demurrer overruled. While the general rul~s as claimed by D there is an 
excegtion to that rule when the plaintiff does not know wt alternative 
or-the-other · · an 1e e en ant would be liable in either event. 
The above case clearly falls within this excep J.on. 
PLEADING AND PRAC'riCE Variance 203 Va .. 40J. 
P sought a declaratory judg:nent to the effect t hat D owed him one half of the 
~ount of certain notes. D counterclaimed alleging that P who was a joint payee of 
,J . ~ the notes had obtained the status of joint payee by fraud. D prayed that the Court l r'' cancel pIs name as a joint payee. Disputed questions 1/ITero submitted to a jury and 
leave was given to the trial judge to enter whatever judgment he should think proper. 
The evidence off ered by D did not show fraud, but it did show damages to D as E. 
result of P's breach of !ontract to allow D a certain drawing account while D was 
employed by P. No object.i.on to this evidence was offered. The trial judge entered 
judgment for D. 
Held: I•'or D. Failure to object to D's evidence •was a waiver of the variance. If 
timely ob,jection had been made D could have amended. P cannot deprive D of the right 
to amend by remaining silent thereby d.efeating the ends of justice. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 203 Vao461. 
in (1) When. P appealed on the ground tba t the judgment below was contr~ry. to the law 
tl'OS.nd the ev~dence, he designated only those parts of the re0ord for n .ntlng that 
\..vJ~'f.. were favorable to him_. He omitted all cros s examination of his witnesses. Rule 5:1, 
¥ sub-section 6 states that as much evidence shall be designated as is "necessary and 
0. material to allow the court to determine the i ssue involved." Should P's appeal be 
,_: dismissed? 
Held: No. If D was not satisfied with P's designation t he Rule permits D to desig-
nate any omitted evidence he thought material and if he had this opportunity and 
failed to take advantage of it, he cannot be heard to complain that P's designation 
was insufficient. 
(2) In the above case A and B were counsel for P, and C 1/ITas counsel for D. The 
Rules provide that if all counsel request it, the r ecord may be transmitted in less 
than 20 days to the clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals. A and C r eques ted it, but 
B did not. The record and the designations of the parties >-Tere sent up ahead of time. 
Shouls the appeal be dismissed for this r eason? 
Held: No. "All counselll does not mean every lawyer involved, but counsel on each 
side- A signed on one side for all counsel on that side , and C signed for the other 
side. 
!:L.:_•;.li.DING AND PF..ACTICE--Reference to Amount Sued For 596. 203 Va.543. 
In 202 Va.at p.932 it wa.s held that instructions given by the court should not 
L~ntion the amount sued for, because, ncoming from the court itself it is likeJ.y t:J 
~'iv e the jury the impression that the amount sued for is significant---". In the 
~ns tant case plaintiff's counsel made several references to the amount sued for. 
Is thj_s ground for reversal? 
Held: No o It is illogical and absurd to inform the jury that plaintiff cannot re·· 
cover for more than he is asking, and yet not let the jury know for how much he is 
asking. Coming from the attorney, it has far less weight than if it came from the 
court. Defendru1t is entitled to an instruction that the amount being sued for has 
no bearing on the amountll if any, that should be awarded to plaintiff. 
PLEADING ANTI PRACTICE--Petition for Perpetuation of Test:i.mony 203 Va.665. 
<f" V#8-317 provides a simple way in which to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses. 
Q \r~. -.~ Und~ the provJ.aions the person desiring to perpetuate the testimony files a peti-
't} .friion with a commissioner in chancery of a court wherein, if there were a formal b).ll 0~~ in equity to perpetuate the testimony, such bill might be filed. The testimony is ~ ).l~.f"\aken and placed with the clerk of the court by which the commissioner was appointed. 
\eY,. ~e court, on motion of any party in interest 9 shall, if it appears that proper and ~ sufficient grounds therefor ezist, enter a decree or order directing that the testi-
mony so taken be perpetuated and preserved~ 
P, ~ ~ ~ posit~ t~ brin~ suit at ~~' filed su.ch a petition with the 
proper commissioner in c:hancery. D, who would have been responsible for the payment 
of any judgrr.ent obtained against its insured sought to enjoin P from any further 
proceedings with reference to the petition, and the injunction was granted. P appeal-
ed. 
Held: Affirmed. The injunction was properly issued. The st~tqtoqr pr~eeding out-
lined above CC-!1 9nly be taken if there are ~roupds for a hi 11 ±.a perpetuate testi-
~ One of these rounds is inabilitv of the o ·· ·· · ·· hin to er etuate :1mony 
to ros • into. V#.S·-·317 
is n?t meant to be used for purposes of discovery or to ajd the I,~etitioner in the 
pr.ew,ration of his case _, but unly as a substitute for the common law formal bill in 
equity to perpetuate te;; timon,'r when and if such a bill would lie • 
. lPLEADING AND PRACTICE--Appellate Procedure 203 Va.755. 
\ t;'/1 In this case it was held that V#S- 489 and Rule 5:4 are jurisdictional, and that ~ .;.-t- under them the record in an appeal must be filed wi t;h the Clerk or Justice of the 
\'); - ~ Supreme Court of Appeals within four months from the date of final judgment, that it 
/(v!' was not enough that the petition for appeal was filed within that time, and that the 
J fault for not producing the record was that of the clerk of the trial court. The 
clerk cannot change the law by neglecting his duties. Notion to dismiss the writ of 
error sustained. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Discowery --Federal Procedure 203 Va.810 • 
....U'1 P insured his truck against loss by fire with D. Th~:re nas such a loss at a place 
\\.$()1"' ~eyond a 50 mile radius from .,1here tl'1e truck was pr.-iJ'icipally garaged. There was a 
V' / bona fide dispute as to the amount of the loss ru1d as to whether or not a rider 
;e:,9rfimiting insurer's coverage to use within fifty miles .,1as in effect at the time of ~ the loss. In its answer and grounds of defense D denied any liability, and especially 
denied liability for the sum claimed which included loss of the contents of the 
burned truck. After the pre-trial confe.rence P, pursuant to V-#'8-111~ 1, requested D 
to admit by not later than May 29,1961 (l)that the 50 nales ria er limitation had 
never been sent to P and, (2) that there was no dispute about the $'1 ,000 damages 
claimed by P. This request was i gnored, so the trial court entered swnmary judgment 
f or P. Vl/8-111.1 provides that each of trw matters of vlhich an admission is requested 
shall be deemed admitted unless the party to vJhom the r equest is directed serves upon 
the party requesting the admission either a sto~orn statement denying specifically the 
matters of which an admission is requested or s etting f orth in detail the reasons why 
he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or that the matters requested are 
privileged or irrelevant. This s ection of the Code was copied verbatim from Section 
36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Was P entitled to summary judgment? 
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Held= No. When the legislature enacted W/0:-lll.l it knew how Federal Rule #36 hac'l. 
·ceen interpreted, and it impliedly adopted· the interpretations which were to T.he 
effect that the Rl\[le ;;tpplied only as to matters not in di.spute and was meant mel'e ly 
to expedite proceedings as to such matte:cs. Sin~e the two things about which ad--
missions were sought wt:re in dispute and P knew they wore in dispute, he had no 
right to an ans\.;er. Reversed and remanded • 
. PLEADING AND PRACTICE Res Adjudicata--Domestic Relations 203 Va4880 
H ·' a Filipino, and W, a white l-JOman were legally married in New Jersey while 
domiciled ther~. They moved to Virginia. H sought a divorce for cruelty. The divorce 
was denied on the grou.nd that as far as Virginia was concerned the parties were 
never married since the marriage violated our fundamental public policy against mis-
cegenation as set out in V#20"·5h. After the time for an a ppeal had gone by, W sued H 
for a divorce on the grou.nd of desertion. H did not plead "res adjudicata". The 
matter was referred to a commissioner who reported that the marriage was void and 
had already been so declared in the prior suit. W filed exceptiona to the report on 
the theory· that the marriage was valid because of the full faith and credit clause 
of the United States Constitution and she vouched the record in the former suit in 
support of her contentions. · 
Held: (l) Whether or not the marriage is valid in Virginia has already been liti-
gated. It is the same issue .:md the sam8 parties. It is im.'Tlaterial that there are 
additional issues. (2) Res ad,iudici ·~a need not be affirmatively pleaded where that 
fact is shown, as here, on the face of t he pleadings of the party against whom 
tha·t principle is to be applied. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE~-Statute of J..imi tations 203 Va.90I.j.. 
P bought a deep freeze refj:·igarator from D for $h50 and paid for it by check on 
August 1, 1951. A week later he inadventontly sent D a second check for the same 
amount. This check was drawn on th<'l s ame bank. A few mo:J.ths later both checks ~vere 
returned to p by the bank a long wi ~h some L.O other cancelled checks. P then l ocked 
them over to see if th -;re were any forgerj_es but did not notice that two of these 
checks were for the de :p freeze refrigerator. Nine years l a J.:;cr P discovered w~at had 
happened and demanded that D _r:ay him $h50 . D r elied on the statute of limitations. 
Is this a good defense? 
Held: Yes . VJL8-..l.U provides t hat "The right to recover money paid under fraud or 
mistal<:e sh(~.ll be deemed to accrue bot.h c;.t law and in equ.ity, at the time such fraud 
or mistake is di ocover ,:;d, or by the Exercise of due diligence ought to have been 
discovered. The burden was on P to p!'ove that nc acted wj.th due diligen~e within 
the period of the statute·--three y~r·.:r.s on a contract express or i mplied and not in 
writing. Here the facts clearly sho w that he did not use due diligence. He should 
have, as a matter of l avl , canght the m:Lstake when he examined his returned canc·elled 
checks. He failed to offer any plausible expla.nation for not having done so. Hence 
the statute has long since run. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Rule 5:1, S ::.,~ tion J.O 203 Va.9L.6. 
In the suit of P v. D the trial court found f or P . Fifty ei ght days later D sub-
Lf'"1Tlitted c. 11Stat.F-)ment of Testimony" i n narrative form to the judge for his signature 
,. } -,\ . c.i~' after duly notifyi ng p who objected to it on t he g•;ound that it was not accurate \JJ" ~ or complete. p did not s ubmit hls vernion of t he tEJstimony. The trial judge refused 
~ .-'\to sign the statement. As a re3ult the Supr~":Jrfle Cou.rt of Ap peals found it impossible 
/ ~\./" \to pass on the mGrits of the case. . 
/( e; Held: Reversed and remanded. Under Rule 5: l, section 10 P shou.ld have f.ubmitted 
his version in writing 9 and th3!1 the judg.:l sllould have resolved any differences 
thrU ·l consultation with coun.se:L. If the judge cannot :io this because of lapse of 
time ~r forgetfulness, he should grant a new tri8.1_, so that he can certify to the 
testimony. Otherwise the losing party would for 1'ei t hi s right thl-1; no fault on his 
part to have the case decided on its merits by the Suprflme Court of Appeals on 
perfection of a proper appe:al . 
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rLSAD:CNG AND PRACTICE Unautl'for ized Vie'j1 by Juro~!t" 203 Va.?65. 
J !s car, driven by D, struck P, a ten year old girl, while she was riding a 
~.:.icycle in an interseetion. There vlaS a conflict in the evidence as to whether 0, 
\ befor e enter ing the intersection, was riding in the st-.·cet, or on the sidev.ralkn 
~ J ~ one of the jurors, made a solo 6:30 a.m ~ visit to the scene of the accident., and ~ a skett~h showing a certain tree that had been referred to in the evidence. 1'his 
\. ~: c;~ekh also shm~ed cars parked on the street. t.hat interfered vrith visibiH·;;.y. He 
1\\f \ also exp8rimented to see in ~hat distance he could stop his car under circumstances 
\ \;Jl" that had been described in the evidence. He showed this sketch to the ::>ther jurymen 
\J and told them of his findings. When the trial judge fcund this out he summoned. t."l.ll 
the jurors and asked them if J's actions had influenced their Yerdict for the de·· 
fendant. Despite the fact that their replies showed that they might have been so 
influenced.!) the judge refused to grant a new trial. 
Held: While an unauthorized view by a juror is improper, it is not ground for a 
new trial unless the verdict was affected thereby, and while the determination o:f 
this question lies within the sound discretion of tho trial court, there was an 
abuse of such discretion in the instant case since the evidence clearly showed that 
at leas t J, and pr obably the rest of the jurors, had been influenced by J's actions. 
All evidence should be given in open court so t hat there ean be cross examination 
and an opp~rtunity to make it part of the recordo Reversed and remanded. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Ruling on Demurrer as a Final 0::-der 203 Va. 991. 
, ,\. P's land all lay to the nort h of D's r ailwa.y o By V/f.S6-16 i f D's railway passed 
G-.yi' '\through Pis land D was under a dut,y to construct a cert.ain private roadway acl·oss 
\~n e t r acks, but there is no such duty if it merely adjoins P?s land~ P, in his 
_, L It titian, which was otherwise valid, alleged that D's railway pas sed through P's 
~ ~ and. D demurred to the petit ion . The demurrer was properly overruled. After more dvY'" than 21 days had passed sin::!e the entry of the orde::- oven·uling the demurrer, D 
f iled exceptions to a commissioner s ' report on the ground that the evidence clearly 
showed that its railroad did no t p2.ss through P' s land and hence fuis petition should 
be dismissed on the merits. The tri al j udge held tha t t he order overruling the de-
murrer had become fina: . and refused to dismiss the petition, 
Held~ Error. "An order mere:!.y s~.wtaining or overruling a demurrer---is not final." 
In order to be final vli thin the meaning of V#8-·L~62 it must go further and dismiss 
the case. The exceptions to the c ommis sioners 1 report should have been sustained. It 
is not enough to allege a good case. The allegations must als~ be proved.. Reversed 
and di smis sed. 
PLEADING AND FRACTICE-~Evidence 201~ Va.4 • 
l. If a responsive pleading i n equ.ity is des i gnated 11Answ::.~r and Cross Claim" de-
? fendant cannot treat it as a plea, and1 i nsist on a jury t r ial on the theory that 
it is a plea. 
2. Since a plea i n equity raises a single iss ue of f act which operates as a bar 
to complainant's bi ll, a cross claim which asserts a co:mt erclaim cannot be a plea. 
). If a cross claim relies on br each of an ora l warranty made in connection Hith 
the sale of a truck, and the oral warrant y was superseded by a written warranty, 
there can be no recovery on t he Sllpe:roeded or al warranty, nor on an implied warranty 
of fitness since the cross c l aimant did not r ely oq the latter, and the parol evid-
ence rule prevents the s howing of the former ( llnles~ a sui t in equi ty for reforma-
tion). 
) 
PLEADING-Jurisdict i onal Amount-·~Venue Une!n.ployment Comp., Cases. 204 Va.l8. 
P, whose last j ob was i n 1/Ja::Jhj_ngt.on, D.C., but who lived i n Virginia, was laid off. 
He sought unemployment <~or:tps nsa ticn in the c:mou.nt of $~~]_) . A deputy of the Commission 
disallowed his claim. An appeal t o an appeals ex.8miner rr1as unsuccessful. An appeal 
to t he full C-:lrr.mi ssion resul ted in a denial on t he ground that P had not liileen avail-
able for work during the period f er t-Jhich he cJ_,'::.im'3d compensat ion. P then appealed 
t o t he Corporation Court of the Cit y 0f Alexandria whi~h found that he had been 
available for work a nd r eversed the Conunisslon. The ComJniss:i.on appealed to the 
Supreme Ccurt of Appeals. P urged t hat ~300 Has not i nvolved and hence that Court 
t:;99o 
b'-'.d no jurisdiction. The Cormrd.nsl.on clnim3d that the Corporation Court had hacl no 
j·.crisdiction since the statute provides t.hat the action must be brought in the cou!Tcy 
or c i ty in lvhich the cJ.a.iman'G last wo!'lced. 
He1d :(l) As to jurisdictional amount, it waG held as per P's contention in 177 Va. 
at p .,,258 but; since that time Vf-160--S';) was amended to read, 11 -:<-:H~ the Supreme Court of 
1\.p.pe.;:LJ.s shall ha:'Te jurisdiction to review 8uch decisions regardless of the amount 
involved." (2) As to venue the statute means 01wherc P was last employed I N VIRGINL4.11 
"Nhere his Virginia work record is available. In the inst.?.nt case that was not tn 
Alexandria but since the Commission failed to file a plea in abatement the right to 
have the matter passed on by a proper court hc.:.s been waived. (3) It was also held 
that whethe:r P had been available for work was a question of fact on which question 
the decision of the Commission was final if based on evidcr:~e. The Supreme Court of 
Appeals concluded that the evidence was such that reasonaole men could have differed 
and henoe the decision of the Commission was .final on that point. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 204 Va.96. 
P suGd. D who was visiting in Florida from Seotember S to No-v0mb13r S. ~ervice was 
ha.d on October 20th by tacking same to D's front door(sincr:l no one cou:F be found 
at D's usual place of abode) pursuant to V//8··51. 
Held: This was proper service since D had not changed his residence but was only 
temporarily away. 
When the above case ce.rnE·. t.o trial P int:.oduced his evidence. D then moved to 
strike P's evidence on the ground tha·t it failed to show any negligence en D1 s part. 
The motion was overruled. D then introduced evidence of his own. On appeal D now 
claims that the trial court er:r.3d i n overruling his motion to strike P's evidence. 
Held: This contention is i nvalid. When D int:r-oduc e::l e~ndemce oi his own, he 
waived his right to hav~ the case considered only on P 's evidence. It must now be 
considered on the whole record ;:md not on P' s evidf\nce alon8 . 
PI.EADING AND PRACTICE !1ay Jury Tal'.e Pleadings to Ju::.-y R.oom? 204 Va.ll5 
P sued D for negliger tly causinF; her ~.njuries. They 1·mre r- ~ 3mbers of a car pool. 
~~ Each member of J.:.~1e poo:::. used her car for a weok to go to wor!<: some 27 miles away. O)uP'4S Th~ motion for j•J.d.grnent contained a.ll:'gations of ex trsmel? serious inj~ries most of i / wh1.ch we1:-e not proved. At the conclus1.on of the pre.:Hmtat1.on of the ev1.dence the 
\.. -J..JJ''1 Court gave instructions to the jury, and told therr: tc wri t c their ve:~.·dict upon the 
"f O 7moticn for judgment. D's attorney vbj ~cted to th~~ Jury's taking the motion for 
t-.l)'f1"""' • judgment to the jury r c•)i!l ar.d asked ',.rby the ve1·di ct couldn't be written on a piece 
of paper. 1'he Ccurt replied, "They a· ·e entitled to read the pleadings. I hate to be 
made a fool of . What are tho plead:i r,;:;; s for tf t he jury can't read them? Do you 1·Jant 
me to read them to them right here?11 D' s attorney replied, '; ~~o sir. I object to 
them being sant into the jury room. 11 The Court then said) "You want to hide something 
from them?" D's at ..t.orney objected ami except~1d. 
Held: Reversed and remandod. The pl8adings contained un.proved a llegations. The 
jury could reasonably suppose that the Uou:;:-1.; thought these allegations perfectly 
valid for he has told the111 tlv~y c cmld take them to the jury room and read them. 
"Under the ci:r(:ums tances of this c.:!se the pleadings Here improperly permitted to be 
taken by the jury to th3ir r oom . 11 
~ It was also held that pqrconn ,.i di ng ·j n a car p?ol are ~+ 1:guec;ts without 
p,fl;yment", and hence ar c owed a dut,y of ordin::1.:·y care by t he driver. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Rt1S adjudtcate. Insurance 204 Va.292 
H and W were husband and wife. lt[nile W was driving H's c e1.r she became involved in 
an sccident with B, the driver of :.:.not.her C.:J.r. \v sued B and B sued W for personal 
injuries. The attorney for H' s Im!Ur ;u .. r;e Comp~ny1 wittout W s consent , compromised 
the case brou ght by B by paying B ~!;400. The pending case of B v. VJ was dismissed 
a greed. Despite all this, W pruss0d her claim against B who relied on the defense 
of r es adjudicata. 
Held for W. The attorney f or H' s I m:;urance Company hacl a right to settle tl-te claim 
of B against W, but he had no r ight to compr omlses ~l's rights against B, if any, 
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._,.: t~1ou.t :b.er consent. He had no authorit,y to agree to th0 entry of an order, the rg-
.:.: v :!_t, cf which would be to bar the prosecution of an action in whicn hiE company hu.d 
.1o interes·(, or standing. 
7 i:.EA.CING AND PRACTICE Failure to File Timely Responsive Pleading 204 Va.297 
... ;- <.J) r,.; a;::: ser·ved properly not later than Fevruary J$,1961. He did nothing until Mai'f~h 0 ~· ? , 1961 uhe.n he filed a petition for removal of the case to the federal courts. On t.v · Sept. 26,1961 the Federal court remanded the case to the St2.te court. On Octobe!' 9SJ 0/ -;1~61 the state court on the motion of the plaintiff, P, entered its orC.:er a~.varding 
y e. judgment by d~fault, and appointing a date for hearing evidence and fixing the 
mount of damages. D did nothing whatever until October 18 ,1961 when he moved the 
court. to set aside the default judgment. D was not given a ny notice of the date on 
which the court would hea+ the evidence with reference to the amount of damages. The 
~ourt refused to hear thi case on its merits. What errors, if any, has the trial 
court committed? 
Held: None. When D violated Rule 3:5 he was in default and by the express language 
of' 3:19 he was not entitled to any further notice. While D could have mov ed for an 
extension of the 21 day period provi ded for by Rule J:S. as per Rule 3:13 even though 
the 21 day period had expired he failed to do so. "D's efforts to remove the case 
to the Federal court cannot r estore to him a right already lost to file pleadings 
in the State court.n 
ttRuleG J ;5 and 3:19 were adopted i n the int,e:rest of E-xpediting the matur·ing and 
hearing of cases. A def endant is >-Ja~ned W:"len he i s 3erved wi t.h process as to the time 
within which he must make his re~::ponst!. He may have a.n ext ens ion of ·that time if he 
makes proper applta1tion and shows reaeonable cause thereforo Otherwise the Rules 
are to be applied according to their t erms ,." 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Jur:i.sdiction and Vtmue 204 Vao309 
/ p sued D for injuries received in an automobile acc i dent. There was nothing on the 
._)JJt'>- face of the pleadings to indicate t~at, the trial court did not have jurisdiction nor 
{" did D file any plea in abat er.Ent wi·i~hin the required 21 day period which under 
U o ]rule 3:6 is not to be extende.i in any case. V#S-133 r eads : 
11\r.Jr.ere the motion for 
~judgment or bill t;hows on its fa~e pr oper matt er for the jurisdiction of the Court 
(as it did in this case)no excepi;ion for want of such jurisdiction shall be allowed 
unless it. be taken by plea in aba t ement." The evidence showed that at the time of the 
injury D was trans porting P home f:~o:n Hork, that :-he employer paid D for such 
transportation, and ::,ha ·:~ the employor came und.e:- the t'llor krnen 1 s Compensat.-i.on Act. D 
sought to have t '.1e case di,.:'3mis~ed f o."' lack of j .l:>:>isdiction. ~he trial cc:J.~.·t refused 
to dismiss it bL~ d.l'.Se nr, !pY..~ :i.n aba~, .- . ,nent had b:::-c;n or now co.•ld be f i led , 
Held~ Feversed and db'Ir.issed. V#B --~ .33 and Rul :l 3 : 6 a ppl y onJ.y to juris -.:Li.ction in 
the s ense of venue .. Hher e a court l ac.lcs jud.sdic t.ion to he<>.r a nd decide t he Bllbj ec t 
matter of a case it should be d i s missed . as soon as this f act is called to the cour t's 
attention in any manner, o:;:· by t~1~ court on i ts own initiative , even on appeal when 
t he question of jurisdiction was no+, r aised belou . In this case P' s only remedy is 
under the Workmen's Gomp8!1.sation Ac t sinGe the ac cicle!'l·~ was an industria l one 
occuring during and a:t-iRing out of the em~loyment . Thus J0he I ndustr ial C...:;nmission 
has exclusive j ur i sdi ction of the ~ubjoct matter in controversy. 
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE Estoppel--Res Judicata-Wills 204 Va.347 o 
In 203 Vaco246 Nephews contended that their ma.iden Aunt was incompetent to make a 
t·r.Lll, and hence they inherited her land as her heirs. It was brought out in that 
ca~:e that Aunt had conveyed her real estate to Nephews, and that after a falling 0 1 ~.t.,. 
she demanded a reconveyance. The matter was compromised as follows: Nephews re-con-
V9yed in return for Aunt's promise to will them the land. A little later Aunt de-
manded a release from this promise and one was given her. Nephews lost the will 
contest case. They later(this case)filed a bill in equity for specific performance 
of the Aunt's promise to will the land to them claiming that the release of this 
promise was void. Defendants claim .that the whole thing was settled for all time 
in the 203 Va.246 case, and the Chancellor so held. 
Held: Not res judicata. Under V#66-74 "the sole issue is whether the paper offered 
for probate is or is not the will of the decedent. When this question is decided the 
function of the proceeding is exhausted and the court should not decide other 
questions not connected \-Tith that issue." Whether or not the release of their Aunt 
by the Nephews from her agreement to will the land to her Nephews was valid or not, 
had no bearing on her competency to make a will, and hence the matter of the 
validity of the release had not been passed on. Whether Nephews are estopped by the 
assumption of different positions has not been passed on either. Revers.ed and 
remanded. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Torts Apportion~ent of Damages 204 Vao353. 
A, while in the employment of B, and while acting in the scope of his employment 
committed an assault and battery on P. She sued A and B for both compensatory and 
.• Jhpun'itive damages. The jury returned a verdict as follows: "Compensatory against B 
~l"\' for 'the sum of $4500. Compensatory and punitive against A, for $5500". 
~- HeJrl: Reversed and remanded. The jury had no right to apportion the compensa.tory 
damages as between A and B. Besides it is impossible to tell from the verdict 
whether the jury meant a total of ~P4500 compensa·~ory damages plus $1000 punitive 
damages, or whether it meant a total of $10,000.~ An employer is not liable in 
Virginia for punitive damages unless he ordered, participated in personally, or 
ratified the wrongful ac ·~ of his employee. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE ApReal from Interlocutory Decrees 204 Va.399~ 
H and W, husband and wife, entered into a contract with S, a son of H by a prior 
marriage, whereby S received stock in a corporation and land for a great deal less 
than they were worth. H and W then went to Florida. Soon thereafter H died in a 
mental institution in Floridab W qualified in Florida as H1s executrix and A 
qualified in Virginia as an ancillary administrator. A commenced a suit in equity 
in Virginia against S to avoid the contract for lack of capacity on H1s part to 
make such a contract. S filed a special plea alleging that A was not the real pa ... ··:;y 
in interest and asking tha.t vJ be joined. The Chancellor refused the request since: 
W was a non~resident. S appealed and the appeal was granted. 
Held: The appeal must be dismissed as having been improvidently awarded. The decree 
was an interlocutory one not adjudicating the principles of the cause within the 
intent of V#8-462(2)(c) and hence non-appealable. (No interlocutory decrees are 
appealable except as allowed by statute). vfuen s•s epecial plea was overruled he 
was given an opportunity to plead to the merits. The phrase "adjudicating the 
principles of the cause" means "1'he principles which affect the subject matter of 
the litigation and the r ules by whi ch the rights of the parties are to be finally 
determined.n 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Interes t on Unliquidat€d Claim 204 Va.443 
1 performed legal services for C over a period of years without any agreement as to 
the amount of his fee. L claimed ~~3 9 000 and C claimed $150 were proper amounts. L 
sued c. Expert witnesses testified in favor of L that $3,000 w·as a reasonable sum. 
The Court submitted the matter to the jury under proper instructions , and it re-
turned a verdict in favor of L for ~~1 ~ 500 with interest from July 24, 1943, the date 
of the last services performed. The Court approved the verdict for $1500 principal, 
but overturned it with respect to interest on the ground that no interest is allow-
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e; ·: Jl~ on unliquidated sums until they become liquidated by judgment or otherwise. 
Helci: (1) The jury was not bound to return a verdict for $3,000 because all the 
ex;lert.s testified that ~~3 ,000 was a x-easonable sum. Since the jury was prr~perly 
ins tructed and $1,500 was not clearly too much or too little, the Court acted 
correetly when it sustained that portion of the verdict. But(2), it acted erroneousl~' 
~ ith r espect to the interest and in the teeth of V#S-223 which reads in part as 
follmJs, ttin any action whether on contract or for tort, the jury may allow interest 
on the sum found by the verdict, or any part thereof, and fix the period at '.vhich 
the interest shall eormnenee. 11 Note that the statute does not state that the jury 
has such power only when the damages are liquidated,, In fact in most tort cases, 
they are unliquidated. It certainly was not an abuse of discretion to fix the period 
from which interest would start at the time the last work was performed. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Tendered within 60 days and Signed within 70 days.204Va.533. ~~ Final judgment in this case was entered on June 25yl962. On July 25 plaintiff 
,\,tf'- filed -v1ith the cle:o.·k of the trial court her notice of appeal and assignments of ~ if.rror. On August 27 counsel for defendant accepted service of a notice that the 
~~ ~). f transcript of the evidence and other incident,s of the trial would be presented to JJ¥ the trial court for certification on August 28. When the trial judge signed the "" transcript on August 30, he changed the language from "tendered and signed within 
60 days from the entry of final judgment" to 11tendered and signed(by him)within 70 
days after final judgment11 o 
Held: The record shows on its face that the mandatory provisions of Rules 5:1, 
#3(c) and 5:1,#3(f) were not complied with as the transcript was not tende~ to 
the trial judge wH,hin 60 days from the entry of final judgment ao required thereby. 
Writ of Error dismissed. 
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PJ ,EhDING AND PRACTICE Waiver cf defense 205 Va,.J6 
(i , while driving C•s car, negligently injured P. Notice of the accident was give.2 
·~o I who was C ' s insurer 73 days later~ I then inves ti gated and later di~ r.; laimed 
L:Lao:i.lity on the sole ground that S waa not dri·ving the car l'Ji~h crs p€rmission. J (;l_ obta~ned a judgment of ~~9,000 against. S which S could not pay. P then sued I and ,ll c t :nal court gave summary judgment for I, who defended on the sole ground that S ~ ::\ -:ii.:) no·t.; ha·re cv s permission to drive the car. On appeal the case vras raverscd and ~ :::- wnanded br:>e.g:u.se the Supreme Court of Appeals was of the opinion that whether or not .-) had G1 s pe:'l:lission was a jury question. On a retrial and at the eleventh hour l asked permission to amend its pleading so as to rely on the defense that the 
condition of prur.tpt notice of the accident had not been given as required by the 
poliuy. 'rhis permission 1vas refused, and the jury foW1d in favor of P on the issue 
·Jf permission. 
Held: I had wa.iYed the right to rely on that defense by insisting all this time 
tha·t its defense was laclc of C 's consent. A last minute amendment would now change 
the whole complexion of the case and defeat the overaJ_l policy of the law that 
responsive pleading should give the opposite party timely notice of the nature of 
the defense. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Statute of U.mitati_o ns 205 Va..43 
P furnished D with fuel oil through Feb.9,l959~ On or about Harch 7, 8, 9 or lOth 
\\ , P sent D a sta.tement dated February 28, 19)9. This statement bore the notation, 
'") \ r-" "All bills due on receipt. 11 P instituted an c:ction for the amount due on March 8, 
1962. D relied on the statut,e of li.mi ta·tions but offered m evidence as to date the 
statement ~-;as received. D contended the three year statute started to run on 
February 28, 1959. 
Held for P. The statute starts ru~ning when the account i s due, ~amely on receipt. 
The burden of proving that the ntatute has run is on the party s~ alleging. In the 
absence of any proof that the bLLl r.'as received before Narch 8, 1962 judgment should 
be for the plaintiff. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Ejnimmt PSlWr'n J:*"?CAdl~e--Interroga'Lories 205 Vao50 
I. V#8-321 defining the scope -of interrogatories provides that answers may be com-
pelled to those int.,rrogatories whicn are "relevant, and such as the persons to 
whom they are propounded .would be bound to ans-vmr upon a bill for discovery.u The 
J9ltate Highway Commissione~· in~t.ituted eminent domain ~roceerii~gs. to condemn certain 
~ land owned by Po At the hearJ.ng before the c.ondemnat1on comnus:n.oners P sought to \.A p~ove that the State High1.!ay Commissioner had had mo~e ~han o~e ap~raisal made of ~- ln.s property. He served 1.nterrogaton.es on the Connnss~oner J.n wh1ch he sought arls'l.-ers as to hm'T many appraisals had been made _, the amoW1t of these appraisals, and 
who had made them. The Commissioner moved to quash the interrogatories. 
Held: Motion to quash granted. Int . atories may be Llsed to compel an adversa.:cy 
to disclose under oath facts essen· ·j:· o t e ec 1 n o e r ts of his 
o~ ent w g . :J.C"S lS o be unable to produce. Neither of 
these requiremen s exist in this case. Tt e sum a w. J. _ -property has been 
appraised is an opinion of its vaLle--not a fact as to its value; and P is perfectly 
free to call experts of his own to t.est,i.fy as to the value of his property. The 
number of appr·aisals made and wl'1o made tl:lem are irrelevant on the question of the 
fair value of the property. 
II. Rule 3:23(c) provides for dis~overy b~ urder of court of the names and address-
es of witnesses. Held: The Rules of CO\,l,.rt have RO a.a}:ll:iee:tion t.o eminent domain 
procedure. 
-rn. 'The trial court refused to admit eviden~e that. more than one appraisal had 
been made. Held: No error. T-:> permit. such evicence would be to open the door to 
conjecture and cor...fuaion as all the commisl'li.Nlers \Wuld be told would be that ariother 
appraiser had made a different appra.isal wh:i_ch was p-robably hj_gher. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Mandamus 599oS . 205 Va.99. 
P sought a writ of m~damus against the .st-ate Highway Commissioner to compel him 
to institute condemnat1on proceeding~ as a result of alleged damage to P's cinder 
/
17 block building some 240 feet away tram a fEfO~ntl:y constructed underpass. A number 
of cracks developed in this building. P claiMs that these cracks were caused by 
~~ pile driving or by continuous pumping operatiqris which lbwered the water .level under ~ ·· his building or, possibly, by some of ~~ sari~ Cl~ silt theteuhd& being carried away . by the water that was pumped out. Tiler~ ~~t:J i~m'* evidence that the cracks started 
before the eoccavation was commenced. 
Held: Mandamus was properly refused. What caused the cracks is not knoWn• Guess 
work and conjecture are no substitutes for evidence. "It is essential to the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus that the legal right of the plaintiff or the ~lator 
to the performance of the particular act, sought to be compelled, be clear, specific 
and complete." 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Transfer to Equity Side 205 Va.l76 
D agreed to pay P $103,.3.3.3 as a commission if he sold Blackacre for a certain 
price. P alleged in his pleadings at law that he had found a purchaser able and 
willing to pay the price agreed upon, and that he was entitled to his commission. 
This thus appeared to be an ordinary action at law. D in his grounds of defense 
stated that the original agreement had been superseded by a signed written contract 
to the effect that if P were successful D would convey his interest in Whiteacre to 
p instead of paying him his commission in money. P had signed this agreement and 
then sent it to D for his signature. D had signed it but failed to notify P of that 
fact so that P did not know of the existence of this agreement until after his suit 
for his commission had been instituted. Over objection the trial court allowed p 
to transfer his law suit to the equity side of the court as now being one for 
specific performance of a contract to sell land. V#B-1.38 reads in part, "Whenever 
it shall appear that a plaintiff has proceeded at law when he should have proceeded 
in equity(or vice versa) the court shall direct a transfer to the proper forum, and 
shall order such change in, or amendment of the pleadings as shall be necessary to 
make them conform to the proper practice." D contends that this statute applies 
only to the institution of the suit, and not to its later stages, and claims that 
he will be deprived of his right to a jury trial. 
Held: D is wrong on both of his contentions. The statute is a remedial one and 
should be interpreted liberally to fulfill its purpose of saving time and expense. 
As soon as it became apparent that this was a bill for specific performance it was 
the duty of the court to transfer it to the proper side thereof on request. And, 
if on D's affidavit it appears that the case will be rendered doubtful by conflict-
ing evidence, D may ask for a trial of the issue out of chancery, and thus submit 
the question to a jury as per V#8-214. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Criminal Procedure 205 Va.205 
D was indicted, and tried by the Court with his consent, that of the judge, and 
that of the commonwealth's Attorney pursuant to Section 8 of the State Constitution. 
This section requires that the consent of the Commonwealth's Attorney be entered 
of record. D was convicted and sentenced. 
Held: The record referred to is the court's order book and henoe a notation 
written on the back of the indictment is not a compliance with the constitutional 
mandate. Prisoner released from the penitentiary to the custody of the trial court 
to be dealt with as the Commonwealth's Attorney may be advised. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Appeal and Error(Rule 5:1 #6(f)) 205 Va.223. 
Appellant objected to the refusal of the Court to give certain instructions. These 
instructions were printed in the briefs on appeal, but were not designated for 
printing in the record as required by Rule 5:1 #6(f). 
Heldt Since they had not been designated for pri nting in the record they should 
not be considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The case of Gabbard v. Knight 
was held not applicable, "It is true that the instructions in that case were not in 
the pri nted record, but there we said the case was submitted to the jury on 
erroneous principles of law and we would consider the instructions furnished to us 
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<::t. B addendla to the briefs in order t,o meet the ends of justice .n But in the . instant 
0ase all instructions actually given correctly and adequately stated the law. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Declaratory Judgments 20.5 Va.227 
P, a tax payer, of the City of Fairfax, believed that a certain ordinance with 
:reference to the powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals is invalid. He sought and 
obtained a declaratory judgment to that effect. At that time there was no specific 
case pendj.ng. The City -appealed. · 
Heldc Reversed and dismi$sed. If the litigation was not brought with ref~rence to 
eome specific c~se there was no actual controversy and the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion based solely on speculation and theory. 
~ 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Criminal Procedure Constitutional Law 20.5 Va.2.51. 
F was arrested when he was caught in the act of breaking into an automobile and 
stealing theretrom. A proper e~arch of his premises revealed other stolen property. 
He confessed to various laroeniea and robberies and signed the confessions. He was 
an illiterate man who could not· read or write other than his name. He was indicted 
for various offenses and Attorney X, a competent lawyer, was appointed to defend 
him as F was without funds. X spent less than an hour in the preparation of the 
case, did not ask for a continuance to enable himself to better prepare the case, 
did not interview the police officers or the persons whose property was taken. F 
was convicted and sentenced to serve many years. He now challenges the legality 
of the conviction. , 
-· Heldt Under these circumstances F was denied the right of "effective legal assist-
ance" which is g~aranteed to him by both the Virginia and United State Constitutions . 
Prisoner ordered returned to 'the custody-.of the trial court for retrial. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Rule 3r9--Cross Claims against other defendants 20,5 Va.lJ4. 
The City of R let out a contract to A for the construction of a lateral sewer 
along X Street. A su~bc acted to B. After B had completed his work and filled 
r \~-lin the ditch R placedo . d rock on top, roll:'ed it, and put asphalt on top of the 
Lh v · crushed rock and roll ,.· · • After a hard rain the fill in the ditch settled in a 
( .,..0• · certain place by almost a !qot. P was injured ·when the wheel of his oar went into 
V' the depr·ession which was not lighted or guarded in any manner. P sued R, A and B. 
Rule 3:9 reads in part, "A defendant may, at his option, plead as a cross-claim 
any cause of action that he ha&., against one or more other defendants growing out of 
any matter pleaded in the notic~f motion for judgment." The City of R sought to 
file cross claims against A and B. Should it be allowed to do so? 
Held: No. R t s claim is by way of indemnity. It has no possible claim for 
indemnity until it has paid P. It cannot force P to wait for an adjudication of P's 
claim against it until R's rights, if any, against A and B are determined. R'e 
Claim for indemnity must be fitigated in a later suit. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Liability Insurance Companies as parties 205 Va.49.5 
Guest (G) was injured u the result of the gross negligence of Host(H) and the 
oS CtJ - diepu ted negligence of another (A) • H' a insurance Co. (HI) paid G $15 1 000. The 
. r propriety of this payment is not questioned. H then sued A and A ta insurance 
~ 1 company (AI) in equity for $7,.500 contribution. AI contended (l)that A had not been 
· I negligent;(2) that its name should be stricken as a party defendant;()) that the 
caption of the suit should be H for the use of HI v. A. The court at the request 
of one of the parties transferred the case .flrom the equity side to the law side of 
the Court. 
Helda(l) Whether or not A was negligent under the facts of the ease was a question 
upon which reasonable people might differ. In such a case the matter is tradition-
ally passed on by a jury. While an action for contribution was originally in 
equity such actions can now be brought either in law or in equity. It was not an 
abuse of discretion to transfer the case to the ~ side where the question of 
negligence could be heard by a jury under proper instructions in the usual way. (2) 
AI's name should be stricken as a party defendant. The action for contribution is 
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< ' s1. in~3i:. A~ AI does not come int.o the picture as a defendant u:1less H obta:.ns a jnC£5"" 
·u·c :J.ti against A which Al refuses ·to pay. (3) Sinca the ent.ire r€c:overy, if any: 'ue·-
Jongs to HI and it. is the real par'.-y in interest as the plaintiff the st.y:l0 of the 
;.>uit should be chang ad to H for the use of HI v. A. 
FC~;\DTHG A:t-JD PRACT:LCE Timeliness of motion for non-suit 205 Va .. .516. 
P e.;1 administr·ator su~d D under the death by wrongful act statute. She contended 
\' /that ~~·hilc D was driving a school bus loaded with children he drove far on the left 
~~ · -\'b' side as her de.ceascd husband, H, wc-~s approaching in the opposite direction with a ~ ,ll"- load of lumber., that in doing so H was forced off the road into a deep ditch and · 2\killed when the lumber shifted. D denied liability and claimed that the accident 
~ 1~ was due t.o H1 s negligence. After P~s evidence was in D mo,,oed to strike it on the ~ ground that if failed to prove any negligence on D's part. J, the trial judge,then said that P was a poor widow with four little children but th~t he couldn't decide 
" the case on sympathy, whereupon P's attorney requested J to :!)OStpone his ruling on 
the motion to strike until he could study the evidence. J i;J.dicated that v1as un-
necessary as he hadJ already heard the e-vidence.. and J askar:l pis attorney how he 
could ever decide the case if he kept interrupting, whereupon P1 s attorney moved 
the court for a non-suit. J ruled that the motion for a non-suit was too late, and 
then sustained the motion to st.rike P 1s evidence. 
Held: E:r.ror. 'i'he motion . for a nc:nsuit Has not too late. Under V#8-220 such a 
motion car.not be made a:ter the cour~ h3.S sustained a moti.Qn to st:rike. An indica-
tion oy the trial jud~a that he is probably going to grant a motion to strike is r..ot 
yet a ruling on the motion to strike; Hence the ;·,1otion for a nonsuit was made irL 
time(but it cer·i:,ainly was jvst. in the nick of time),, 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 20.5 Va.5?9 
rJ , p bought a tr~ctor from D on the ~onditional sales plan. D warranted that he 
'-;1 o. 1 ~ \-lOuld repair or replaee defective parts Hit.hjn certain time and mileage limitatior:9., 
.L)-+ f\ p thought that D had broken the wa::·ranties and th~t as a proximate result of such 
p breach he had suffered mo:::-e damage than the bala.'1ce he owed, 1::0 he stopped making 
any further paymen~s whereupon D repo~s8ss~d. P then sued D,(l)for damages for 
breach of warra~Ti:,y J a:-;.d (2) for d2.ma6es lor -w:::-ongful repossession. D demurred on j the grounJ that P ~ould not join a contract and a tort cause of action. 
Held: Demurrer sustainedo Causes of action ::.n tort and in contract cannot be 
joineci(except actions for brr.aeh of uc..rr-:lnty and deceit as they historieally have 
a common or1gin), and this duspi te the fa .... ~t that if one is sued in tort or in 
contract he may counter'l:lle.im f::Jr either. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Domestic RcJations Rule 2:18 20.5 Va .. 834 
r1 In a re-opened divorce case H petHionea the Conrt to rec1u-~e his support payments 
rJ l.,. 1f'\o his minor c~ildren from $255 to $17.5 per month. W ignored the proceeding. Ofl l / Sept. 4, 1963 an order w2.s entered grant.i.n3 H1 13 p:cayer: but no draft of this order was endorsed by \']'?s caunoel mr W!:l.::J he or Tfl notified of t.h"l time and place of the 
presentation fo;:- entry o TiPs counsel notified H' s co1ms8l on Sept.20th that he 
would move the <.;Ourt to VCl.cate the order as ha.-dng been impx·ovidently ent-ared slac e 
~le 2:18 requ:!.res drafts of orderG ar:d decreer: to be endors &d by counsel of ~ . \ "\.t tftrecord or notice to be given of the time and place of presentation for entry. This ~d j) motion was overruled on Nov~ 6, 1963. f.n appeal was taken therefrom later than allowed after Sept~ 4, bnt Nithin tb.e requireJ time f:rom Nov. 6. 
Held: The order of Sep·::.. 4 was ·vo!..d sir:~e Rule 2:18 h~d nut been complied with, 
and the rights o.f infant.;;; were involved. The ·time allovred for appeal should be 
figured from No·v.6th Nhcn the chancellor ref ust:.:d to vac.;!.t0 the void order. A void . 
decree or order is a nullity and may on proper applic.s.tion be vacated at any time. 
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F~LADING AND PRACTICE Common Law Recoupment. 205 V3..,9l9 
.P.~ th::J City of Ri~:b.mond, suecl D, the C&P Telephone Coo; for $128,000 due p by 
-drtue of a .30 year franchise ordinance under which D agreed to pay P J% of its groF:·~ 
:~· f.C ei pts fl·om loc:al telephone s ervicc. This arr1oU.n·t wa,s clearly due P. The franchi:::- ;.-, 
o:·:-dinance wv.s not under seal but it w·as recogriizod 'by D in an instrument to which D 
':1ac: c.fflxetl its corporate seal. The ~128;000 for which P was suing was 3% of nva 
g.:.·css receipts for local service from Jan. 1, 1962 to Hay 12, 1962 on which latter 
d:ite tho 30 year franchise expired. During this 30 years P had erroneously e;h?.rg3cl 
~b sor,le ~~85Lt;.OOO ren·~als for use of the streets by D for its poles, wires an::l con-duits. D attempted to avoid payment of the $128,000 it owed by relying on corr.:non  la1..r recoupment of the $854,000 rerr::als it paid through error (The 3% franehiEe tax 
~ was in lieu of rentals). P contended that common law re~oupment could not be used aga.inst a sealed obligation and that the statute of limitations had run on any right t: to rcco~er most of ·~he rental payments. 
Held:tl) While common law recoupment cannot be used against a claim arising from a 
sealed contract, the franchise ordinanee contract was not under seal and recognition 
of the existenee of such a contract by an instrument under seal did not make the 
contract so recognized a contract unde~ seal. (2) The statute of limitations will 
not bar matters of recoupment(which must arise out of' ti1e same transaction--th~ 
franchise in this case) as long as the suit against which recoupment is desired has 
been timely instituted. Here P has instituted its suit prcmptly. (3) In common law 
recoupment there can be no recovery of any excess. So the final result is that 
neither P norD is entitled to anything. (All that work .for nothing1) 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Credi+.ors Rights 20) Va.927 
X owned 506 acres of land whi.0!1 wc.s subjec·~. (1) to two deeds of trust. (2) to 
$242,000 mechanical liens on th-1 improvements and on as much of the land as was 
necessary to the reason~ble enjoyment thereof, and (3) t..o P 1 s subsequent judgment 
against X. A compromise &greernent b8t.ween the h0lders of the mechanics' liens was 
effected by the term& of whir.h the ::.and was to bH oold to Y fo r ~t>135,000 subject to 
the deede of trust condition<:d on tl:e chancellor's approval thereof. After the 
~chancellor ascertained that the ourn due the mechanics' lien holders was more than 
~t t.he value of X •a equity in the land thf-l chcmce;llor entered a decree confirming the 
~\P· sale to Y and extinguishing pts lien forever . P was not made a party to the 
f. ~'< mechanics' lien sui'.:;, but one of X' s creditors wrote P to the effect that the me~hani~G' lien hold~rs ~ere requestiP..g a d~cree ao p8r the one that was entered, and if he had any obJectwn thereto he should make th8m known to the chancellor on Sept .. 8.~ 1961 on which day the matter would be presented to him. P made no appear-
ance on that da·te, and did not seek to set aside the fina.l decree of the chancellor 
aa above set forth until after the expiration of tv1elve months from its confirmation. 
Y/!8-673 provides that if a sale of prvperty be made under a decree of court and !a 
confirmed, the title of the purehaser shall not be dist.ur'oed.r unless within twelve 
months of the confirmation, the ca.le is set aeide by the trial court, or an appeal is 
allowed. 
Have P's right!:l, if any, been extir:gu:i.shed by the chaneellor's decree and the pass-
ing of more than 12 months f:;,~orn the confirmation of the sale to Y? 
Held: No, they ha-.re not been extinguishec. He has not had due notice. The letter 
from one of xvs creditors was that person's voluntary act. It was not directed or 
authori.zed by the court. It c.ould not give the court jurisdiction over P., 
"Judgments*!~ without. service of p:rocGss in 8. manner not authorized by lc:.w, are void 
judgments, and may be so treated in aay pro~eeding, direct or collateral." HeP..ce 
the decree, in so far as P was concerned, is void. V//8-673 (supra) has no application 
to ·void decrees, and hence it is j.mm&terial thc.t more than 12 months have passed 
since the confirmation of the sale ~ithout it8 having been set aside or an appeal 
allowed. 
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE--One Account or Six--Res· Adjudicata-- 206 Va.57 
P was a fuel oil dealer. He sold oil to D for D's residence. D's place of busi-
ness and to four rental properties. At D's request separate accounts were kept as 
to each of the above units, but when bills were rendered the accounts were totaled. 
Payments were allocated among these accounts by P's accountant. D refused to pay for 
some of the oil delivered, and P sued D in the ~nicipal Court in separate actions 
for balance due on each of the six accounts. Fi~e of these actions were removed by 
D to the Hustings Court. The other one was for an amount too small to permit removal 
Judgment was rendered for P on this account, and the judgment became final before the 
other actions were tried. At the trial in the Hustings Court D moved for a separate 
trial on each of the accounts and the motion was granted and trial was had on record. 
number 5903 and judgment thereon was rendered for ~ despite a plea of res adjudicatan 
The other four cases were consolidated and judgment therein was rendered for P 
despite a plea of res adjudicata. D contended there was one running account, and 
that a cause of action on the one account could not be split. P contended there were 
six separate account. ,The Court submitted this issue to a jury, and it found that 
there were six separate accounts. D was granted a writ of error. 
Held: For P. While it is true that a defendant may not be harrassed twice for the 
same debt, this rule is one made for his benefit, and can be waived by him. In the 
instant case D requested separate accounts, tax considerations made separate accoun~r 
desirable, and D himself- requested separate trials on each of the accounts, and a 
jury has decided the issue of one or six accounts tn favor of P. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Mandamus 206 Va.l59. 
The P Railroad Co. filed a petition against A County and the State Highway Com-
missioner praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus under the courts original 
jurisdiction to compel the defendants to institute condemnation proceedings against 
7it for damage done and contemplated as a result of the county's diversion of a )~ stream and the Highway's proposed construction of certain interchanges. P contends ~ that as a result of these acta it will have to expand $165,000 to enlarge its · culvert flow under its tracks. Held: Mandamus denied. There are complicated and disputed facts which the Supreme 
Court of Appeals is not equipped to ascertain. Nor will mandamus lie where there is 
an adequate remedy at law. The County can be sued for any damages caused by it. P 
can also proceed under V#8-578 et seq to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the 
amount of damages caused or probably to be 9aused by the County and by the State. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Statute of Limitations 206 Va.539. 
P, a resident of North Carolina, was involved in an automobile accident with D, a 
resident of Virginia, in Botetourt County on May 30, 1959. Five months later D 
moved from the state and became a resident of Washington, D.C. On August 22',1963 
p instituted a suit based on this accident in the Circuit Court of Botetourt County 
· end caused process to be served on D under the non-resident motorist statute 
(8-67.1) D filed a special plea ~f the statute of limitations on the ground that P 
had not instituted suit within two years after his cause of action had acoruedl as 
required by Code 8-24. P'a reply alleged that Code 8-33 tolled the running of the 
statute as long as D resided outside of the state of Virginia. Code 8-33 provides 
in part: nWhen any such right as is mentioned in this chapter shall accrue against 
a person who had before resided in this State, if such person shall, ~ departing 
without the same*** or by any other indirect way or means obstruct the prosecution 
of such right, the time that such obstruction may have continued-eihiii not be 
computed as any part of the time within which such right might or ought to have 
been prosecuted ••• n(Italics by the Court). 
Held: Judgment for defendant affirmed. The purposes of provisions tolling the 
running of tht statute of limitations during the absence or nonresidence of the 
defendant is tt prevent the defendant from defeating the plaintiff's claim by merely 
absenting himsetf from the state or by establishing residence elsewhere for the 
period of limitation. However(quoting from 17 ALR 2d p.516) '~ere provision ie 
made by statute for substituted service of process upon a state official in cases 
arising out of motor accidents within the state, the majority of the courts have 
599 <)10 hel~ that such a provision has the effeet of nullifying any statute suspending the 
per1od of limitations."· To hold that the statute of limitations does not run when 
Substituted service of process is available would allow suits to be postponed in-
definttely and permit a plaintiff to await a propitious time when defense wHut:~ses 
would be unavailable, thereby depriving a defendant of any defense he may have as 
well as preventing him from knowing until years have passed that he is charged with 
negligence. Such delay could well lead to the equivalent of fraud. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-Lack of in personam jurisdiction 206 Va.$89~ 
H and W were husband ~d wife. In 1922 W instituted suit against H and a final 
decree was entered in 1924 awarding W a divorce, child support and alimony. In April 
1961 W instituted the present action to recover alimony payments for the period May 
1941 to date. H's personal representative moved to dismiss the proceeding on the 
ground that the decree of divorce was void on its face for lack of jurisdiction of 
the court to enter a judgment in personam, in that it appeared on the face of the 
decree that the only process against H was an order of publication. Wadmits that 
the record does not show that H was personally served with process or that he had 
made a general appearance but argues that there is a presumption in favor of the 
jurisdiction of that court to enter the judgment complained of because it "did not , 
and would not, enter a decree which would be other: ? the right and proper, which 
presumption attests the honesty and intelligence of the court rendering sarne.rt 
The trial court granted H•s personal representative motion. 
Held Judgment for Husband's personal representative affirmed. It is true that a 
presumption is liberally indulged in favor of a court of competent jurisdiction 
that the proper party is before the court. There is, however, no place for pre-
sumption where the want of jurisdiction appears affirmatively on the face of the 
·proceedings. The record is presumed to speak the truth and can be tried by inspectr.· 
ion only; extrinsic evidence not being allowed to impeach the veracity of the record. 
In this case, lack of jurisdiction to enter an !2 personam judgment affirmatively 
appears Gn the record. Where thAt fact so appears, presurnptigns cannot be indulged 
in to supply the lack of averments respecting the jurisdiction. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Request for Admissions 206 Va.602. 
In an action for damages f ar wrongful payment of insurance prGceeds the ultimate 
question was who the decedent's wife was at the time of his death. Before the case 
carne to trial P served the D insurance company with a request for admissions which 
contained forty statements of fact. D's reply to a number of these statements was: 
"The fact requested to be admitted is not within the knowledge of the defendant." 
Code 8-111.1 provides in part that each of the matters of which an admission is re-
quested shall be deemed admitted unless the party served specifically denies or sets 
forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny these matters. 
P'a motion to strike these answers of D was denied. 
Helds Judgment affirmed.(l)The decisions are split as to whether a party should b» 
required to admit or deny facts which are not within his knowledge. The better rule, 
and the one followed in the federal courts.(Code 8-111.1 is identical to Rule 36 
F.R.C.P.), is that the party is required to answer ttif the means of information are 
reasonably within his power . " However, in this case the court was "convinced that it 
would have worked an undue hardship upon defendant to have required it to obtain the 
information it needed in order to admit or deny the requests. The 'means of informa-
tion• were not reasonably within its power.»· (2) As to the statements that decedent 
never filed a suit for divorce against P and vice versa, it is manifest that, if D 
had been required to admit the truth of these statements, it would have admitted the 
ultimate fact in issue. The intention of the legislature in creating 8-111.1 was to 
create a procedure to force admissions of fact about which there is no real dispute 
in order to expidite the trial and not to obtain admissions of controverted facta. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-Motion to Strike' 599.11 206 Va. 792. 
Defendant's truck was stopped in the' inside or passing lane of a dual-lane high-
way after dark, waiting to make a turn; when X's car struck it in the rear,killing 
X and injuring plaintiff, his wife. According to defendant's version, the running 
lights and turn signals were functioning properly before, at, and after the accident 
Plaintiff was aaleep at the time of the accident but testified that no lights were 
visible on the rear of the truck when $he awoke shortly after the crash. Both 
parties introduced positive e;orroborativo testiinony on the question of wbether the 
lights were on shortly after the cr~sh~ The trial eourt sustained defendant's 
motion to strike plaintiff's evidence.~·. 
Held: Judgment for defendant reversed. The evidence on a motion to str:tke is to be 
considered very much as on a demurrer 'to the evidence. All inferences which a jury 
might fairly draw from plaintiff's evidence must be drawn in plaintiff's favor, 
unless they are strained, forced, or contrary to reason. It is a general principal 
of law that a subsequent condition is evidential of an earlier one and the principle 
has been spoken of by some as a presumption. Thus when there is evidence that the 
lights on a motor vehicle were not burning immediately after an accident, this 
evidence is competent as tending to show that the lights were not burning at the 
time of the accident. At least, it is evidence constituting more than a scintilla 
and it was error to strike plaintiff's evidence. Notet It was also held that a 
statute requiring trailers to have reflectors, passed in 1960, was applicable to 
trailers manufactured before that date. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE•Rule 5:1, Section 3(e,f)mandatory and jurisdictional. 
206 Va.880. 
Requirements of Rule 5:1 of the Supreme Court of Appeals , that oral testimony and 
other incidents of trial, after beooming a part of the record, shall be presented 
to the trial judge within 60 days and signed by him within 70 days after final 
judgment are mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure to comply with them is fatal 
to appeal. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 153 S.E.(2d)209. 
Rule 5:1 sec.)(!) (dealing with the presentation of transcripts to judges)provides 
in part that "Counsel tendering the transcript or statement shall give opposing 
counsel reasonable written notice of hae time and place of tendering it and a 
reasonable opportunity to examine the original or true copy of it." On Oct.l5, D's 
counsel notified P's counsel that he intended to present a statement of the evidence 
and incidents of their trial to the judge on Oot.20. On Oct. 19, P's counsel re-
quested and received a copy of the statement. In the afternoon of the 19th both 
counsel went over the statement and agreed to certain corrections and additions. At 
the hearing on Oct.20, P's counsel objected to the judge's certification because 
he had not been given a reasonable opportunity to examine the statement. P's 
counsel suggested numerous changes, and the judge ordered that the statement be 
amended as suggested by him. The revised statement was signed the following day. 
Held: Affinned. What constitutes a reasonable opportunity to examine a narrative 
of the evidence to be tendered the trial judge must be determined by the facts of 
each case. In the instant case the statement consisted of only twelve pages. It 
was amended to meet the suggested changes of P1s counsel. He conceded that it was 
factually correct. Under the facta of this case, Pta counsel was gi~en a reasonable 
opportuni. ty to examine the statement. 
PLEADING AND FID.!CTICE 1 $99·.-12 154 S.Ed 121, 207Vao933 
. /: Caplan V. Stant 
.. /{ In an action to recover rental from D as a surety of c, the corporate lessee, p 
\ \W#"' ~lleg8S in h~s c~mpla~nt that.Dts signa:i:.ur~ at. the end of the lease without reference 
·'.J ... o the l.}apac:l ty 1n wh1ch he ngned makes h1m a surety of C. D demurs, has he admitted 
by tt~.i~ semurrer that he signed as a su:cety of C'? 
No.> the allegation amounts to a legal conclusion, the correctness of which is not 
adm~. t t.::d by a demurrer. 
t'~I.EADJ.NG/.AND PRACTICE Paytan v .. Rowland l$5 S.,E.2d 36 
C, 1,#:1f' \P !: a tenant1 sued D for injuries received in a fall through rotten porch on leased tr'A1 premiseso P ra:i..sed fact question in deposition as to whether or not she had ex-
" Jl clusiYe possession of porch or held it in common with co-tenants upstairs• lower 
court entered summary judgment for D. 
Heldg For Po-reversed and remanded. P's deposition raising question of fact ~• to 
whether or not she had exclusive possession of porch was jury question. Once a 
question of trial nature is raised, summary judgment cannot be entered. 
LEADING AND PRACTICE 1$5 S.Eo2d $6. 
P .. , who was both executr1.1t and sole distributee under the will of decedent, brought 
an a.r~tion as executrix for a sum allegly owed decedent by D for nursery work done on 
~ D?s prcperty. D moved to quash on the ground that P, as executrix, had no interest 
~· · in the claim because she had made a final settlement of her accounts before the 
• Commissioner of Accounts. P1 s motion that she individually be substituted as plain-
tif f was denied~ O.,,Ai"-' Held: Error. According to the general r~le, s~ long as the cause of action remains 
~~- the same~ a plaintiff may amend h~s actionAo as to chau~e the capacity In wntch he 
sq9s from represept.at.iye to irldiJTjdnOJl. Here the cause of action would have remained 
the same; D was the real party in interest as the sole distribut~e of any recovery; 
D was before the court and would suffer no prejudice from the requested ohange. 
~ ~also had a ri ht to maintain the suit in her re resentat· a a~it as 
.e o ttle-
ment of accounts, but continue indefinitely. This rule is unique to Virginia. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Chappel v. Smith 156 SsE~2d $72 
In an action arising out of a motor vehicle aocident defendant defaulted by failing 
to file responsbre pleadings within the statutory time period~ In the trial on the 
q ntum of damages. The trial judge limited the defense counsel's participation to 
ss examination of plaintiffs witnesses. Was this correct under Rule 3.19 Rules 
~ -or _9;>urt? e~~J in a case where unliquidated damages are sought, a defendant in default may not ~~ only cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses, but may also introduce his own witnesses I and evidence in mitigation of damageso 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Wimbrow v~ Wimbrow 156 ScEo2d $98 
introducing into evidence a 
at $277,000 when H said his 
In a divorce action the trial judge prevented W from 
3 year old bank statement showing her husband's worth 
current worth was ;j~2o,ooo. W appeals,. 
Heldt For Wo The bank statement was not 
to H~ a present worth in that w~s counsel 
dispositions had been made of the assets 
privileged information and was pertiment 
should have been permitted to ask H what 
listed in the fmnancial statement. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 207 Va o795. 
p brought suit for construction of a lease o A commissioner in chancery heard the 
testimony and found largely for the lesseej Po D appealed. P now seeks to have the 
appeal dismis sed because D did not give P adequate written notice and time to ex-
amine the transcript prior to being certified by the trial judge for appeal. The 
commissioner had certified the r ecord to the judge one day prior saying it contained 
11 depositions of witnesses sworn before metto 
Pleading and Practice . 599.13 
Held for D the lessor. Though under the Virginia rules 5:1 & 3(f) the judge's 
signature is final. Here the signature of the trial judge for appeal was not re-
quired. The commissioner heard the depositions and could certify them to the clerk 
without further action by the trial jqdge who had not heard the testimony. 
; 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 159 S.Eo2d 623. 
D was . convicted of first degree murqer. The testimony showed that the victim's 
death occurred in the course of a robqery in which defendant participated as a 
principal in the second degree. D's cqunsel offered jury instructions that every 
murder is presumed to be in the second degree and the state has the burden of estab-
lishing the elements of first degree ~der. These instructions were refused. 
Held for Commonwealth. The facts did not support a finding of second degree murder~ 
Under the evidence the jury could only have properly returned a verdict of guilty 
or not guilty of first degree murder. 
PLEABING & PRACTICE 158 S.E.2d 663 
(Grover C. ) Brown v. Commonwealth 
Facts: Defendant charged and convicted with incest relating to sexual intercourse 
with his 21-year-old daughter. Defendant objected to the attempted use of his wif e 
by the state as a prosecution witness and his objection was sustained. However, 
defendant did not move for a mistrial. At the close of the trial defendant's 
counsel moved for a mistrial based on the calling of the wife which forced the 
defendant to object and put him in a bad light in the jury's eyes. 
Held: Conviction affirmed-this conduct was grounds for a mistrial, but not ·unless 
the motion was made immediately. The Court of Appeals said the objection was 
waived if not made immediately. 
Pl.,& Pr., 599 "13 
He1c for D the les sor. Though under the Virginia rules 5:1 & 3(f) the ju.dge ' o 
zigna·ture is final. Here the signature of the trial jndge for appeal was not re-
c;_uired. The commissioner heard the depositions and could certify them to the clerk 
-vd:i.~hout further a~tion by the trial judge who had not heard the testimony. 
5541. (August 1952) 
2 LE:iDING AND PRACTICE Federal Procedul;" e 337 ·u.S. 582-. 
X of the District of Columbia wished to sue - Y 6f Virginia in a Federal distriDt 
c0urt on the .gro.und--of-d::i:-vernty of citizenship. An flct of Con{;r ess 28 u.s.c. 1 :~ 32 
provi des that the· word " State" as u sed i::J. that section includes th e t erritories and 
t h0 Dis trict of Columbi a . It wap argued tha t Congress could not make the District ~ 
St:J.t o by l egislative fiat. 
fie l d: ( 4 judges dissenting) that the act is valid. C_zrigr <:: s s has tho power to allow 
a G~izen of th~ Ui~txiQt __ tQ br~ng_div.ers ity suits as ~ r Basonablo exor c is e of its 
power, conferred by Article I, to l egislate for tho Dis trict of Columbia . 
~ ~ . 
PLEADING Mm PRACTICE 189 Va 982 
Th,~re was a t errific gas explosion in the bo.s ement of u. building owned by M. PP a· 
empl oyee of X who operated a beauty s l:0p ir, the building j\'"1\3 killed. P' s personal 
r epr esentative sued M nnd also the Go.s Company. V4f- 8-96 ron.ds in pM't, 11Now parties 
dofondant ~ be added upon the a.f'fido.vit and mot::on of nny dofond::.:.nt where it appo' ' 
that such parties ar e or nw.y be lio.blc to such pla intiff f or c.ll or part of plaintif 
claim." M movvd the court t o add X as X h t::.d ~~as fixtures from which gas might have 
escaped , ancl a lso to add tho City s.s the City maintc.ined a gas inspe ction forc e . Th 
tri a l court r efus od to n.dd those parti es when P's por sonal r epr e s entative obj ec-ted 
thereto and this writ of error was a llovved. 'Whn.t r es ult'? 
Hol d : Affirmed. Plni nt iff c~1n..'iot b o madE: t o S:l0 pa rties he docs not want to sue. 
Even the Federal Hules (S ec Rule. 14 i r, Q, . 59 on p. 8 of F0 der:1 l Proc edur e ) do not go 
that f ar. To ho ld so wou l cl. bo t o c onvert j oit'lt nnd scvur al li nbility into something 
e ls e and chru1g0 other s t ntutes by implication . I r,sucs as to thE: liability of the 
City and of tho omploy~::' r woul d vastly complic:::.to P' s pors on0 l r <J pr esontative ' s suit 
or even overshadow it. The stGtute is cxtrem0ly fr n.bmentnry--only a skeleton rule 
governing t hird party pre.ct1ce. Under these circumstu:-:r;os tho court conc luded that 
the wo rd "mav" in the st':ltuto did not moun "must", but th~.t t such po.rti os sho uld bo 
added on l y if the tri r.tl ~ourt thou.ght it best. NOT.£;. Ru.l e 3: 9 .1 abolishes third 
.rwrty pro.eti co ot J "'w st_o.tJ.n~r.:uls:Lf:'..Qndilll_t sho.l! be r·Jrmi ttod to bring in a n ew 
po.r ·ty. " 
PLEADING .fJ'JD PRACTI ~E Crininn.l Proc odur o 190 Vo.. 134 
Dwn.s i ndicted for breaking i nb the C So..l~s Co .,Inc . with intent t o commit larccn 
end f or l arce_ny of a car th erein all i n one Q0unt . i'b0 Court f! llowed the indictment 
t o be r.unondoC. by inserting the f o llowing wo:rd.s l;J Gfor C:J C Sulc:;s Co 1 11Ford Garage Build-
in g be l ong i ng t o". Tiw jury f ound D guilty aud Gen t er. cod h i m t o three yenrs in the 
penit ontiory for bre r .. king and onterin~ in the ni ght time (e. s t at1;1t or y f e l ony) and 
to three yea.rs for l n.r ceny of the cor . D;i..s cuss po i nts involv(xl. 
He l d : (1) The tunendJnent was pr opor. V# 19..-150 provide:;; thnt a dofoctiw~ indictment 
mn.Jr be amondod n.t o.ny timo b ..:.: f o e · '' ' ~ da.n:LplL'ods_ if Uw amcndmQnt:ct:oo.s norGh ange 
t.bo ch QrO.Qter of the of.'f onso cha.r;.,ed, (2) The v erdict i s bnd . Tho s ettl od law in 
'~'ir gJnia. i s that i f t v.ro of.fons os o.r o ch[-'.I'[,Od i n one e;o.unt the jury can convict of 
oi,t hcr on() or the othor___Qut not of' botli Wh01'c tho mfJ.tt Gr charged -is one continuous 
aff air howe'IZor ther e nrc twt> so nrnt e counts then the 2.cc.us od cnn bo convicte' 
PLEADING AND pi~;,C TICE Bi ll of RGvi c.JlN 190 Vn 145 
B o.nd £ wer e br othror o.nd siste r ar. cl co - own ers of a. s ingl e froni ly dwelling. S fi l , 
u bill in e quity fo r PL\rt;it i on o.ll c ging th n.t s he wa;; :.::b l e nr1d wi lling t o t alee the 
pr opE.;rty f or h er se lf puying: B fo r hi s i nt e rest , nn:.l thc.t B wn.s not )).b l e and willing 
t o tuke the property f c,r h iT!'u'le lf p~yiEg her for hor int erest . 13 fil ed an answer 
pr ayi n[s tha.t tho p!.' porty bo s0ld '.\t public Ltuctirm e.nd c1onying t ho.t he was not abl r. 
and willi.ng t o tnko the pr operty hi:m.a 0lf. At this point B lost inter est in tho co.s< 
pai d n <) attent i on t o thu r1o pN;itionc tha.t s t nol;: UJ:.<.cl u i sc!1ar ged his nttorney. The 
c r, urt r eferred the rnnttc r to a Cornrni sc i onor in 'Ch ~.ncery who f our.d the value of t he 
pr r)porty t o bo $3500 . 'rha c '1ur ~·. onte :rorl. d€lcr oe in which it stot od that B was not 
!J.b l c and 
555A,. 
"'-·Uling to purchase the property, that S W3.s, and that S should pay B ~jil,:t50 and 
;· :1(mld receive a deed from the commissioner in chancery of B's interes·t. This decree 
" as , entered July 30,1947 o On Sept.3,1947 defendant B came to life and fileda pet5_ti.on 
for a rehearing. The chancellor refused to entertain such a petition on the gro,.md 
t~at the decree was a final ono no longer in the breast of the court, but treated 
J ·+ t.ha n;:;tit.ion to rehear as a bill of review. Was this proper? · f ; .J ' ~ 0 Held: Yes. A: et,i tion to rehear comes too late after a decree has become final. In 
f~. c.- .~S'.lC~ a case i is p;ro:Qer to treat a etition -to rehear as a petition for a bill .of 
revJ..ew. 
· In the above case could the trial court allow the bill. of review on the ground that 
the evidence failed to support the conclusion of fact set forth in the decree that 
the brother was not able to buy the property? 
Held: No. Except in the case o r di§cove:red e_yig_~nce a bill of review lies 
only: for error_ o ;Ll~w apparent on the face of the recordc In this case there- is 
nothing on the face of the decree to show that the conclusion of fact set forth above 
was an error of law. If the errors complained of be errors of judgment in the de-
termina~ion of facts such errors can be corrected only by appeal, 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE E~ity Pleading 190 Va.380. 
P had a judgment agains D which he claimed was a lien on certain realty and filed . 
bill in equity to enforce the lien. D had transferred some of this land before the 
judgment had been obtained but P cJ.aimed these transfers l'Tere fraudulent. P's counsel 
without having presented any evidence, tenrlered and asked the court to enter a deere 
referring the case to a commissioner vrith directions to report, among other things, 
"what real estate was transferred by the defendant without any consideration as set 
out in the bill of complaint." The trial court refused to enter such a decree. Was 
this -error? 
Held: No. "An order of. .eferen.ce is not to be awarded to enCl..bJ& a .Qlainti.ff to 
make out his case. It should not -be made. for the purpose of furnishing evidence in 
support of tha .allegations ·of the bill, nor until he has the right to demand it." 
Before P .is entitled to an order of reference he must show by depositions or by 
evidence ore tenus that there was fraud or lack of consideration so it might first 
be determined by the court whether the properties were in fact subject to the lien 
of the judgment, P was not entitled to shift to the court's commissioner the burden 
of taking evidence 
556(no1tl) 57l( ol d ) 
?L~/,_DE!G APD PRACTICE 9ontriOlJ,;t j un Q.P-9:-?tlbrog::.tiqn . . 190 Va. 851. 
D·tJ.o tc tho j cdnt ::le;gli,c;:o:;:·.co of P and D, X uc~s sor ic-u sJ.7 injurod. P proper J.~r coB-
;:-.::.·:~~··:is . .)C:. tho cc..sc:; f or .>10, 000 c.r.d _n:: i d so.r1o to X. P carri e d l inbiJ.i t ;}' im:11..~r <.•.Pec :.l~1Cl 
I , ·!~:-,o i nsurer, r c imbm·sccl. P . Arter mcro t.h8.n a y o:cr from the d c.te of t he :Lllj m~y ;-,l:.s 
·r:Lti1::.n c. y0~.'-r frc'l~ tho d ate of tho pnyrcnt P sued D f c•r tho usc of I f er ~15 , 000 
c :ntr:lbutirm . It vJOS c nnto:xkc~ , ( l )tJ)o. t the st<.'.t1:te of limUc.tions k1.d rm1. Hol(1: ~·To . 
'['[:.c :.: tc.tuto of liB-! tc.t·; ons.-did-.no.t~st :.:n-:t t o ru:1 until P had pr:dd mcro t~m: his shc,rc 
c.i' tho ~\> 1 0 000~ [:nd sinco c ontrl ' ·i llL i.s_ f.m.lm;losl_Ol1 ....... et ...... c_cntr..:::Lc_t _inpliod _in .J.<:>_-,,_ tho 
pcr icd iG thr.uO-y.oars. (2 ) It \1ets c c:1t ondc d tbc.t since o.n I nsur,:>.:nco C!l. • ..  rn.s ,,_ot a. 
t ortfcnsor tho str-.tuto c.lJ.c·"lrTing ccntributj en h1 ·i:.0rts cf ;·,'cn:J n,~glj_r_;onco ne-t h;volvi: 
··· 0 '' J. t' •t 1 h ' ' J · ~ l' -~·r ·. 1l ,-.}d • 'l'l1.'1' •r· -~ · r• l t ·' . .,, .• , ''•l '·"' C' 1' r' 1T~ "r-;• ' -~ .",, ,_.t.,r ._, urpl u.c o .• ~, 110 •. pp lCnul "n. n J • • . •• • s C•. n " .... . .1 J. c,1 .L.> ~-. ~·c url.>c,un-t. ~ ~- ~ · , J . . . ... .. 
'··~ ·1 ·• b ·· 1· ·10 ··" ·'-h ·· ., ·y•·~ l ·ibor"·l·, s·t- ~ 1- ''"' ·'n "l·l,..,rJ· .. ·; s•· 'r r 'gn t~ ""l 'lD_. ., .. ~ - .. , " ~ -_. s :.c 'Fl,t S O·J 1 0 1 ~ (,l ,, U .,, ,_..., ._, . .. . ~ ~ • . ,~ .•Cu .L ' ·· _, _-_.,· . ..• !,, u. . l. o:,c~ .l. l. i '· L< ... r\ J...•.-
3Ur nnco cnrri\:;r wh;:. DO..y<J li.c.bili tv insc•r,<1.r~ cr: t o... cnc j <" ·ir:t t,...rtfe~~sor i::: o~.1t itlod. in 
oqt:IF.• l"'~~-:a - l!oodccns~ic;l:co -E c be ~ubr o[[.~" tcd t~· }d s rigl!t c.·f ccntribution. Dcs:icks 
such ; _ rigr1t -{S o:-c>r ~; o :i.n c..c t:i·c·n uhich CB.n be; :::xprcsnl ;.r ns::;ignocl tc tho in.Slll'['.Y!Ce 
c t.:rr:ior u;.1dcr our <.:'.gpi r;~jj 'ont stc'..t uto 5768 (n r-·\-I 8- S4). 
PLEADmG AND PrlACTICE Ros 1\.d.iudic:-:, tc. Docl:Lratr;r~r Judr;:••cnt~ 190 V2. . 873. 
H nnd i·J were hush['.,1cl ~u~0. 1.Jii c. l"Faiod C'i.lC d cvis,;d B1::-,ckc.c r-e t o H m1til his dc~1.th or 
ror:tr.trri .",go , ::.nd then to P \:hen he b ocnne;s 25 yc~'.r:s (:>f ~'.30 . H romo..rr:i.ccl befor e P be--
c nno 25 yc c:.rs of :c.zo. P :-•<::~ ·g~"lt nnd :::e:c,_~ ·: ::;--:1 a de:cJ.~.r · . i"/ •ry ,ind~;r"cnt t o tho offcct th:..::t 
ho, P, \-JIJ.S onti tl.of;_ tr' ·l;l ·\c r-o·:.,_ts rc:·~ ;:··,· c f .i.ts :.:1.J.t1::.r~.11?;h ho F'.'.:-.; D 0t ~' C:t 25, 2.nd H 
va cated tho promise :>. ·~Tto:l P suod H f c.r the rr.:". s : :~ ;::.hJ.o v o. JJ;;r.:; ,_,f tho rent<.1l s for tbo 
pcric1d fror:J. his ror' :..crr:i. ,·~HC t o his v :::.c::>.: " .-;,c d t~;s prc:.1i.sos. l-l c ontcr.d ,Jd tho nnttcr 
\ill s r os ndjudicc.tl:'. Z1.!:( U .:::.t l:,o c ol..I ~L£:1 . . c'~ bo h -1i co v ·,x:j1_ f c;r tho srJ;le thing. 
Hold : Contention lli"\8'~;1.nc/~ . Tho dGcl:..">.r ::·C. : r~y ju:.l'r.~ .1c.,nt. c~· .. (::~; d ccillud thu abstr:..::.ct 
rights of t ho n&rtios. It U:i .. d ~-~ · .:;t cL:d . .-Ie =~·or purDort t o c~ <:cj_r}o tho 2.i::ntmt duo P for 
- .. , .... 
tho occupc:::. t ic·n o f Blo.c:~:t.crc , or to cr -::·.nt c .. ay c·: ..c:Z~f-,rc relief. lfol!Cc the ~.ssu0s ':JCTc 
not the sGJ.C; in the ;.i '.fO c:J.sr;s . It '.i :".S the; r?:.~F~'1Sn c:i' ·ch" De c l P,..,.. t,r~:r.;:r .Iudg~:wnt_!ct i.. c 
· ~dJ't' .,.,, , ,.. ,-,- ~'~""'-1~:o,· --J.,. ,., , .. ,nl " --."·r·i· .,_ ... tt. -,r ·f·1J' ·., Sl'') · ·r ·~ (· · ·' c· orr")J"n·' r ··· c·~1.1 "u~'S of g ,lVO u . (l « J oioie...-.J..-~r=va .... . u ~ ··' ~..)·+.- - vt·:~,; !.• .L c.:. l lU . -' .. ....... ~ .. . · ~~~ -u....:.:_ ·.J .. t..L ----d' u . 
a.ction. So P nLty pr·:~:n,; rlr :'.':st:i:!;l.'te an ·.\c"!.:.j_c i , r' l : w:::.;; i-c'.:Y(~rr}.ctun.l principles t n 
r oc c•v ur duns d1.1.0 hh' iw i~ f er tho 1 1 ;:. '-~ c.f P 1 n prc>pcrt:;: . 
J.. 
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C , e. c r:n trc:ctcr uh r:· 1:f'£ or octcc:. ·a lx< 5 J.d :' :~1 (r; f r.:r D f:i.:1 m~ ·"- 11j_}j in oqu it:r t o onforco 
n nech:o nics lion in the su;:J c::f /), OCO. D ;:~1l z_,,., ~; -] ·i,}·~o c~~['" ~I ; o f.;c- by .le fr".ul t. Tho CCl~r 
d ocroe('t cJn A1~guot S'tl 1 ·t:2~·.t C rc'c ovor c;f D ·:~<; , (;CD, LJ,;·.t ·c.l•c; C ". ~':.: ~jo r ofo:;:rod t o a 
;:1.1.s t or c crunissicnor •.r>o H C.S r:'l.iroc tu·l to ~·.r~c crtc.:in ~ · :ll: ru·t_~c,rt ·the l i0ns _:'..i.1c1 tho order 
c-f th· ::: ir priority c•: D' s J ::.1~d c :.-::..1 1.11.;:J .J.d :l.ng . S>Jrrt J::,.- ·i:. l-;c; :r;, ~ fto:;:' t he: · :. ~'. stor cor-'.:· ~i .s:-; :i c,_, 
filed his r oprTt -::.o 1-J ' ;ic> :w oxccmt i ·. :·;s Here; tr.:1 n:.,, ··.r,d en :S cy.rc. :Z l,l9/~8 n decree <n.w 
en to r od c onfir;:d.ng th :i r:: rctr~rt ~:1c\ c·r'::.ol'i ~g th :.~ pr c-pu·t~,r tr·~ l-: ~J s c1d t o sc. tisf:;· t~-,o 
liens thereon. At tll:..: r~o::<t tcr :::\ :·f C•ch t D f5l o;i :_ ·~ ·~· ·L:i t~.<./t c<llq;j nb· th;:-t s ::ncc C.ho 
c;ntr~: of t,;1e ,Jecroos · .. :o"~t:i·. :·wcl ::~h -~Nc he J-E·~d discnvr)!'0t'l ;~k·.t U!cl'o •~ oro r: or ·i.c.us do-· 
f octs ir: the coast 1:rc ·c5.cn n::' t. >o buil cl.:Lcg ru·,d t Lu 1.::.::w ::f j.i~,·~ ·.r c. Jx'r n;::.t .)ri::.ls, c;·~ J tl' ~ 
such dof cJcts c0uld :·.:ot k~vc bcor -Jj sc 0V·)r<x1 bJ~ t.l e oxu~cise of ;_l_l}C; diligence. It be · 
c ,::.;:c !lnt:.r:i.a J. to clocir."!.c Hl':cYG)'c r r: ' !YJ"t. +.lJc.; ." b<::vc r:oc :r-ccs 1rnr c finc.l d ocro<).S •J I' 
intorlocut.or :yr ckcr8cs . 1·n1 :i ch ~·.rc J.;~:oy? 
Hold: They c. r o intor:tcc1 :· :_,_-,r~' 'J.o crc~: s ;".n:' :\'> once m;.bj cct t c, pot:i.t:i. o'1 fer rcbo::cr in;:;, 1 
f). ll' ·· 1 (1l0 CI' '", '"rr ·'t +· ·•• · i ;.,., ·. i~ ,.~J . .,.. -~ q r·,rc 1 1 v11i.~,_;,:.;.;;,.c-c><• ·f -~ 1,,.., ,,.1-. r· l " r.::ub j oct n·J· V' ' r.:: '"'·1·· 
0 ~(. ,, •• . •\.J ~ 0 Jl,.; j , ) , . ~ . \ ,j , ,• • ' •• - 1. ~ A o - ...... -----~- · - - ... t!:. .~- :j.;.,: ... -6 1 ~... ~-~ b • ...... \.,_; (,., -
th e r oli --; f th c:. t vl f.'..[~ ~ - J'tc:··.-r; l~ · .t:J r.1 , - - ·<.:C1d ] .c:-,1V1~,s ·Jf. i:.Linu tr· lx, cJ • no in tho eau sc s".V(~ 
t osupc r i ntcnd r':in"r. ~:t(Jr:i. :c JJ.'/ t i.;- .Jxccnt:i_r' r ! r' f tL~ ·lv:::."cc:11 • 1!U.l o th::-.. t portion pf the 
decree f i :;c.i.n[; D 1 s peTs·~·,)::-. } 1~ ·:b~_ : .. :• f.'j- ls f Jl~ ':1 t >. 0 ,,._::; n• t t be s ource of oq11.itQblo 
jurisdi cti on \..Jhicl1 E:e>l~n·c ~; ·.r ~·<i.: t he. d :::;>t ·i~c- 1. ·. r ,_;e J. .. Ec ·'.: ;,> L!;;n i n oqui ty . The cc1.P1l o·( 
relie f srmght b~,. the li -:.:n c ::-•;r'l __ ;_-:,r,r , C, ~ cPL: ' jrt 1">.:; :.~c c · :-T· ,]_:; nho'l tmt .i 1 the property 
h.-:.cl 1•oon sc-l cl, tJ:1o n<.>. J.. <J c·~pfir;· ,ucJ r:1:-.l :~.h :: ;:;r c ccv1s c:t:i.s t r:; ht.~.tccL Thus n furtbm: clocrc 
w:>.s nocess::-.ry f or ti~c; occ ·-!-;Db G1'!·01:t d ' tho s1. 2 ·;·~ c.ncl l". 1. · ~i. s l"''.;q1:;.ir cd judici:;:l r:. s 
distingui shed fr cn r:D.n::..~;·krl~:J. ·:'.c-r.~·:-'•;! by t}.u c: t,;~t. 
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/r(f{ "7 Pl;'.inti f £' sued dofondo.nt f 0r d~~r.':-:gos nr u:ing out of c.n c. uto colHsion ::'.nd r ccovOTCd 
·r :J. '!~1500 verdict. On ~·. ppoo.l tho judg::ont vTo.s rcvor sod bc ccn.lcc of i111propor in;:;trlJc t:;_r;;y; 
--u .• c~ -a new tri;·~J. grc.nted . Upon t ho snc ond tri a l ;_Jl nintiff >W.s '' 'mrded a ver dict c-.f 
:~ ;? , OOO .Sovero.l days thor o0.ftor dof ond.:t2·1t nhd his counsc:l discovenJd for tho first 
tir:;o th~.t.t one of tho jm·ors on tho sec ond trial had c..l so s orvr;d as a juror on tl-:o 
f~ .r;o i·, trio.l. They O.SDic;n thi s QS r ever s ible Ol'ror. Before thinl t ho defense at;l:,crr: e: ·: 
:·,·:.d r.. skod :_;.}]_ jurors if ttwy he.r:l cxp1'e~Jsod any opinioJ.!. in tho c-J.sc r:.ncl '·Tn.S tv1d. n:.l . · 
The roc or cl Hhich \vets two.iJ.~blc t o cotmsc l disclosed tho previous se:rvico of tho ju:r·or, 
but 1:0 one discovered i t until c.fte r _tho trial. Should o.' no:1 tri~·. l be gr~mtccl? 
Hol d : No. It i s t oo l o..tc c,ft.;:;r the vordict~bjcct to tl:.e conpotcmcy of c. ju:cor 
unlcsc one is o.blc to s : ·m1 thr.t cr.m;;o for chnllcugo oxistcd u ld tho:t in the e:x·Jrc~ co 
ofdilOaili[<;cnco thc:t t c::t'sc: cm1lcl not hc.vo boon discovoruc~ bcfor o t ho jury \ 't..'. S m1nrn 
L~Qd a lso t hnt he ho.s boer: :lnj ured . In t he imJto.n,t c:1so noi·;Lot> c-no of t hose t'ro 
()~_;s;mtj_c~ J.s ~tms shovm. Dof ol-:!.do.nt ocn-:1ot sny thc.:t ho hc.s b een prc ,judicod h~{ tho j1.1rcr I s 
htcving sorve:d t'.gd.n r:c:r ::.~ J.y b ocD.u sc: he cUd no·t:. h:mg tho jury i:::J C'.cf ond o.nt 1 s f c-.vor . 
The qi.LOst ion o.:Jlwr.t t ho ~urors nor;.:lR-lly "'ould indicc.t o n probe f r.r possible p~~rt io.lJt~r 
r~·.thor tAK1Xt t ho poooibi1~.t3· of cno uf thor .. l:.c.vinr; rondc~r:, cl. t. ~)rovious jury vcrc~i c ·C. . 
~-zoz r ends, 11 l'Jo irrO[:;ul a rit y· i c:-1---thc er.lp:~nolin:; 0f jurors r>hrtll b o suffici ) P.t t() 
sot a side a. vordic~ vnlos ~; t l1o p.::'.rty nnLi.ne; tho cb:J () Ct::.en '.·r.: ·.::; i"·Jj urod ~r tho 
irregul o.ri ty or unlocs c.n o1j cct ion spocificL:.liy p0int i j11?; n~t such irr ogul;".ri t ics 
w:cs r.1c.dc befor e tho suor~ri.:-:G d ' t.l-)o j ury;-n. 
LEADI NG AND PI\.ACTICE.-Ar.:or1 dr:;c.c~t of NoJu j~_J;f' 1 ~ot:i r ~'- 190 Vo..l016. 
Plctintiff o.llogo-d in hi::; :-c:l:.ic0 of nfJt:i.on thz::l 1-:o "~-s t ot::lly l1iSt:blod .:--.s ;::. rost~lt 
of em nccidcnt on Av.c;u,~t 26 9 191,.9 , :  nd U·· ~~t :.bfc~1d::'.~1t i nsurLt"r'c :-) c onpo..ny h~'..cl fai l cc. to 
m;_:cko Ponthly po.y;:!;·; ,,-(;::; ·v :15.i ~ the:J.'oc.f t r.:.:r .~. G i +, ,,r: .r;· oLJ i e;: tc~~ ·:; c· ci.o un-::1e r pl o..intiff ' s 
c ontr.:;.ct of incu.r :-·.nco dtll dof'ontlo.nt. Dcf om1ant filod pJ. ;::;c.s of tho gcmc r i'..l is suo, 
rolonsc, c.nd c.ccord (--. :2c1 s:~tis:fncti o;'\, i,t th'J hog:i.nr:~ ng of t;·,.::: cr ±c.l , -1urj_ ng tho 
cxo..ninat:i en of thu first H:i.t:1oss, t he court ~:Jlmwd plc5ntif:f' t n <.'. > ·c:xl. h~cs '!ot ico of 
notion so D.s to c~ llcp;e; t~:::>.t tho <2G t o of c G; .2 ;or.co~ ·.ont of his tc-t:.:l di s ::,bili t ;;· 1:m .. s 
August 15 instcrd of Jmr:t <>t-, :2 ~1 . Pl ::1.intiff 1 s oxpl:~~l:.t:i 0~1 of t!1o c:::- it:,in::·~l orr·c:r >Jo..s 
t h:.'.t his r;:d.lr• ! =. ~d f c rc.i ·[.'.n J·::.CI. c.:.r r:i.ccl hj;·.l e:n th:J po..::roll p;:,ti l tl~o l ;c.tcr d(Cto , so 
pla intiff h~·.d thought cf tre e, r ::.:t hor tL::'.::l t he r].~:tc cf tho -::.ccic1o~Jt, o.s bdnr; ti-~o 
rln t o cf his dic>nbili i~ .'.r . Dci\md·:·.nt c-b.j octcd to t h r.: :'.r ·.c :K1;-\.::~1t, but r ofusod tc tc. ~cc 
ndvnntc-.r~c of :;.n offer 1);:' c l·.-nt:i.m.:_,~ncc redo by l;0tl ~ pJ..c..intiff ,· :·.d the c 0ur t . There uc.s 
s one quosticn c.s to 1·!hcn l:.hc ::cccidont r~ctt<j .. l:i· clid •:,ccur. Sh •:t:l'~ tho o......,onclr.en t lv'.Vo 
hewn t,llowod? 
H old : Yes. Bet h co.w.~ ."'.l\c1 s t.:_t,:·t.o lm: .::. l loH Sl.l.!)st~mti:-·.1 c· ;·:on.c .. T!ont s in t}:c.: olo".L~in·::s 
.. - -~ ..._, 
for tho pr_ouoti.oJ.1-CJ· ' '.u: ·t .ico.. Til;.; cc::cncl:·:()nt w:.s r.·onJ.::.;!o t0 ~'- r:J.-;. tori~'-1 fc..c t in con- · 
t:r: o~.:n·s.y:, · a_.clut l: of tJ1Y ;·.c_, :LC'.ont >-r!! ich C['..Uscd tho dis "..bj li ty . The chccngoV:'~. s o.llowx~ 
b0fcro c.ny but a snc .. ll 0-~: ·.ouni:. c.f ovi r~.cr'!c :: h:2cl hr)on S1 'h . . it-Gd .• It '-res s till pos:J i blo 
f or dcfondm~t t o introcb ccv r;v.l.( cm cc th: .t tho 1~ 0\ J c1:·•. i,.:) H" s vr -:-ng , • -. nc~ dofonrlc..nt H <J.G 
off orr.:cl t:' .. c;:-.ntinWJ.nc ~ ~/l rH'UP<'.t'O his c ~so but r ofv ... ;cc1 it or; the gr.:.unds it Houlc1 be 
of no bc!lcfit to h:i : ··. st~ c·t. t •:r,~c inv·.:: lvo~~- ~-~C V/!8--119 , 3- 21'1' .:-.ncl. G-532. 
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Quiclloy n.nd CJnnton \J :··•··o c e;:wictc,l in PoJi.c• ) C(-·urt cf ;n·c-;:>ntj :1g i.l. "nun1x;rs retcLot 11 
in t ho City of Norfcllc . Sc.vcr::J. ,1_oy:::: J.,~.-t·~r th(J Co>T:: ~C'·D'.Je:n }::J~1 1 S Att.ornoy fDoc]. L'.n 
infornc.tion ~g;.:inst C'. !I'L~C~f.J..:n ~jc.Jn.n j_n Hhicl' +,1~·.c pc:. :L r ho..d b oc~l ·:1r :Lving c-:t. tho t :i.no of 
o.rrc s t and <~163. ') !,. il'. fcc:~0l"Cl Cl: :,:'r01JC7 ~-rl ~ir:.~~ H C.s i•; t 1<d:c pc·c ~ ~ .:; ·:,s r. t tho ·ci:le: , c.slcint; 
C0ndunnntion o..nd f~T.f.'c·i.:tt•.l'u ':'l r.hu :.;r•.'i )Ort~· t( thu St :·-.to . Qu.:Lc:lo;y· nnd Clo..nt on Cl.l1311Cl'-
)(l "llogl·nrr ·t ll"·" -!- ' o T-Itt' "'· ·' ..... _. ,,,·,·t · .--r,!·•l--,]_i r l ''. r; '"~ 'Jh ·. r., ·• lir· .,. ,•r·n+-,,.,lPl"t --·d by -:·:·.· ·" , u . t.:. ...... v 0...!.~. , u 1 .• .1 . J .~.:.~ .. . u' ·~· ..... --· r:, 1 .... •• ·. -..~ 1 - J . ... l .. •• . • ~ ... ... - .~ ........ . ... 4,.. . L·. _ v . _ 
forfr:; i.tur o s t .:l'tu t c , ,..,_m1 ti :~':i: +,h,;ru 'r: .s nc· ov ~_ :' 1.cr>co t c c t'c~:-·o ct t:1c i:\C; l10j' in their 
pockr;ts -.,Jith Lb.-.ir uu.nb .. n·s .:--.ct·v:;_ t _!J; s . At the V _l,c c-f .c..r :'Gr~:~ ';)137. 68, cv :.r ::>20 of it 
:i.n chnneo , v! 0..0 f ounrl in Qu~clr;y ' s pocl~;) t s . li\:.rt}-,c r cr·r~t.cn tJ.(·p ·-. ms nc:do that u.rKlor 
Va l 9-2J2 ,.· Hhicb. prcLil)it;: t>ro:::c CL'. t. :; __ , •11 w:·1or Pc ru tl::.·;1 r::rJi.! r.Jc·:~t~ .~-:-. • ) C·r 0rdin:1nco "\Th er e 
558 (nel·l) 573 (ole~) 
an ::.ct in s imultanem~sly a violation of more than one stc tute or ordinance , t he r;r esen ·. 
;,·~ ~:.t 'l ~:~s bar:'ed by tho Police CoFrt conviction . Also ·ap:t::Jear:~n;:; in t he proceed in:_::D u:.~ ; .· 
,:_ ,;~od.u.te s Discount Corpbrat:i on, Hhich cla:.i1:1ed th2.t it ho.d a vc.lid lien on th3 c :T i:" 
. ~-,) O~:ou::1t of '~S786 , i3J, tlmt :i_t hc.d 110 lmoHledge of the USC to Hhicb th8 c ~:.r bac1 !xlnc'! 
:· ·~ L~t ~~.:nd tfi.:J.t its lie:~ sllo~·ld 1)8 s;:;. t.isfied before t. J1c state condcj~med the cr2r •. 
Euic.: (1)Code 19-]..-"8 is 11pplic::tbl e only ~~2.: .. s r tm:inal. p.:; ~oc..e.ed :i.ng::; . __ Tho proceocLi.n ::_~ j~ o 
tcr.Ccit oron:;:ct T is Hho-: 1 -'l ·in re~~ It is a civiJ. cc:.se, net <;c cdrainn.l proce()_dling . 
2 'I' : .o st~;:~.t·o.to(Vtil8-302 o.llous for feiture to the st :~te of 11 2.ll .-. person~:.l prop-
crt '/ of :::tny kind or cho.ro.cter, 11secl in connection Hit}; the r:'ol~loti on, operatior~, o:c 
c c-:xh:ei;. O'~ ~'.ny l ottc2:·y1t. C1occrl :r i t cover s both n cr.:::.~ u soC lly those colloctjng 
m."':Jbor s slips and ·l~>o money 1.~secl by thoril i n 1:1aking collect~ . ons o.nd paying ,.J'5.nners .• 
(3) QuicUey offe red x1o r;xplo..nation for his havin;~ 0vor ~::aoo in hi s posso s~1:!. on, 
::· ~uc:1 of it in c ~H:tr! :~o . The t r ial judgo couJ_d fine~ th.:>.t t he 1:wncy wc1s used in r•c:.ld~1r:: 
c0llections . 
(L~) Tho Jgnor c.nc ,;_J)f o'w e~.g_nn_;i.nterost in tho m·orJor:lz· th::tt i~ i s bo:l.ng ns~d 
fq,r_ i11') 2:1ll pur posos i~>, ~:1:dc.:)r t ho Virp: ini.o. st:•.tl; t o , no d ofc~1s o to tho f or foi b-.ro pro-
ceedings _. Thoro is no "._,:Orit .to the ~i0i1or 1 s contention t ' .. :ci:. Hs lion shot:J.-1 b :3 
:ttL"Gls"fj_od ·bofor •-:3 tho Stc. ::.o ::;l"ould t.o <~ J. lovocl to ccl:dor:r:". the cc.r . 
Tho t act of liG.biJj_ '(:,~ : :.; tho guilty net of tbo one h:.v:i ng cln.rgo of t ho property. 
PU~.ADHlG rmd PRJ~CTICE .. ·'l' :::'.."{.~.t:: 0!1-Hc l:i. ~; f fro1:1 I t:vctl:i.d Lsso::; ::r~nont 191 V~ . 52 . 
Pl c. intiff and five othc:c L'.nd m.mcr o ob,jcctod to tl1e vc, l:id i t~,r of n tax nssescod to 
c over cost of gnrbc .. &::o colle ct~ on i ;1 tho county . All or::i.n3 -i:.l! ~'.t cl~Jven thousc.nc1 other 
t n:;.']_)ayers 1.;e:rc simiJDrl~'.~ s :!J~1 'L.'.t od, they plr;d c. h:i11 i n oqui~y to en join colloct :i.on 
of tho tc.x , basjnc; o<;ll.i ·l:.? ,j m·isd:i.ction upon c .. voicLncc o~L' a i;mJ.tiplicity of suits . 
Held: Equit:r hL\S no ju::cisdj_cti.oJ:J bccc.v.so V{58- J.l58 providos tl'.::'ct no suit to r ostr,:d.n 
tho o.ssossmoiJt or collec·c5.o't a: o..r;y tnx shJ.lJ. lx.l nc h:to.:bod in any court in tho 
Cor.1J .lom1enlth oxc c:,Jt >·r:·;cn. tl~cro is :10 ('doquett G ro~ody .::t t l~·.H . Pl1'1.inti ffs hero h.:~.d n.t 
l oC!.st thr oe r er1odt cs o.t 1 ,· .\·T; ( l )1bdcr V#58- 1145 t hrwe;h 58-1151 of the Tax Code t llcy 
c ould ho.ve applied t o <'- ccmrt of l e.H for c .. n ardor of oxo:-lor.-·.t :ion r estraining tl:o t:.:.x 
collector from c olloct :i_c"lg :m~r ;:T:'oneous c:.m3u s.s:~~ont :r!.nc. cUn:c.: t :Ln<; hin1 to r·otv.rn. w1y 
nmount a l ready p::-~ id . (2) U:1.oor V/1 58-841 of tho Tax Co<Je 1 ::'.ny Dix l:~rdounors of ·the 
county coul d h:.1vo f er cod t ho Cor;r.: .. onwoC!.lth 1 s Attorfl.oy tv c ~.;'TG o ct Jhc vc.'..]~i d i ty of the 
"" · ss'·lont J.'1 i· l•e; ci·~cn J'+ c ...,1.trJ.. ( '-') 'T"..,. ,,_. co·ulo' ) , ~ v " '""~ d t1... "' t·-~,-,~.~ n.rll0o 88ot1  co-., .. 1,··1 u..:;,SQ ,1 , _ ... v .......... .l _ .. u ~-.~ . '-' • _l .. I .... vu .· _ .t .• L_ ·'· -L- l!U ... .. ..:y t .. J .... U""S L..:... u.l. 
l c.H principl es f e-r r ·Jc ov ... T~· af the c..;:wt.mt p <'. icl . T:-nw oq ,_~:i.t ·.-· h·.cs no jurisdi ction to 
cnj oh-1 a sscssG·:mt n:c· c olloc·~, ~ c.n of n s t ::.to or loc:.:.l to.x 1.n Virgin:L'J. . 
PLE..<i DING fdrD PHS.CT I CE Dccr~os Dro confes so 
The bill ('f coupl~·.il1':; in n c:oncr ,-::1 cr;:;di'C. or 1 n suit in oq_<.J.:i ty ::tllce~x1 t hat 11 fr on 
\-Jh,n .. t he (plc. i ntiff ) h~.s 11:;~·.1·r1 oT j _,3 l ed t <J [).-)lj_cvc.l 11 dc-i'cndo.nt Oi~n :::d .:'.n intor ost in n 
Lynchburg n;rcc.ntiJ.c ooncc:n. DcfOlld:'..nt. f c'.iJ.oC. to ~·.r:m!()].' tho bil l , ::-. nd it H O.S t;'.~ :e 'l 
for ccmfosscd :·~s tr) ) o5.~ : f.~ TK1 J.; lw c::msc r ef erred t o :'. c O? •lL::i. :w ~; oncr t o c'.scertn:in tho 
oxtc:1t of dcfcndo.nt 1 s cut.:·:~·,~, . L~~tor tho pnJcc.:di,l;;s '. J ~;r (; 8EGp(;ndocl " t tho r oqnust •Jf 
dofondc .. l·lt t o cnc:·.bl-:; hir. ~o :::ctU.o Hith }d~; cr.:cU.torn. j_ft ~l r f :ivo yo:'..rs passod vr i th •10 
fur ther nct :ton bc~.n~. tr. ~:on in tho suit , it H: .s di::;r,::i.:J[>;;· ' fr c1,; th :: d 0clcct undor tho 
fi vc _;re;r·.;· rule; . I ~.l -~hn p:c:~~s.:mt :su.:i.·c. oYer -~ ; h~~ mmDroh:i.p of -~.!1o Ly11chbt<.r,s concern , :Lt 
is contonctod by pl:_-1.2.:1.tiffr;, 1·h r) '.'r;ro C(rtk1\:m.c1c~.nt:::; in tho !.'lr0v · ' YLL.'3 rmit, th:-.t tho 
r_l ocr oo pro C,...·11ft;scn j_~~ t !'O pr~y·.,r~1 .~:·1.1EJ :Jtj: t·, Js C t:~:.-.: cJ..u. s :i VC t."?< f -~:.:he (lllCf:'t i c::J. Of C:hrncrsl1i1) 
i 11tcru~t in t ho ~ .. 1~;::.-~c ~~~~ -~ -~-~ - lc.~ 83 t c.CJ.i0 >::·.:ur.t . 
llold : Tho ducrue J.):C'o co"1fce:::o h'-' c.:; 3.s nc·t cr:.:Jc J.u::::_: ·:r.-) . T>c 1. :iJ.J .. (~~1ly c..llc ;:,;e::cJ. tlt::t·:; on 
i nf or n.:J.tion ~mel 1: ·di::':~· tl!\~ ir:i·, ,;J:'03 t i<T.':'.S <'.i3 ;::t:·~tor~ .• rt' :1 c :~>.et ·l:,i::'t the C2.US C \h1S re-
f erred t o t}1c c cnd.fJr>:·· . ·~;K r ;;l;ou:; L:.c t. :·.ht:: ' : . . t ·;·,, ,y' u. -. f, .-~ 0t ·: :cc. ·.-i; od c·. :c:.: scttlod . riot onl;y 
thc.t , but if the clccrco :·!l'C· C O''J :i:\:.:f.i~:;c, :1,·.~d put tl1c i . :. ~t';cx t c ::· _):Tt 1 J.·~. HouJ.c't l":c.vc i1 ccn 
b0t\-TC011 plaintiff ~'.lcC1 clc:!.'c~~C~C.D.t , 2.:1Cl :1ct 1.~otvv~r; cr> .. ·'\JfC; :: r: · ~cnk: >:".:·1d the dcfc;:cb~-:!t. . 
\ 
559(new) ·· , · 
PLEADING AriD PR.ACTICE-Incorporn:t ion of Ev~dco1co_ir.ltQ Re c or<;l 191 Vc . • 73. 
Virginia is not enforcing the crinl1n<::.l l~cH · of o.ncther stntc 1r1he r o tho Commissioner 
'Y;~ Mot or Vehicles r ov olcos tho dri v or ' s license of a. V irginin -res ident wh o has boo;!. 
. c orni:i.cted of drunken driving in a :tviary1e.nd court. Purpose of the Virginia stah1te 
2:J.a.king revocation mn.ndCLtory in such a case is to protect Virginia citizens in their 
~we of the highways. 
The court on appeal Hill not consider petitioner's cantent :io;1 tr11t the Ha:rylu.nd 
c onviction vms void for l ack of jurisdiction Hhere the certificate of exceptions r,ays 
only tha t pet:Ltioner was held for 39 hours \oTithout 8.rra i gnment or the opportlm'.ity fo:r 
medical examination but d oes not shm1 evidence of any kind to supnort tha t c ontention. 
!Petitioner : should_have objecte~ to exclusion of hi~ e'?-dence in _the lov:er cour t ;:>..L1C~ 
had the evldence 2ncorporated mto :the .re cord. As 1 t lS, t here lS notlung t o shou 
\oJhc.t type of evidortce he Jmd, if"'" .nny~ or whether it 1.-ms lr;g:1l or admissible. I f ther e 
were errors in the 'tvh!'ylani1 proceedings petitioner :::~auld have apprJa1od. 
, ~ .. II' "" .. 
PLEADING ~iJ:D PHACTICE-Doin?; Business. for So_:ryic e of Process· 191 Va.l36. 
Dc fendt:mt corporo.tion '\ras cha rtered in Hasr.mchusotts t a mrmufacturc c.md sell office 
equipment. Its plant::.: and •)fficos He ro in Nm·T York <.;.nd i\~a;::s3.cl;us e; tts . It sold its 
products to indepenrlont retE,.J.l concern.:;, 16 of then in Virg:i.l!:."cc~, f. o .b, f'act<Ory. It 
supplied its d eal er s \·Jith a dvertising material and :i.nformo.tion, but in no 1:1ay 
financed them or directed t ho rotail snles. Several tili!os a year each dealer v/OtJ.ld bo 
visited by on agent of cJ.ofondant corporc.tion, ~orho HOl' lcl he;lyJ :in f o.ruing displays ~.md 
putting on d emonstrations . \{hilo ono of the s o agents l!C.s in !. lor f olk nncl. engaged in a 
showroom dcmon stro:t ion , ho Hf:'.s sorvod y ith procucs by plD.J.nt:i.ff . 
Hold~ Service of p:coco::;s nuGt be quMhod s:i.nco t]·Je ::..gent H:c:-~ not sorvod ·in n count y 
or city vJhore ho fcnidod , or \olhorc his place of bus:inC:;sc ' "'-s, or Hhorr) tho priricipo.l 
office of tho corpo::c·c1.t :i..on w:ts locnt ,;d ~. Th.) fareign corpor:~.ti on c/ O.S not d oing business 
in Virginia so as t o have subjected i·~·'seli"' t o the l mrs of this St ate . · 
PLEADING AND PPJ\ .. CTICE ..SsJ.!.;p · 191 Va . 525 . 
P suod D(du Pont ) for ';:,666 , 561 daJMgcs- Jvc t o defective p:t~nt u.sod by P f or tho 
purp ose of finishi"llG r c:.dio co.bim:ts vJhic:h paint r:>.o.dc tJy; c .:~binet s unmorcho.ntc.b1G . 
T):10r:o wo.s ono count f er b.c-cc.ch of ••o.rr0-n"t!v , one c ow1t a llog:l r,g fraud , nncl cn e c ourit 
o.J).oging nogligoncc. D do,.mrrod on tho. ground. th~~t thoro W '"'S mis j oinder . D c ontended 
thnt P must elect t o s1..1.c o ithcr in contr ::wt ·')r :i..11 tc>rt . 
Held: Demurrer ovc:rruled in spite of exprossions(dictc.) b tH o Virgj_nia c o.sos that 
o.n oloction must be r,1cce'lc (l66 Va . 314 c.nd 181 Vc .• 390). liistorico.lly Gn n. ction f or 
br~3ach of vmrrnnty gr o·w c.>1xt of deceit, o.nd ~~tV di.Q:t:i.nct i on between 
c ommon l m1 f orms of o. c G·wn r.:::.s l~~p-ely dls~per::.rcd ;:;ince tho c.dopti0n afOur- n otic e 
of motion s t a tuto . 
PLE.ADIHG A .. li!D PRACTICE. CnrrUnett'..rt ccs 191 Vi' .• 768 . 
P su ocl. D who cliscl:::.::.r zcd h er 1~~\·JY'::lr just bof c:co tri::c.L Th e! j udf::;o go.ve her a c ontinu-
o..nco . She negl ected l:. o un(:;:'.;:;e ::>.Jtot hor l c:..ryG}' untjl s:·~r .. rtJ_y h:::foro tho nov! d.~:te f or 
trir.Ll 0.nd nlso srJC1ITod ['. Dt::-..to·m nt f r on her cloc+.or thr:!.t Dl'l. o H·c.s under his. cc.ro and 
tho.t ho deemed it inL'..~J.v:i . so.blo f or h e r t•::> n. ppoo.r in C')l:rt . Tho l lCU J.,-.uyer nsh::cl f0r ~,_ 
sec ond contimJO.ilco cr.h.:i.. ch u ;1.s rofl:cS')CL \1..1.~~ this cr:~ c .r ? 
Held: No. The /:f,I'W.lt il'r; •f .~: c r·r~t ::.nu~·.nce is wi'c,h i:1 tbe cU:; croti c"l of tho tri:ll j'u.dge . 
Discho.rge uf C 0ll: : J~l r)Y.' ?. 1.:•.l.:.>rc t o obtr.:Ll C OU11~3 C l i!l ti•.:lC i~: ;y·t <.'.bsolutc gr c· ll:K1 l\;l' 
ri cont 1nuo.nce. OthorHL;•:: Lt f: .[\ ;i!c}·..;.nt cculd p G3t :)ono tri:-1 ~i nucfiPitcly by ch:::LD.ging 
c ow1sol. The c1octr:.r 1D ccrt, :i.ficc.te :l.::; toe equ i vocc.l. Dcs :L ~:~. o;, , ovon i f jt :is inG.dvisc.blc 
f or l<er t o o.ppo11r in c · l1_rt 1 hjr t estinn1y cn.: l 1-:l :-.: ,e;ivc:". b:,· cl.ol-'C' :Jit inn . 
FT..E.DING .fuill ?IU.CTI-:::E 560A. 192 Va. 8 
P sued D for fro.udulm1tly repre sent ing to her th:-. t a r::nrriage to him would bo vcclid 
•.<1,:r. he 'tTell lmow tht .. t so.i d m.::trr:i.&.ge v-r:.."ts fruudulcnt, and alleged that said i: nrd q~c 
·, :-- ~ 9 subsequently 1::-.e l d to be invc;lid . D demurred because (l) it is not all eged th.r:.t :::· 
' r: s ' innocent;. (2) it is not a lleged Uw .. t mL!rri2.ge \W.S void rathe r thnn merely vo:i .. d:..tl-,2.3 
(:;, ) ~10 Llcts nre sta·cod but only the pleo.der 1 s conclusions . The trial ccurt St'.stu:i.;!oc..1 
the do:~turrer. vJas this correct? 
}hld : l'Jo . The notice of dotion above is a good example of hovJ not to do it, but it · 
·:;0 ·:;s not:ify D of the n o..tU:i.'O of the cl£dJn. P should have boon allowed to • ..DID.nnd, or D 
s\ot: ld l1ave aslwd for Ct '~ill of pr-1rticnl o.rs. I}.J il e 3;] 8 then governs tho proced.w:·e. 
PL:SP...D:fi.JG P .. nD PRJ.C'l'ICE 192 Vc... .47 
D rnn over B, o. n:;_ne yor.r ol d bo~r, :..md killed hin. P sued D, and a lso his f~~thor, 'F . 
D l:K.d his m-m homo :1.ncl. o\med tho cc.r, but P c laimod th:'.t D 1.v c~s F 1 s c..gent . Shortly 
c..ftor~:m.rds, and before suit vPls sttcrtod , D, vJho w.1s in tho o.rny, v1as sent to FrCJTco. 
F cng~;.god. A o. s C'.n F,t·;;ornoy o.nd A ~.sJ~od for n number of ccntinua.ncos. 1Vhcn D rot-:..IT.cod 
ho l:tJ.do no obj ection t o <' i1c.t h:'.d happened, but nft8r tho l r..psc of c. considorn.blo 
period of time he movcxJ. t}:t0.:t. tho caso be dismiss.~d on the gr01md t hnt he hnd novcr 
boon sor\ved ui th process . This notion \{c.s e;r::mtcd . !!o.s. this error. 
Hold: Yes. A _gonoro.l O.Dpc:::.r::l.nc:c by counsr;:l~"l :o.iJu;r of sorvicc of 
O..RPEJO.rnncc \-IUS c..uthorizod, Such o.n appov.r:>..nce is pri'.·1n f .".cio i:.uthorizod n.nd this 
priEn f ncio o..uthoriz,r..vlon "hc·.s not Lom:~ robt'.tt0CI .. F cUd not tost if;y ·crw .. t he hc.d no 
<J.uthority frcm D t o cl>3<:.l[;C A ns counscl,for oecb . D's fril JP~c promptly to mn::c c~ 
motion for tho 'vJithdrmr<.:.J_ of A' s c..llcgodly unnuthqrlzcd .<;..pro L:.:r ~~'. lCO . i s ovidcnco of 
tl.l,lthoriznt·i nn Tho CO"lcr·c, '.HLL not <1 SSVJ:10 t hl'l.t A, c.no.ttc)rnoy of integr:l.ty c~nd ox-
pericncb' v!2..S 2.. r c:nl: ir~tur lopnr uho uro:nrrfuJ.ly a ct:x1 fer D. 
PLEADING AND PR.I\.CTICE Ar:rpo2.ls i 92 Vu .60 . 
J . .• 1 
owned an undivil:cl'\ mw ·b irc.1 :i.n.t or cst il1 Bl tcc1:r.,cro. If be died without :i.ssre his 
·,.... ~r<Jst Hnc to go OC!_Uf.l.lJ.y to X nnd Y. vJhc v oro tho ot.her co-tonmrts in fee. X died 
v· In ... ~~uithout issue a nd h:i.s 1:idmr, H, clcd1ncd do'..-ror. X :::nd Y dcn~.cc~ th:.··.t she \vc.s ont:i.tlod 
~ . to dw·er end filed c. biU for p~..._rt:~tion . Tho trin.l co1..1rt ·r:.olc1 th'. t s he H~:s entitled 
t o dmwr 1vhereupo11 Z ::.nc1 Y ~~ppc c:.lr;d . Si•1ce 11 0 d ucrt30 r~£:l1 yet b een entered in tho 
partition suit should tho c.. ~)po.:'. l be c1ismissc::d on ·tho (;rOl~1d th;::.t an r..:. ppoal liar; onl y 
in the co..so of t~ fiDc.l rlc croc ? 
Holcl.: No . Under V'§ --/.6? c.r.:. c:·::-1xnl lies to cork:,b i ntorlor;trl:.QD': docroos . One of' 
these is n dccroo na·judic.::-.t i ng th8 )r :\ nciplos cf ;:·. cc.iJsc,r::~'.cl Hhen t!1o court decreed 
~ - -- - . th.:.tt \,f >J::'..S on it c•.~ t o c;_ouur it Ctdjudico.t od tho princi,;lcs · of tho cnus o b ot\orooE X and 
Y on tho one pG.rt rmd H o:1 t ho othe r. (Tho r;tb;:Jr intorl~cutory Cl.ccro0s tho: ~be 
np•; c;CLl ud ~tro docro0s Jj.sso1ving nn iuJunct.i.ol.L,_ cr .r.:JQt:P ·in;:;; no! <oy ·_to be pc.id , or 
pc<:o~_o s.-: .. r·n_Q·I' n QR..ort" t o 1J · c:n ndod) . 
PLEADING AND PPJ'~CTICE li en~ Rules Ji D •ms c onvictcd eo•· ~ fo l ony. 'hl ·' ppeole• '·· 'lll'> At. t c.r ncy • Gc"er .tl 
11'1t of error on the r-;rc't'l1C~ t h:--.t the clcfmKb.;::t dld not t :llo his 
: .. sn igm10nt of e rror ~.rit iliL :~~.xt:·' c1;·.yn ;·~ftor :f:tnr.J. ;judGJiJont. 
The:; SupreL!O Court of ftp~)(~nls d :.·.tos: 
192 Vc, . 200 
mewed. to dismiss the 
rwtico of _...,_pper'..l Ol1tt 
In additi on to soo in;:; -c; ;.-·.t tho r cc c:r·J. jn tho t.r:i...'.. l c curt ib c complotod , appollc..nt , 
in order t o perfect his r-.~jf-":w.J, mu s t ·t.::-Jro t he fdloHin~ s t ope : (l) vrithin :::;ixty c"l.nJrs 
:'.ftcr f i nc..l j udgment cJ.ol:i.vor t o or serve on oppo::dr:g counsel n copy of his notice of 
·apponl illld nss igruet0~1t:1 c:. error , ~·.nr..~ fil () tho ori;)nr;.ls H:i.t1~ tho clerk~ (2 )nftor tho 
r ocord is mnc.1o up, file \6th th(J c1cr1r: 11 d c ,'3 i znc.".. t ic:n of t!1o JXTts of tho record ho 
cl.c siros printed; (3 ) .:-'.ft c.r -:~'.w;~ty c\::'..ys fro1~1 t 1.to t J1~ \0 h .. ) h:·.r; :f: ' i l ~)c:. )t is dosic;~1::1.t:.i on f or 
printing thG r ocorc.1 he l:;ust T'. ct:1.f:.r the cJe .,~J : · to trr'.l13l":1.it tho rccorC'. in time for it t o 
bo dolivcrod t o tho cJ..cr~-:: r f t.ho Sup:rur:lc ourt, cr c ~.1c of t}-.c justice s , Hi thin four 
561A 
H ·.· nt h :> f'r c:m t ho d ett o of f i nnl J uclgr:o ~r\:.; (L~ ) be mus t d oli VOr t c· Op DOS i ng C cunsol 0. C ODY 
rf his potit i r:-·n f er c.ppoe .. l c.n1 f ile t ho or j.e; inc.l uitL t l~o c l ork of this c .::u r t 1 ·Jr ~; · · c 
j u:;tic(; t o 11 hom tho r e c ord hc s b ocn tro.nsmittGcl , i·li t hi !1 t 1:-lo f our nonths 1 por:l c·;1:. ;-.. : - ,~.~. 
C>r PW" t ho fil i ng f oo of .;'1.50 t o t ho clerk of tho Supremo Ccurt . 
T;·1o precise guest :~ rm prc s o:1t od i s wLo thor tho provisi on r cqv.iring the a ppoll(~nt t o 
l 'LI u h is n ctico cf r>.p':> or; .. l :.t.nd D.ssign!·1onts of e rror within ~J ixty rk~.rs freD. c1 :--:(·, o 0f 
:~':i.;·k ·. 1 JUclgl'1cn'!t :i.e; n::nck .t (>ry nr diroctcry . 
Hol d: This pr ov isi011 :is r.1c.ndatc:r ::r i n crim:inc,l C.f)]JO;l. l s c.s 1•cll ~\s i :1 civil crw s . I t s 
purpo:.>c is Lr:• (.; i vo o. ppe l lvo oppor tunj_t y . (1) to oxill'Ii no t ho r 0c cTcl nnd ::~;:: sure hinsolf 
d:' its C';.rrcctnoss bef or e it l of'.vc s tho cl erk ' s o;f fico of ·i:.b\) t d cll c curt ; (2 ) t o f i le 
in civil c~so s , r:ss igm·!c ;.lt s of c r oss c rr0r; (3) t c dos i gnc.. t o f c,r l•r int i n,<_; tha t pc~ri:. 
c.f tho r e c ord he doon ;; n . :-:-.t c r ial t c aupport tho rulint:; cf t he tri :-...1 c r·ur-l; ; (L,.) t c -pro-
p-n ·e: o. brie f i n pppon:i.t i on to tho gr ::-.nt ing of c.n ~·. ppec.l. I f n o ;1ct ico (l f ::..~po ~· ·. l ; .ncl 
:Js ni gr!l'lonts of e rror r_·.ru file~~ \.Ji t h in sixty c: 1.~· s tho prcv.':c il i :1g p~·.rty then l:no\·rs t he. t. 
t hu c r~cc :ts ondccl .• ~Jrit c f error ~UsFiis sod. 
Pil~ADli'JG AND PRACTICE .-,_, 192 Va . 205 . 
Nrs . D. vms pr.::> s c cut cx1 fo r crimo. Th o Cor11:1omioal t h f;.;ilod t c. c <.d. l R, a mnt orinl 
,.fitne s s . I n tho cl0si~lG c. rr~v.nont Nr :J . D1 c ;'.ttor n03' ~c.rl·:) r.mch cf this f nct, a nc1. 
su g[r.ost od th:~.t tho r or'. fJ C>'.l th:.t R v <c s n0t cnl l o:·:_ vr :-·.G t h:ct :!.f R b:~r.l to stifio c~ his 
t os t jJncny wovl cl h~:.vo bcrJl" unfc.v c r r;.b l o . Tho c.trJ_'r ncy f or t. 1:l0 COI;oonwoo.lth r e pl ied t hc.t 
Mrs . D h.::>..d net cu..llocl he r h twb:::.n·.: :c s ;-, wit~1e ss ~'-~Kl tk~t t llu . ~;hco fit s b oth f eet . Tho 
o.l ert t r i o.l judge t hon ;.;tc;pr od t. h o ~rococdine:s rmc1 cc. l l;;c} f'::· r c. c cnf orcnce out of tltc 
honr ing of tho- .jury . lio ;?ointocl cut t h:'.t Vh18- 2iJ:3 he .. d boon v jr::J.:-. t od i n th·.'.t the f <.'.ilur ( 
of defendant 1 s hu::;h.'.; J :~. to test i fy in h er L1.y rJr hc.<1 b0c:n c c;:;:Jr.:ontr.Jd upon . He c. s b::c1 
dof ondo.nt 1 s c c-un s ol i f ho 1-1 is 1 ~c r1 cui. i nstr uc t i r"n t c ~.- ho e ffe ct thr ,_ t t ho j ury sh ould 
·dis r ogc.r c1 the a r r,;w:1ont . Tho r op1y v ::•. 1-; in the r.:ow'.ti·-r.J l~n the :;; rnmcl t hc.t such an i n.---
s truct:i. on would cm1~-- r:;: :ph~.si zc tho iJ! 1~·1r•:.rp cr :~·cr: lO..r} ·s . Tho juc'l.-.~c r ofus od t o g r ".nt c. 
r:d.otri o.l. The ov :i:d.Oc1CO c l c ::.r·l :,: ;:;l)(M1) <} . !'11rs . D' s ~~uilt :-' . .':1':1 t hJr0_ 1.JC.S n o evidence tl,r-. t 
she v1c.s pr o judic:i.u:l :Ln ~'.ny H«.y . 
Hol d : Convi ct i c-n etf _~·:;_ }: . KY:'. , Tile impr opor r on tl.r l:·s ~-..re; -ne t gr~und f or novors c~l becnuso 
·of our st:-:-,t u t o of j guCr ·i ·1 s (Vf-'8- L1i!.7 ) , 11 1-b j udgr:-tont ::-; };.~,n he rcvcrsud f -:.ny_ orror 
c ornnitta.d_oiLthQ_J;ri;:;.l 'T>,_QUL it plcJ .ul,y_:-<J.ppco.n : f r "l.' ·-c ,w i~ o cad c.~c.i t ho ovi (10Ylc o 
thco.. t._h_g_ . Lcrt i., hrrl[e l~::.'..L: ~' f;d r tr i ::.l c.· ~ t bc Jc:.e r Y .s .:-.r·rl sub::rt :.:ntia l ju:::t :i.ce ho.s bee~ 
r r_:,:'. Chod • II 
--
PLEADING ALm PIU\.CT ICE 192 Va . 329 
Con po.r e these h w c a~") S; 
Cc· . .sc l (191 V~ . 731) s:)ct:i.on 6 ~ d ) o~' .nule 5 ~ 1 r oq_ui r es , ~ 1) _ t! '-·~.t t he j udg::ont ap:?ealec· / ( 
fr on , (2 ) the t r l nl c ottr. ·c 1 s qn ::n on , lf :·.ny , ( J )and t he c.s ::a _c~ n..~ -:on'Ls of e r ror t hc:.t mw e y:J 
11lrc.ady been 1.10.de m.·:ijhii1 ·0}1n Toqtdrcd tine oll b e d csip1at ucl . .for r1rint ing by t ho lti( 
X'1 • etppollnnt, L!. nd Soct'i.on 8 of s o.id rulr:; r cquir o3 t he c l erk of tho Svpr o:.J.e Court of y-· r Appea l s t o caus e tltei 1 ·to h o printe:cl . Tho cl cs ignc.t i o~ bJ COUili]OJ of t hn above f or 
rint :i.ng i s f or th o c onvoni.c::lcc of t lw c1ork . These part s of tho r oc orc'l. n:us t be _pr int-
~ od v1h ot_·~1 or d os i r,nd .cd or i ~ ot. Dos igm~t :i. on of th o :~c po. r 'c.r; i,s nurc~ly '-' nini s toria l c ... ct . Tho rul o is direc tor y on1y . Iicnc o t. r1c f o.il urc of <'.ppc l lunt t o :1c ~e t ho n bovo dr;~d.r~:nn­/ t ion s :i s not no c c~: snry :ff.l.t ~ .. l. So; 192 Va . 3 ~31-332 . 
Ca so 2- (Thc instcmt c -~cr30 ) S0ction 6 (o. ) of Ru J.o 5 : 1 ;1rov:Ld.:J s t h,:-. t couns e l f or a ppell-
ant s hnll fi1 o wi t h t lvJ cJ. ~;rl ~ cf tho court fr om ,,,rh :i.ch r.:.n ::c.;_-Jp<;e.l J.s t aken n ot l e s s t hru 
20 dnys bef ore t ho r .:.;co:~ · c::. :i <~ t r cms:::i t t od c: dosigno.t ior: of tl,c: purt s of tho rec ord 
tbnt lw 1.>1ish e D pr .·.n i;r'r} . 1. :po l J.r .. n t nc[;l octcd to d o t.hi~J . Sbm, l d h:!.:J c. ppo2. l be di smi::>ce( 
Hol d: Ye s . Tho por tion of t he rec ord t}~ .. t :L t o bo pri n~cd :ir.v olv:;s d i scret ion t hf'.t 
can bo oxor c i::J ed on1y b~,.- -:;; :o ::.q•p0Jlc:.nt . It i c i'\Ot :..·. r:or::; n::.; ist cri0.l c.ct (o.s in C[l . .so 1 
ubovo ) . Until nppc l lt.t:"lt cl r;::-d. c~:-Jo:t. . ,::.: ·J;Lo ;-:;c-. r t of U c rcJ co:rd to be ;Jr i ntod the cler k o:f 
tho trinl c ourt h:~ c no .:.ml:.lJ o.d.t :r t o t r ::a wu:i.t tho r e c or d to t l !C Supr ol':lo Court , This 
p:rov :i.oion is clonrlr ,-:~~nu.-~tc)ry . To ir;nm·e t h i s 20 r1.rry r oc;yiro' lOnt would cronto tmtold 
t t tr T7loi 1 nnrl confus i on . 
J,J,~,-I:,~:c.-- 0-ff:t.-~,..... 562A · (RGviscd August, 19)3) 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Criminal Procedure 192 Va. 437 
'I'he maximum penalty for perjury is 10 years •.. D was indicted for perjury and plead 
guilty. The court referred the matter of punishment to a probation officer who made 
a d(:tailed r eport ..rhich recommended the ma::d.mum penalty. The court, without notify-
ing her attorney and in -her absence, sentenced her to t en years. What errors, if 
any, Here col'_!lmitted? 
Error 1. · The case should not have been r ef erred to a probation officer. It is 
o~ly when t he pe-nalty might oe mo:re- tt1arr 10--years that such- r Gferenceshould be made . 
Vl/53-278.1 
Error 2. The pr2Qation officer has no right to rec~rnnend a penalty. 
Error 3. It was reversible error not to giv§.._£oun~_el_ tlw right _to __ cross-examine 
tbo probation_of£ic er and to i ntroduce evidenc e in r ebuttal. 
Possible Error 4. The accused should have b.e.en_pr.e.s.ent ben "'t=;nt.enced. There is 
a conflict of authority on this point and the Court found it unnec essary to pass on 
it in this case . 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE ~hirdtfartr Pr~ct.ic e 192 Va . 727 
Has owner entered into a con~act wit ~ t as general contrac tor to build a large 
nu.rnber of houses. L sublet the plumb in~ and gas fixture -vrork to C who put in inferi-
or gas fixtures. As a r esult there was a bad gas l eak in one of the houses and an 
explosion r esulted . The gas fixtures put in did not meet contract specifications. 
H sued ·L and C. Aft er pleadings had be~n filed H moved tho court t o dismiss C, which 
motion was gr ant ed. Lat er on in the case L moved to make_G again a party defendant. 
This motion was denied . · Was this -er rorT . 
Held: No. It was not an abuse of d"iscretion of th8 trial judgG t o r e"f'u.s.e ... to add C 
as a party. ·Many complications would aris e if' he wer e added ::1t this stage. To what 
extent, if at all, would C be affected by what took plac <:l <1 fter he was dropped and 
bef or e he was added? 
Not e : Third party practice has not been as successf ul as had been hoped even in 
the English and Federal Cop.rts wher e the judges have mor0 control over the trial than 
they have in Virginia. R_\l~•-l,. gffe?tivo Oct. 1, 1951, reads, "Third party prac-
tic e is abol · hecLand-~cta.nt"-shall be. permitted--to ... br:i.ng_ in a new party." 
- -. - --~- --·--:--: - --.:. __ _ 
563A. 
P1 .& PR, l ime allowed to a ppeal .lJ:gm inter) ~ptorx decree. 193 Va.l91. 
D was employed by P, the Southwest Virginia Hospitals,Inc.> and •rihe hospitaJs in-
dividually to effect and manage a hospital insurance plan. D was very successf ul, anr:: 
P t hought D was making too much money. As a reslllt the parties fell . out. P terminated 
t he c ontract a nd s ought equitable relief which involved an accounting. In order t o 
·~Dterr.:ine how the accounting should be made it was first necessary to interpret the 
.~c;.ntract. The trial c ourt interpreted the c ontract as per D's contentions a nd order ed 
P to pay D some ~>54 , 000 at the rate of some ';p900 per mcnth for 60 m.cnths, and its 
decree also provided that if P f ailed ·to·-pay ·D as above s et forth then execution 
should issue at D's r equest. The court a l so referred several other matters t o a com-
rnissi cner in chancery who was to t ake ndditional evidence the re~n and report t o the 
court at a l a t e r d at e . Some e ighty days after the above decree was entor0d, but befcr e 
the commissioner rw.d made his report P appealed. D moved that the appeal be dismissed 
because P had net fil ed his notion of appeal c.nd ass ignments of error within 60 days 
aft er the <'3 ntry of tho d ecroo Gs r Gquirod by Rule 5:4, 
Held: Motie:n denied. RuJ e 5:4 applies only to finGl judgment s a nd decrees. Since the 
decree Qbove wa s intorlocutory(as othe r is sues were ye t t c bo decided), and adjudicat-
0d thG principles of th ::J c ause it wa s a. ppeal e .. bl '.3 qs cne of thE) excepticns t o the rule 
that only final decrE::cs cnn be appr3al ed. V/,'8-1}62(2 ) (c). "i·lher e 'ln interlocutory decree 
is a ppealable ns adjudicating~pri · l os cf tho cause , the aggrieved p~rty ~s:TICt 
lirrii ~QQ. to the p(ir j od Ii'J'!61 . r ;+l. fUL~' --~-ErC OU't may appeal 
an ~~Pe ent0r-od and the a n appeal ther efr om has 
e~ 
Note l. It wns a lso hGld thcct P ' s f [d lure to put up a proper suspending bond, or in 
fact, any such bond did not h:::r his a ppc~l. ( Ths cnly effect cf such a f ailure is that 
the prevailing party be l ow can go a ho'l.d t o get hj s r0lief 5ust ".s if no app8al bad 
boon t aken.) 
Not e 2 . It W ' S a ls o hl~ld th:lt th:-ct porti cn of the d ocr':OlO allm.d ng D to have executi r 
on futuro defaults was erroneous . The 0ffice r issuing tho executi on is not the proper 
pnrty t o det ermine wh ether or nc:t ther e has boon r.1. def;-.mlt. Tho c ourt shouJd have 
r eserved l eave t o D t o u. pply t o it frcm time t o timo, f or r elief, if necossary t o 
cover pnymonts cf irtstr1lmrmts thureaftor falling due . 
PL&PR. Ploq of antra J:9. s c r.nvj ct--"throc t e rm statuto" 193 Vo. . 216, 
D, a Nogr c , w.:ts indicted by :m nll whi t o gr and jury chosen in viol ation of D 1 s con-
stitutic·na l ri(5ht s . Ho was n0t tri ed until aft er 2 r egul a r t e rms of tho Circuit Court 
hrtd gene by. When tried ho t:r god tho inv:::.lidi ty c f the indictment . The tria l judge 
put tho point down f er l nt ar a r gunent, and tho trhcl proceeded . D was cc,nvicted. When 
tho point was ar gued after tho ccnviction D' s contenticn was sustfiined and the ccn-
victicn set e.s ido. Whor cupnn a properly ch osGn grand jury r e- indicted D and a ft er two 
:noro r egular t o.rms of the Circuit c ,-.urt h · ~d gnno by he w2..s ::tgn.in ccnvict ed . D pleaded 
t.mtro f oi s c cnvict and al so thnt ho was d isch.'lr gr?d since throe; r ogul e r . t nr :ms of th<J 
circuit ccurt in which his c!lso HE'..S pondine hr..d gene; b:,r vd.thcut a t ria l. (V#l9-165), 
Hold: F' c'r the C onrncmwo<~lth. Sinco tho fir s t pre C8 t.Jdings D.g:~j nst D wer e v cid o.nd s e t 
as id . .J ho h'l S net bcon in j ocprtrdy. Tho l c.vJ ns l P.. id dmm j.n Pc: ttcn v. Mississ ippi, 
3J2 U.S.463 expr essly atatos tlle t th:::ct hcl·jing d ce s nc- t P1or:n th ,·,t a guilty defendant 
mus t go free , "For indictments can he return0d and convicti ons can be obtained by 
juries selected as the Cons~Hut j on c owmands ." The fallacy in D~ ot her con:t.ention i s 
tha t h is sUJ,.ernpti.ng_t_a_.adcL.the_e~ed tj me ~!2... t_!:e ~ri j naLguaghesL i n_dictment -to 
the elapsed time s :i.n e tbe nBK indictme t, This Qannot be done a nd hence V 19-165 has 
no '~pplication . The two indictments we r e separ ate and distjnct. 
564A. 
PL .& PR. Power of Court to nake its own rules 193 Va.221. 
The Court 01 t aw and Chancery of the City of Norfolk adopted the followin g rule 
( fa:.:ts changed slightly) governing practice in suits for divorce : 
11 0HDER ESTABLISHING RULE OF PRACTICE TO BE OBSERVED IN DIVORCE SUITS AND SUITS FOR 
J.i.J:~ ; , TJU1ENT OF NARR.IAGE, ENTERED APRIL 11, 1949. 
nrn o:cder to safeguard the public interest against litigants who may seek divorces 
or annulments of marriage in cases in which such litigants have not acquired the 
necessary r es idence and domicile as required by Section 5105 of the Code of Virginia, 
or wh er e the grounds of venue as required hy said SecUon do not exist, and to 
better determine whethe r there be legal cause for divorce or annulment in any given 
case the following rule of practice in this court is hereby established: 
"All such suits, by appropriate decree , may DE') r eferred to one of the Cc>11missioners 
in Chancery of this court to ascertain and r eport (1) the facts relative to whether 
tho n<;cossary grounds of jurisdiction a nd venue exist ; (2) the facts r e lative to 
whet her the divorce or annulment should be granted or refused, and(3) in like manner 
upon o ther matters r a ised by tho pleadings and the evidence. 
"All a'f the evidence in such cases shall .be t alwn and transcribed before such 
Commissil:mor who shall havo authority to direct the Clork of this Court to issue sub-
poenas for witnesses and to make such investigat ion as may be proper and necessary 
to acc omplish the purpose of this rule . 
"The complainant she ll pay the cost for issuance and service of such subpoenas and ~· 
shall a l s o pay to said Commissioner tn ndvnnc o of such hearing a f ee of Twenty-Five 
Dollars to be taxed as part of tho cost." 
It was contended that n court could not adopt its own pri v<:~to rule nor delegate 
its judicia l functions t o n. commis s ioner in Cbancc ry. 
Hold: (1) "The general rule is thnt a ~rt of gtmcra_! _j urisdiction adopt a 
rule of prr:J.Ctice 1frovid6'a tho subject is not reg~- o:r ado uatel rovideq for, 
ox general l aw._ Such a rul e mus t bo r easono.blo , nust not contravene the Constitution 
or statutes, or affect substantive l <.,w. 11 Tho rulo promulg;_tted above meots all these 
r 0quirements . It helps to ascerto.in th r~ f :J.c t s speedily, tends to prevent fraudulent 
divorces, qnd protects th8 interf)St s of the Commonw:;r.,lth. 
(2) There is no del egation of j udici "Cl authority. The cormniss i onor :i.n chancery is 
an off icer of the c ourt ;:md under its contr ol. 
~\\ ~ Pl. & Pr. Bill of Rcvi~w 193 Va .320 
· \ (a) Fill in t he blanks , "A bill of r eview docs not lie to r evj cw or correct errors 
al-1 ,v-J of judgment in the det ermination of ____ _1 __ • If the re be error in this particula r, 
V aft er a final decree , it can be c orrected only by -- ·- - 2 • Buut if 
error of l aw be npparent from an ____ __l _ __ --·- in the cause , and a 
----'4 has been enter ed, a proper cnse for a bill of r eview is .Qrima f a cie 
presented." 1 f acts; 2 an appellate court ; 3 inspectjon of the r ecord; 4 fina l 
de cree . P.325. 
(b) "There are onl y t\.TO gr ounds on wbich a bilJ. of r eview may he filed, viz: ( l ) __ __ ____ ___ ___ _ __ , or 
(2 ) on account of __ . 11 1 fo r error of l aw apparent on the face of 
the record; 2 newly dis cover ed evidence . p.326. 
(c) P fil ed a part i t ion suit ag<:tins t D 1,rho suffered u d ecree to be entered against 
him by default on Dec.20, 1950. On J an. 30, 1951 D c :une to l H'e and filed a petiti on 
for r ehe[Ting for error of l avJ apparent on the f~cc e of t ho r ecord. The c ourt r eopened 
the c ase and f ound f or D. Was t his error? 
Held: No . Tho decree of Dec . 20,1950 be cane finl:'.l 21 days aft er Us entry. 1-?hile the 
ca se cannot be r e - opened bv " pl:;tition to rche::;.r ~~ f ter the d ucrco has become fina l the 
petition t o re~r jf it_pDil~_Qut the or~grs of l aw app~ront on- tho f ac§ ~f the 
record C2n be ir.-B".r.teEJ.- a·s-a--b:i-1-J. - O-f r eViOW -Which l i i)S to '"· fina l decree for SUCh errors 
565A. 
Pl .& Pr. Bill of Review Property 193 Va . J20 . 
H and W, hus band a nd'Wife , ovmed a house .;md lot a s joint tenants without s'U.l'Vi:vor-
sh ip. H died intest a t e . The r e we r e three childre n . W c ontra cted io s ell t ho - l and t 0 
D -..rh o r.:.groed t o pay off a first deed of trust a t the r a te of :~26 pe r mont!-t, and t c 
p.r:..y ·:i>650 when W gave him a warra nty deed • . D· t ook possess j on of the whole and ke pt up 
~;he ~p26 payments. Ten y ears late r a ft e r the d eath of W the children filed 101 bill c) f 
cclapl :.dnt f or partit ion cla iming tha t D had no interest in the property. D f D. iled t o 
duf·snd, and th e Commi ssioner f ound tba t the v alue of the u sc of the property t o D f n. r 
oxcoodod the $26 per month he had b een paying, and that the c ontract be tween W and D 
,.m.s v oid for l a ck of r.lUtua.li ty a s W 1 s children could not . bE) f orcGd t o c onvey the ir 
h('.lf inte r est since thoy were not par ties t c the c ontract. Tho Cor:J!TlissiC'nor 1 s r e port 
vms 101ppr ovod by tho c ourt nnd a f i na l d ecree so f~lr c.s D w:s c cnc ornod was ente r ed. 
Sixty day s aft e r the e ntry of the f i na l d ecree D obtrd ned c ounsel. 1tihat, if anything , 
c~n ho d o ? . 
Hold: It i s prope r f or D t o proc eed by n bj.ll of r ev i ew f er e rror of l aw appa r ent on 
the f a ce of tho r e c ord. 1-l.t the very l east D 171ay claim n1l of vJ 1 s rights in he r ha lf 
of tho prope rty,_ and ho c annot b <) d e prived of tha.t ha lf ,just because ho c ann ot got 
the other ha lf. D is undGr no duty t o pay the i~650 until n w1rranty d e ed i s F;iven and 
he nce is n r;t in default. Tho he irs cf vJ t ook hGr intor nst s ub .i c ct t o the c ontrnct 
she had made with D. 
PL . & PR. Rul 9 5:1 , 3 (o ) 193 Vn . 390 
P sued D f or dal:!llgos ml.ff.:Jr od :in an a ut. c·r:J r-.bile fl cc:!.dNtt . Tho VrJ rd ict of the jury 
. f or P w ·, s r eceived by the c cu:r.t en ,J,Jly 7 , ~.md -:-J. ofon~h.nt r.: cvoc~ t o set it as ide , a s - 1~!lY 
s i gning r eas ons t hrJr Of 0.r . The n nti c·n '...J ilS t d<en und·: r [li'lV :i scmont ['.nd continued f or ru~· pr 
argur.1ent vlhich wo.s ho2.rd c:n Oct c.b ;·Jr 26 at wi"ich tj l-:1C; th0 c ourt overruled t ho motion f 
and prcncunced jud.gmont 1..1pon U w v .. n ·d1 ct . Nc' nrdor '.•lt'.s ent ()r od on this dr,y, a c c·ntrc-
. vorsy having e.ris<~n be tween c cun r.·H1 2.s t o V w c cnt :;nt s of th ~::: crder t o bo enter ed 
ca rrying into aff ect tJ-,o court 1 s orr:1l r r onounc er.Jent. Et:~ 8h counse l s ubmitt ed a dra ft 
of a n order ( judgment) On Nov . 4. The r eupon the court d rew its ovm order, resol ving 
the diffe r e nces beh rocm t h t-J p().rthls , a ntedat ed tho s:".!~;e Oct ob8r 26 , 1950, endor sed it 
a nd mailed the origin,:tl t o tho clerk flnd copies t o counsel. \,Jets fina l j udgment enter· 
ed on Octobe r 26 or on Nov. 4th? I f on tho formo:r date tho tra nscript of the t esti-
mony and othe r inddonts of th0 tria l w::1s not t e ndered to tho judge: within sixty days 
from the timo vlhon j udgment wo.s r:mte r ed . Rule 5 :1, 3 ( 0 ) • 
Hol d: Novemb~.:: r 4th. The r o is a diffe r ence botwo . .; !l t'f-)c rcmd:ition of a ,judgmrmt nnd 
the ont:r:y of a ;j1Jd cr,ntcnt. In t his co.so th; j u,Jr:mont we s n.:nrio 'r:' c d on Oct. 26 but it 
v/fi.S not ent ered until Nov . l+th . Entries nunc 12ro .t.~~nc c n.nnot bo g jve n r etrospective 
of f oct '...rhich would r c sl' lt in cutting dO\m pJ. ri intHf 1 9 thn'-" fo r c.ppl ying for ' writ 9r 
error . 
PL. & PR. Crimind T, ' \ ·I .C~.nri Procedure 19.3 V:·2 .• L.L.,9 
Code 19- 232 rr·ovidcs t hat i f tl~G w~r:lO net be o. viol~.ti on ~f t~ro or mor e st Atutus ~~ 
1
' ~ conviction 1mdc r onrJ of tho s~,ntute;s sh.1.ll '!''') a h'' r to a >:r osccut ion und e r the 
others . D was Jrivin~ r eckle ssly whiJ. ~ drunk . C~n ho ho conv jctod of both r ocklos s 
and rlrun:k on driving? 
Jbld: Yos . Tr1n o:f.'fons·~ r; ·'n·o not j r~ mticnl. A : ·1rvnl~cX1 Jno.r. r:1ight c onc d vA.l,l y drj vc 
co.r ofully, and sob··:; r !'lon ;; mot j r.t.:· s ·J ci vo rce l<I,;Jss1y . 
In this caso D W(~n t~-· k .:;n 1 ~~; f c"rc Ju~J tic-J c;f tho p ·_·;r~. c o irrun·~;,ji '::t cl)r aft er hi s ~.rrcst 
I s tho justice of th •.:; pc; ... cc >: :: snu1pct(.)nt wi t'18S:3 in thu d rcuit c ourt t o t 8st:ify :.:s t c 
his drunkun concli t.:i cn? Hol d: Y··J s . H; i s nnt L,::;tifyj.n0 r:.s t c sb.t.;:~r.v:.:rl't.s. me.de 'by the 
llccu.,od but ~,;,s t o wh~. t he s· · · ~J reg· -:-d ir~g h:i s ,£.;::;u'\,it_trn . i'kr ·:) c..v:.: r cur pr :J s ont sta t 1.1t0 
(19- 21..1) prohihH s tri_: 1 .~ust-:i C\-J S fr"lll t ._;s t .i fyin g .-;s t ' ntr t·~·~r·mts .- n0 tho f c:rmor pr e 
hibiti (. n aw:inst ,iu c.tj C O S Gf th e: p C: ·.c·_) S \, t c:: st i fy j "g n CJ lr);'1es<) r 'lppcar s i n th ·~ 
· ct ntuto . 
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\ . }l.&Pr. Cr~wtrrrrT-lrPxcrdcro ·-suspension of Sentence 566A . 193 Vn.470. 
· D wEls c onvicted of involunt-::.ri mansl aughter a na sentenced to a year in jail and a 
fiPe . The j a H sentence was suspended a nd D )'-'a s placed on his good behavior(not on 
f c:r na l probation)for the year. vJjjthin a year he vi o:;.ated tho condjti on of the sus-pen:;-
:; r·;, -three times but these violations did not cone to the GOurt 1 s a ttention until a fter 
··~.he s~piro.ti cn of the yer.r. Ho.s the court jurisdiction t o revoke the suspensicn? 
Hold:Y8s . The court no.y_nr..e._:;u~rHm the tjme a nd the condi~j o11s ..Qf__thi~-'Rrobation !J.f 
it pr c:. scrjbes the t.ime., ·-...e.....thcL p.nr.j,_Q _ p_:r_<ibat.im_,_:t_QQ.__Q_ouJ;::t ___ I'!'l_DY under sect~C2_n jJ-27S_ 
revoke the sUSP.ensi cn <:: .nd the probation only within the probati on period. If no such 
!_)l'Obatj <:m period h['.S been }2rescrf5edtn8 C oun may:_yev_oke_ the S us pensi g_n· _g._ _any iiiiG" 
w;l. Qlin thr;; nriXim1~f9;~riod f or which t hL d ef endanj:. might nrigi.na lJ.y have __ been .inprisonc; 
~"'L [)."-"~ .--,(/.J.Jt. ~::::;u> J 'JUV'.-1, 
Pl. &.Pr. Q_rimina.l Pro,e_edW:e . 69 S .E . 2d JL.O,l9J Va. 502 
D was on tf'ia l f or il1egally s elling a half pint cf whiskey a t a c ertain .. tir\e and 
place . Her attorney put l~ on the stand t o testify she w::ts ::tt nncthe r pla ce a t tha t · · 
t:3.1!'1o . The judge them · snid , "I 1m not going t o allow this e vidence tha t D was in Rich-
mond; it has notl-dng tc· de -....dth thi s cas0 ." The attornEw r emonstra t ed a nd said he 
th ought it vl!lS most pertinent. The judg0 then, without ::my oxpla.n'lti cm , r eversed him-
self a nd let the e videnc e in. Tho attorney , howover, wis hed the c ourt t o .declare a 
oistrio.l , but tho met i on vtas over-ruled . Shc1:l d a mistrinl have b een declared? 
Hold: Yes. The jurors mi ght \oT e ll have i nf erred that tho prosjding judge did not think 
the testinony r.1aterial, cr, if Elntorial , thc.t it was nd entitled t o credence. These 
j urors might have inferred al so thnt t ho pr(:JSiding judge wDs of opinion thnt . the 
accused was guilty. It wa.s the jury 1 s cluty and not the .iudg.Q 1 • t o .-£,'1 on the redi-
bility of the evidence and h0 snould h <W0 scn1pul c:usly nbsto. jned fron c onduct us urping 
the jury's functi on a nd indicating bie.s ag.<J.ins t the accused . Tho very l east ho could 
have dcne wr.s t o expla:i. n t o the jury thnt he had nc,do a nistalro e.nd tha t they should 
disregard his r er:mrks . 
PL. & PR. Necessity of Stating Grour:ds of Defens e 193 Va .51J, 521. 
P sued D f er a d8Dt w1t!i-:''Ot""'il"l'lj i ndi cat-i.e :r-t--t-hat he was sui ng hb 0th0r than as a 
principal debtor. P's ovi ·lence, ll cwovor, indicated th:::t i.f D w?..s liable at a ll he ,,.,as 
liable as guare.nt or. D tbon 2tter1ptod t o rely on the defens e of tho sto.tute of frauds 
although no such dofons £. W l S sot f orth j_n D' s grounds of dofonse . See Rules 3:5 .qnd 
3:7. c ~n he do so? 
He l d : Yes . Rules 3: 5 rmrJ 3 :7 c.r o a th · ic_e_o.f-moti-en-indicates 
the neces.si.:t...y:- ~ tre~o wns nothing on the r ec or ' 
t o suggest U mt the statuto of frauds wcul d be ihvolvod until pla intiff introduced hi s 
evidence . As D point ed out, if P had o.ttor.1pt0d t c s how t h::tt Pace , (the r eal principnl 
d0bt cr) was D's agent, it c ould n s well have boen <lr gtJod that D sl-J.c:uld have pleaded 
non-agency bof or o be:ing nllowed t o deny it. 
PL. &. PR.-- Crininal Prcc oc1uro--C onst. Lm..r . 193 Va . 814. 
X, a Negr o , wa s 'En ed nnd c cnvic"toPi 6I t:mrdor of n whit') nnn. The case was r ever sed 
~ .r. nd r enandod by t he Suprene Court of Appeal s . On tho r etrial c·f the case, X, for tho J ~-./ i r st time def ended on the gr ound that tho g;r~pt.''! .iY!X which indicted bin. was inproper-
. ! ,~<l- y se l oct0d, that is, ho wishod t o with,Jrnw his plo::t of not guilty and t c plead now 
tr\J\ in abdeDont t o the ind.ictncnt. . 
Held: By f ail i ng to c·bj oct nn t h<:tt grrJund nt the fi r st tri •:t l the r.tatter was wa ived. 
One cannot bo permitto~~ t c :_:;:::.lJble r-n the c·utcoue 'ind l oso , a n:1 then g0t e new tria l. 
A pl ea c·f net gnj lty wn.s r pl an t o t l+&-lilB~ J£ 4 •. AA&-&.l:W&.y8--been- the aw:.. tha t 0ne 
can_not pl ead in abntor.wnt aft nr plc:::tjin:r t o t~e r:wri t ~ , _; _ n;'l , t':'i.V.Gn assj.lming that it was 
d.iscret i cnnrJ with t ho tri.:'..l c ~=urt t c gr~c'r"t dof en·Jant 1 s rcqvest it c ertainly \.JP ::" •Jot 
an abuse 8f discr ctjcn t o r oft; sr;) t c ·1r· s r . ~~"vlh0n "~ new tri~:l i s awa r ded_ ".:..: ,e case is 
in the snne s itu::1.tion e.s when the fir::o t t r i ::tl bo,,;c.n , th ,;.t i s t n £~~:;, o.ll the proceed-
ings subsequent t c the j cintlcr cf issue c,n t he plua l'w.v ing b.;;on sot a sirle , the 
Ccr.monwenlth n.nd the dcf on;Jant a r0 r:: t j ssuc on the pl8r.t c: f ne-t guilty ." 
56{A. 
PLEADING AND PR.ACTIC?. 194 Va..39 
D promised to deed a house a!ld lot to P fol' . ~~8'500 as soon as D, or a certain rocl 
ost ~1te agent, c auld f)nd another place suitable for D. Months went by and D c ontinut/'. 
to rm:Ja:in in the house . P filed a bill in equity alleg:ing th[' t D was making no atten, ·, , 
to find other quo.rtc rs and was not a cting in good f a ith. · · 
lk ld: These nro me.ro conclusions of the pleader. It is not a lleged that the a gent 
lt~~ s f otnKl a suitable place for D to go, nor a re there m1y a:verr.Jents of the circun-
stances as to D 1 s alleged inaction and bad faith. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Equity Pleading . 19L. Va . 50. 
p s ued D in equity when D. was alrncs t 21 years of r.ge . DIs gu ::::. rd i .<>Jl ad l i t el'! filed an 
c.nswer . V.Ihen D .boc.mo 21 tho C~t a llowed hin t c. w i thdrt,;,w tho answer and. en t or a 
donurrer instead~ P's bill shewed .on its f ace th;:'.. t if she ovor had'a cause of a ct:i cn 
it aroso when she was 16 y oc,rs of flge , tho.t she is nqw 29 ~ and that· the pa rty she 
chc.r go<l with a gross fraud was hor f~ther who rlied a. yeo.r cr so age . Discuss points 
invclved . . 
( e./ (l ) 'J:J;;.cugh n demurrer and.:-illL:'lnsw.e-~tJa-y-ee-f-i-l-ea-At-thcLsD.nd.imo_a derJUrrer ..QP.nnot 
h.&f'l'1 &PI b · d after an answer h ill.ed . (2 ) -~u~ t~ c ourt, f or good cause, may allow 
}) ct-4th~ answer to be withdrawn and then J?el:!!!.tt ~d~murrer_to be filed. RUle 2 :2)reads , 
fL ~ "The time for filing pleadings may be extended. by the court in its discretion·, a nd 
'N"' s uch extension may be granted though the time fixed has already expired; ***" 
( 3 ) The moment an infant becomes of ago he has control of the suit and he rna~ disre-
gard the answer s e t up for .him by bis guardian ad litem befor e a decr ee or judgment ~ 
has been rendered. (4 ) Her e P' s bill shows on its f ace that she j s barred by her · 
l a ches as she had 8 y ears aft er r eaching he r majority to ascert Ain the f acts ~nd .she 
has deliberate ly wait ed until the princ ipal wi tness against he r has died,. so D's 
demurrer should be sustained. 
PLEADIN<.~ AND PRACTICE CONSTITUTIONAL LAV.I 72 S.E.2d 402 , 194 Va .---.~ 0 hi:red un ion men to do ,.( ·,,ob . They went- out on strike so X tben hired non-union 
/ , ~ fJ~n. X 1 s pl!~ce of business wc s thon po:J.cefully pic1wted by. one picke t who carried the 
A-'1 ~sual unfair sign. The purpose of the pi ckr~tjng 1<1<1S to notlfy all union sympathize rs fV ~ of the f act of alleged unfa irnes3 and to bring press~rG othe r than physical on those ~ ~r ~ hiring non-union men to change ove r to union men. X ~pplied to tho law and Equits 
~~ ~. Court of Richmond. for an injunction against picketing which the Judge r efused. 0 <; tk (1) HB.y a. single Jus ti.c c.: of tho Supretto Court gr <'.nt an injunction? Yos. V:/18-618 
rends, "Wh en <,1 circuit or co or9.tion court, or city court h '.l.ving chancery juris-
diction, or a judge ther eof, shall r efus e to awa rd r:m injunction or having awarded a 
t emporary in ·unction dis so LS., a::...r" uL c0 enlarge the sa'1.lo , a copy of tho pro-
coo 1ngs in court, l< lf >< may bo presented to a j'4dg.o of the S1.1preoe Court of Appeul s , 
who rTJay thor eupon e ithe r ::wa...r.d ..an-injunction, _or rcinstn.te the injunction dis~olved, 
or enl a rge the injunct·~. No~ If a judGe of the Suprene Court of Appeals o.wRrds 
the injunction ·· ent er ed ·1s a de rJ.!li c ourt and nn a ppeal l iG.s to 
t BP-.'Q'" _ - peal-s . 
( 2· ,, ... : wn.s held in the 0.b.<;rvo c E"se tb t:t no injuncti on should have i ssued since tho 
..?ttfP~f t:_£.o pick~ting W'\S not ill.e:g':l.l ~1 nd the Con<>titutions of both Stnt e a nd 
Nn~ ion :11low freedom of speech . 191 Vr., . 272 . ( abstr'lcted in section on c onstitut ional 
l nw} followod. 
Pleading and ;?ractice Des.ositions . 568A . 19h Va .284 
i:J filed a bill c!!f complaint for a divorce against H. The fifth paragraph of the bill 
s tated that depositions would be taken at a -certain time and place stated therein. 
~~o fu rther notice of the time and place was given H, and he failed to appear at the 
said time and pl~ce. Are the depositions taken at that time and place in behalf of W 
admissible? D 
H eld: No. Quoting from headnotes, "The purpose of the required notice t6 an adver-
3ary of the taking o.f depositions is to give him the opportunity to appear and cross-
examine the witn8ss, if he so desires. To accomplish its purpose a notice--- should 
se .:;.j->:. r and explicit. A notice which is confusing and misleading is not 'reasonable' 
ana G.oes not mee t the requirements of V#8-307." Since the purpose of the bill of 
complaint was diff~rent namely to inform the defendant and the court of the nature of 
the case , a notice to take depositions incorporated in the bill is in conflict with 
the. t e rms of the subpoena, for it notifi es the de fendant to ·be present at a time and 
place ·and for a different pu~pose from that stated in the subpoena artd is apt to c~n­
.fus e and mislead, or to be overlooked and is hence not the r easonable notice required 
by tho Code. Note: If at the time of commencing suit the J2laintiff des~_res to r.i..ve 
notic e th'lt depO"S"r'tions will be taken at a ~-tain_time __ and_plaM)_,_ thl.s_s.ho.uld- be 
dine l?y 'a c l g_aL .;;n_d .explicit notice embodied_j..n a _§eparate _ i.,nstrum~nt and s erved on 
tJ'l~· 
PLEADING AND PR.ii.CTICE Federa l Proc .edure 199 F2d 720 • .. 
P sued D in a Virginia State Court f or fals e imprisonment and malicious pros ecution. 
D r emoved the case to the Federal District Court. The ju.dge thereof r equired P to 
· elect the one action or the oth0r. 1/Ja s t his correct? 
·Held: No. Rule 8(e) 2 provid8s that~ a oarty may st:.:tte as man;y separate .claims as 
h_~, regar ess of consi stenc:/, -:md 1.-rhether based on legal or equitable grounds, 
or both. And Rule 8 l(c) provides that the rules shall apply to civil actions removed 
to the District Courts from the st ~~t e courts. 
~ Burks(4th Ed)p.25b. states t hat in Vig inia slander, a n action for insulting 
wo~ Jihel, maliciou~P-rosecution, f alse imprisonment and abuse of process may be 
united in oria._ac:t.iort. - - --
PLEADING AND PHJ-~.CTICE Parties Insurance 194 Va. 367. 
P l eft his car at D's garagt:: to b e repaired. The car 1-.ras destroy ed by a fire which 
m:!.ght or might not have be en du e to D's negligence a s r easonabl e people could have 
differed in view of the evidence introduced a t the trial. P was insured and the in-
suranc e comp:my paid P. D mov ed the court to pl.:1ce upon the notice of motion .for 
judgment aft<;) r the naine of P the follo-.li ng, "who sue s for himself and the Insura nce 
Company a s their inte r ests may appear. 11 This motion W::l.S g r .::mt ed over the protest o.f P. 
Held:'. Error. This is in e.f f t:ct telli ng the jury that P has already been pa id, and 
that they should not shift the loss from a. rich insur:1nc e compar:y who was pa id a 
premium to bea r it to their nei ghbor, D, >-rho se business has just been wiped out by a 
fire . The cause of action by P ar'linst D b2.s not boen assignGd to the insurance com-
p:my . The assignment sta t ute allowing n.n .:!ssignce to s u G in his own name was not 
passed .for the benef'i t of · de.fend&nts. f-'lo r .:::ov (;; r thG j 1 dge ' s -::tcti on violated the spirit 
of V#8-96 vJhich r eads in par t as f ollows: " Nothing in t his s c: ction shall be construed 
to penni.t the j oinde r, or addition ;::s a new party, of any insuranc e compa ny on 
account of the issuance .7.-o any pa rty to :,1 causG o.f any policy or contract of liability 
insuranc e for the benefi t of or that will i nure (to ) tht:: benefit of a ny party to the 
cCJ.usc • 11 If D r eally bclicv t: s that P may not a ccot1nt to t}-;e Insurance Co. he can make 
the above motion aft e r v~rdict 1.vhen it will not af.fect tne jury. 
PLEADING AND P.1.ACTICE--Demurre r as a fim.l .JMS.c...ment 194 Va.J94. 
P instituted an actiori a t l [I.W aEainst D who demu.r r ed to the motion for judgment. 
D' s demurrer was sustained a s evi denc 8d b~· an order ente ... ed on Narch 29 ,1951 simply 
s t ating t hat it was adjudged .::.nd orde r ed -::. hat the demurrur be sustained, "to which 
action of the Court the Pldntiff excepts • 11 On Hay 21.J.th P asked for l e ave to amend 
'· ;;6jJ\ . 
bj_.s mo t ion for judgment which request was r efus ed on t he ground t _1at the cour t was 
r.vi thout jurisdiction to allow an amendment after the expiration of 21 days of the 
e~ri:. r;; of judgment. Did the Court have jurisdiction to allow the amendment? 
(t.•'C r:~d: Yes. 11 This ~?ur~ ha s cor:sistently held that. ar: order merely sustai~ng or over· \)~~ ~'llh~w a d~mu~rer k,H~ ~o.Lfinal-. An c:rder sustalnln " such a demur:er. ln orde r to 
\ {,I' be~ .f:tnal Wl thln tillun~g_of-CGde , sec. - mus t go further and dlSffilSS the case . 11 J Ins t ant case reversed and remanded. Hule 3:13 reads, 11 In granting l eave to amend t he 
c •"J c.~. rt may make such provision for notic e thereof and opr-ortuni ty to make response a s 
the court may deem r easonable and proper." nThe trial court .in the exercise of its 
discretion, may pe rmit a litigant to amend his motion f or judgment, .and impose such 
t e rms and conditions as may be r easonable and proper, and if the litigant fails t o 
comply with the conditions within the time specified, he is barred from further 
· prosec;1ti on of the· same ca.J.se , a gainst the same parties!' 
PLEADING & PP.ACTICE 194 V a. 409 . 
The C&P Telephone Co. sought to enjo i n the City o f Newport News from collecting a 
3% gross receipts tax. It prayed the court tha t in the ev :::~ nt tha t equitabl e r e lief 
was not ei ve n on the g round that the r e was an a d r::qua t e r cm,;dy a t l a.,_.r t hat the c a s e 
be transferred to the law side of the court. The co..1rt di sMiss ed t he c a s e beca tlSe 
the r e vms an ade ua t C:; r emed a t l aw. Wa s tbis error? 
Held: Yes. "V# .- provide s that ' no c a s e shall be di smissed s imply because i t was 
brought on the wron _ s · · e-eem.rt·1 , but t hat when a pl aintiff ha s proc eedBd · in 
equl y w en tle should hav .:! proc eeded a.t l av-1, or the ot he r wa;/ about , t he cou rt s hall 
di~ a transfe r to tho proper for~n ." 
PLEADING & PRACTICE Res Adiudicat a· 194 Va .S57 
IJI!hen X died he vlaS s u rvi ved by A; A 1 s daue:hte r, B; and by C. B cla imed tha t X and A 
had contra cted a valid common law marr i e.ge in Washi ngt on , D.C. in e 3. r ly 1902 and that 
s he wa s the l egiti mat e cl:ild of X. C cla imed that B wa s i ll8gi timat e , and tha t she , 
C, went through a marri::tge ce r emony with X i n l ate 1~102 a nd had lived with him as 
his wife . until X 1 s death in l 94G and that s he >-Jas his 1tlidm? and s ole heir a t l a1r1. 
~ \ JJt:cn X married . C no . obj ecti~n was made ?Y A w~o h0.s s~nce marri ed ~ numbe~ of times t.i;> ;r.-without eve r dl vo r clnG X. After X tt:as kJ_llE:d ln 19!~6 ln an a•J.tomoblle accldent C . .);.t. qualified as his persona l r e pre s ent ativ;.,; a nd s et t1 C:;d t he claim unde r the deat h by ~) wrongful act statute fo r ~?1200 . Aft c;r S<:: t. t l ernont o.f th0: c l ::ti m B sued C, and C only , 
~~ for h t: r pa rt of th8 ::r,1200 . The tria l court i nstruc t 0d the jur y that B was not entitle< 
to a ny j'1dgment in he r f :wor unl"'ss they found she w-1.s t he l:::gi timat e daughte r of X. 
'rt10 ,jury found in he r f wor and gav e he r :;j; l and cost s . B is now claiming to be X 1 s 
heir and a s such entitled to X1 s r <;alty. She s ays t ha t i t is r ns adjudicata tha t s he 
is l ogitimat <:: . 
Hel<i:. It i s not r e s adj udi c __ t a . ~;  ·: .. e n:s adj~dicata i t must be a 
v~id rfdgment. ·~ be a V-'l lid j.udgmc:lrt.- t b.e omplslint_mus_!, _:otat~ n. cause of action, 
:m a nec ess~ )a r ti os {Tll.J..S t _be._ joined . Si nc t; i n Virginia i n d e;ath by vrrongful act 
c asCo:s e .JUrY have an ·atsolut~CJ:cl,.i.G astO how t n._)ir aw"'.rd s hall be ..dis:tn 6l*t ed 
members o f th €.1 s®-' cl::.ts s t ht:r c i s no assuranc;::; lrJllat -'-'-'IL " · r..at__:t.ha_ju..r.,-y, if 
thor - ' he..en_o_ne_,_ woul d not hove gi. ve~tl10 Hhole _s um to the v!idow. _Thus B 1 s case 
was bad on its fnc u as f ounded o n m0re spucul :1tion. !vlo r 0over , if E 1 s t heory i s cor rec 
A would bu X I .s wi dot-r, :md A vn.s a nc::c e.ss::~ ry pa r t y . S.Lnc •, s h l! 'd::.J.S not j oined i n t he . 
action the judgment in B 1 s f nv or we.s a nullity 'lnd h enc e not rt;s '.ld judica t a . 
r.J I n-AfJ!LEADING & PH.ACT I CE 194 V 2. . 607, 610 . 
/' .. ~~ q-/f " _I} ;. j.n a bill f or an in .j ~nction , .q.i_l -;;E~d t Lat . ll e; i·nls th e owne r ~f a c e rta in trac t of 
'~lb.,. ~'f.arul b nd tha t D w'ls cuthng v <J.lu J. t. l c tlmher t .-10r efrom. I s the blll demurrabl e ? 
~'.,);-(J Held: Yes . It i s not suff i ci .:.:,lt me: r ..::ly to alh:g ..:: ownersnip . P should a l so s et fo rth 
/~ ?'his titl~ . "Wh•:! r c he c l 'lims under a p;:p :.... r t itl e he shoul~ ~unu·ally exhib~ t _ns titlF· 
""'l pape r s , o r copies t he r eof , or such of th t::m :=.tt lcn~.;t ~1s t-Tl l ..L m'lkG out a pr l ma ~ 
c n.s e of title ." 
5'70A. 
fLBi~DHJG ft PH.AC'riCE Stet ut.e of IimHati ons . Wills Contracts 19h Va.641. 
U and N 1:.Jere Uncle and niece. In 19L~5 U told N tha t if she would take care of hi m 
J'' o1~ t he res t of hiS life he would leave her everything a nd gave her a validl;'/ 
e:.u-;·cuted V\'ill l eavj_ng everything to her. U died on l"'ay l G, 1948 and N had t he will 
in her favor probated. Later N dis covered a late r will, but this will had been r e-
voked by U by cutting 011t his name and the names of the witness es. Court proceedi.ngs 
r esulted and it was held that the second will r evoked ·the f irst will although in-
oper a.ti ve as a will for other purposes, that the des truction of the r evoking will 
did not r evi ve ·the original will, and that U had died intestate . On Ha y 24,1951 N 
su ;:;d tJ 1 s administrator for damages f or breach of contract. The d efens e was the t hr ee 
yea r sta t t;.te of limitations. 
H d d : The defense is not valid. Unde r :the doctri ne of ant i cipa tory r epudiation N 
had an action agains t U durh!f his lifetim~_ because of U' s abs lut e..:.r::.epudia · on. 
Srp c_ould_.haYe "' .ed __ t~ lOCai~l J:lis deat l} . V!Lfr 31 reads, "The peri od of 
one y r::. a r . from t he death of a n' a rt ' shall be exclud ~:;d : r om the com ·tab on_o_L.i..ime 
wi hin w l Ch the ope r ation of any _ R.t_a_t.]J.. ...t&.:.Qr rulE2_ of lmv, it may be ne~essary~to 
commenc e any proceedinr s to preserv<2 o_r )revenL the_ loss of_an rig~~ remedy." 
This -:t_n --~ - ec cnapges t he th~e year statJ.te to -~ four yeJ.r _one _wher e one of-t he 
part i esal es. 
PLEADING AND Pi~CTICS Damae:es ' 194 Va.704. 
P sued D for the t,ort o f.~nal convers at i on . The jury , though properly instructed 
r eturned a verdic t for P f or :B, 000 11 as punitive da'T!ages onl y ." The judge suggested · 
to t hy f or eman t hat the l as t four wo r ds sho,lld be crossed out. The foreman obliged 
and Without f urther del i be r ation each, member o f t he j u r :-;: acquiesc ed in the change . 
J;l_ cont ends that t her e can be no verdict awardi ng puni t ive damages unles s ·ther e wer e 
CQlnpensat Qry amag_as_and Sinc e the jury found puniti V 8 damages- only, it is really a 
v erdict in his favor. · 
H eld: D is only half right. It v.ras er ror f or the tria l court to strike out the last 
f our words as t hat vJaS a cha D;ge in substanc e r a th(_; r t han mer e form. Acquiesc ens e by 
t he jurors without delibe r ation did not cure the def ect. But t he ve rdict for P f or 
;jpJ,OOO punitive damages onl y , c an no t be interpr et ed a s a verdict for D. Rather it 
indicat es tha t the jury mi sund.::: r s tood t he- instruct i ons. Ordinarily, then, the cas e 
woul d be r eve rs ed and r emanded , but s inc e neither side wi shed a nothGr trial it was 
af fi r med by m.1tual cons ent. 
PLEADING AND F: RACT ICE 19L~ Va . 709 . 
X was injur c~d in an automobil0 acc i dent d1e t o t.he n;"gligcmc e of lJ. A f ew months 
ther eaft er X di od f r om a heart at tack not connected v.rith t he inju ry. In the meantime 
tcX had started s uit against D. Aftur X 
1 s death P qualj_f i ed a s he r pco r sona l r epres enta -
o.. tive o.nd r evived the s ui t . P clai ms that the jury can m·mrd d2JTlagos fo r pai n and 
CA flur rcring sinc E:: h e i s pros c:cuting X' s suit and X coul~ lf,fve r ecover ed such damages . QtY' , v l Held:: No . V#8-62B ~pa .s s er.J in 1950 r eads , ".No causr::)~lof i n j uri es to p~rson or prop-
~ erty shall be l ost becaus e of th e d c::d h- o.f-th.G-pcr.son l ·j flble_fo.r_j:._he-inju x..y-dD-
cau s c of ac t ion fo r i n juri c;;s t o P''rson or p ro pPr t y shal l h 0 l os t because of the 
~r::_:th of ti1e person in whos e f avor · tl1e c .qus e of ~c ti o ~1 cxi sl~~d , pr:ovi 1*d~ howevQ~, 
ln such act:LO n no r ecov t:; r can be had for Jn® t a l m UJ.sh a ln or suf erln ~ ." Thls 
l anguage may e lnconsis t <::nt -vri t h V r J - · 0 but if i t i s, t h e.: l at er statute the one 
quot ed) pr evails . I n d .:;at h by vJrongf ul ac t cas ~s ther e ce.n be no r ecovery for pa in 
and suffering of t11 e dGc cas c::d , and i t. woul d be i llo E;ic a l to a l low i t 1.vhe r e the · 
· :?.dministr at or sued def endant on a r evi vad action, :1nd not :cllow i. t where._ the ad-
mi nistrator su ed on the or i gina l c ::mse of action . 
?LEADING AlliD PRACTI CE 57lA. 194 Va. 766 . 
In a negligence case in which the evidence as to P' s contributory negligence was co 1~ 
G icting the jury f ound for P in the sum of· $2, 000 vJhich was fair compensa tion for t J 
injuries r eceived. P vJas only 18 and had brought suit as if he were an adult. D con-
!;jcnds the whole proceedings are void. Is he right? ~.,j ~ 'Held: No. ~il.e an infant should__Q_u_e_ by next 1)'i erid,_J I£n-4BZ reads in p rt: " No ,juct 
1,...... ~ t mc:~t or dc-;c r ee shall be arrested or____:rexcr.sedtll)E_o!: th?_ app<,'la ranc~ of eithe r party , 
/))JD \ bm ng unde r the age of twenty.:-ona years ,_by:_attorney, ....:~f t he verd~ct, whe r e ther e is 
[ . d Qne , or the judgment or decree , be for him, and not to his pr e judic_e! 11 Note that if 
1 .,: r.:/' the: judgment had been against him it would have tret.m- a- nulli{y, and if t he damages 
had b<::en grossly inadequate in a clear case it woul d hav "-' bs en to his prejudice . 
PLEADING AND PH.ACTICE Federal Juri s dj ctj rm and Proc edure 194 Va .872 
D in viola tion of f edera1 statut8s against certa in unfair l a bor practic es by t h r eat f 
of forc e prevented P • s employees who we r e members of the AF of L from continuing t o 
work for P. D sta t ed that P wa s in United Mine Worke r ' s t erritor;>' and that the men 
would have to j oin a n affiliat ed union or e lse l The thrG.J.ts t ook place in Kentucky. 
P is a Virginia Corporati on eniJaged in the constructi.on b'.l s iness . P sued D i n Richrno 
in a State Court on common l av-J "'principlos. Has t he court jurisdiction? 
fi e ld: Yes. The f ederal statutes provide r emedies but they arc not exclusive . P may 
i gnor e such statutes and sue on common law principles . Maliciousl JL_interfering wi-th 
P 1 s contractual r~:: lations 1tri th the AF )f _ L_<!_nd wi t ll__!,hD cv l com_pa.nielLfQ!:_which he 
was dolng const:ruction wo.r:.lL.co.nstituted _tnr.t f.o_r which bot h compensatory and 
punitive damages could _lli,)J.f;lCcNer ed_ und~r the l o.1t1s of Kentucky . It was a l so he l d 
that the upreme Court of Appen.ls cvul d strike/ o·;.t. an unprc.vcd item of compensatory 
damag es in the sum of :!n46, 000 f or injury t c. P' s business r eputation, and, as 
modified, give judgment f or P without lt.emanding t hu cas>J .fo r a new trial on t he 
question of damages . 
. A ~PLEADING AND PRACTICE Venu t~ and JuriscJi c~n 194 Va . 9J..li ~ D, a def endant and sh t-1 riff c f F County, h3d given the bond r equired by s t atute ,Hhic 
bond ran in f avor of thG CornmGnwoalt h , a rr.l the S Suret y Co .,Inc. of Baltimc r e was 
V 
surety the r eon. D r esi.ded in F Qounty . He bnkt:. the CGndi t i.ons of his bond in w ~ County t o the i n jury <:. f P, the breach being contractual in nel;ture . V#S -716 proyiQ_es 
+- a remedy by motion on off icial bonds but states t)1~t __ sui t ma be bro~gh!-_ i !:J. "the 
court to or ill wh_ich 1::._ ~< ~~- any bond taken by an officer, or ~i ven by an sheriff-:< -r.- ~~ 
~ ~ is _!'0 ·uireU.CL · e ~turmi_d ,-fi._led_, ~r recorded," in our case F County . P sued D and j J.F S in W County in the Co~nonwealth' s ncune t o wit, tfCornmonwealth o.f Virgini~, Ex Rel. J 
v.D and S for the benef~t o.f P." D was properly s e rved in F County, and flled a pl e< 
i n abat ement (as did S whose s t atutory agent was s e rve<i)contending that the only vem 
was the stat ut ory one of F County. · 
Held: (l)Th e plea in abatement is.>bud . v#8-"(l6 is cwnul ative and fives an addi:t . ona: 
v~ .e caq._se oLaction_a. r os e lii if1 Count y , t hat was a prope r venu e , (2) 
b~ cince this i s not one of the c as es in which proc ess will i ssue out as far as D 
u conc e rned, th o s e rvlce on D w;:ts a nullity ana th e; Clrcu:Lt Cou rt of VJ. County acqu: 
ed no j urisdiction ove r b. A· ·· s ti..nction WAS drawn in the c as e of actions on offici; 
bonds as follows: (a )Whc:re t he bond is ktY.:cn by an off1c er pu r suan o s a u or y 
aut hority (as whor 8 h e t2Jces an indemnifying bond),that is onC;; of the f our cases in J which process may i ssue-: o~.tt of the county or c ity in 1t1hich th e action i s brdught. <&~~ See V#S-47(1). (b ) But where a bond i s given as r equired by stat ute f or the faithfu 
·performance of the duti .cs of thu offic u, this s ecti on has no application. Not e (l): 
Sinc e S was a corpor tion , prc,cess properly can be issu"d out o f W County t o be 
s erved on S ' s s t n.tutvr y ;:tgont . Nvto (2): \.-Jbere t ho s e rvic e of process on a defendan 
is invalid, no f o rmit l pl8-'l is r e:qui r ed, .md the court should itself raise the obj ec 
i un , if obs e rved. Not e (3): But i.f n curpon.tLm is J. d(;f endant on a note and S is 
:m indorse r , and Pl-'linti f f suro s defcnd.:n:t and S i n A Cc ~nty 1trhe re the Corporation 
has its pr incip1.l <dfice , pr c,ccss will issue vut of A Cuunty :md can be served on S 
in F County whe r e S r esides {;.ls in this cas(;: then: a r e c, thcr gr ounds of venue than 
that t ho cause of action J.rOS§ in A County). 146 V:. .21) ,135 S.E. 823 . 
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J')LEADI .NG AND PRACTICE Rule 5: 1 , Sec.4, and Rule 1:8 195 Va.269. ~Vi thin sixty days after final judgment defendant filed with the clerk his. noticB of 
!"' appeal and assignments of error as follovrs: "Because the trial court erred in giving /r".;.'\,x to 'the jury in writing, improper instructions on motion of the Commonwealth. 11 The 
. / unly objection to the ruling of the trial court is sta(ted thus: "Defendant obj ected 
\Z-<.t and exc epted to the action in giving the instructions specifying them. )" 
Hdd.:~ The writ of errarr should be dismiss ed. The assignments .J.f error must specifi· 
call v- point out the errors reliad_on.~or.....identify_the i tr~.tcticns allegedly erro.n .e.ous 
l,;y~ . Rule 5:1, Sec.4. Furthermor e Rule 1:8 r equire that the r eas vns f ur obj ecth 
be stated with r eas onable certainty. Counsel must 11 lay his firit;e r on the error." It 
is nut enough t o invite the court t o delve into the r ecord and winnow the chaff 
f r om the 1-1hea t. 
PLEADING MID Pn.A.CTICE--Meaning of "convict:i,_on11 • 195 Va.353. 
V#46-416.l requires revocation of the driver's license of any person twice convict-
ed within -a· twelve months' period of violating any speed law. D wp.:s once ~onvicted 
and later on in the twelve months' period was arrested for speeding . He gave bon:d 
and f or"feited it rather than stand .trial. Should his license be revoked? 
Held: Yes . The l egislature did not intend t .o l eave the violator of speed laws such 
an easy way out. The act is constitutiona l as it is a reasonable r egulation of one s 
privilege to drive a c ar on the highways. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Not 3. quoti ept yprdict 195 Va.468. 
In eminent .domain proceedings t hr u:.! commissioners f avor ed a sum of around $5,000 
and two commissioners f 3.vor ed a sum around :;pl2, 000. It was then suggested that ea ch 
man put down the sum he f avored, that thes e amounts be added, that the t otal be 
divided by five , and the amount obtained ther eby then be 'Consider ed. The re was no 
agreement made in advance tha_!: t hat amount would neces sarily be the: aiTlOiii1t of the 
award, although such sum was eventuall~r awarded. · 
Held: The award is not invalid as a quotient Y~di.ct . Had they all agr eed in advauce 
to accept it vTi t hout fur t her conside ration then it would have been void. It is only 
I natural for people to hav e diffe r ent opinions on valtle s and vJhe.n they do, there must be some c ompromise, and if the compromise is based on r eas on it is immat erial tha t some figur e more or l ess arbit r arily t aken, was used a s a sta rting point f or the a rguments. 
PLEADING AND Pit\CTICE 195 Va.678. 
Case l. P sued D, a foreign corpo r ati.on , for damages for breach of coYltract. He di e 
not allege or prove that D had ever done business in Virginia, or that D had ever 
l
rJ .J .  .,.- t ~ designated anyone to be his agent i n Virginia. Process wa s served on the Secretary 
~ ltvt of the Commomrealth. D moved to quasi the proc ess for l ack of jurisdiction. P con-
-d -~~~~_:;, tended t hat all pl eas in abatement must be swo rn to, a nd hence the orq.l motion shoulc 
be overrul ed. 
Held: A motion to dism.iss :·or want o'' · isdiction(as distinguished from want of 
venue ) is not a l ea in abatement and hence need natbe- sworn .to. While such a n ob-
j ection c ou have been made by a pl ea in ab;tt ement, it need not be. Indeed the 
court of its own motion co11ld have dism~ssed the case . 
Case 2. P sued D, 3 fore i gn corporation, for dama.ges for br·~ach of contract. Ther e 
was proof that the cor por01.tion a yea r or two bef ore the institution of this action 
.had been doing business in Virgi nia but th::tt it bad clos r·~d its offic es in this State 
before t his action was started. The r e was no proof that D h.'ld eve r appointed the 
Secret a r y of the Commonwealth as i ts s t .- tutory agent. Proces s was s e rved on tha t 
party. On these facts th e tri.al court di smissed the c~1s e: on mot ion for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
He ld: Error. A i]!Qtion t o dismiss f or l ., ck of jn.,-j sdi cti oo.,_li~abatement 
is not sufficient unles s H nc ' gnt.iv~"~ry_gmunct_o~ Jurisdictio.n_enJ.!Jlltla.'\;&d in the 
s t-;tut es. Unde r V//13-217 a fore:i gn cor poration trnt does busint:s s in this St a·te by 
that v er y ac t is deem0d t o have a ppoint0d the SGc r ct ary of the Commonwealth his agent 
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to receive process. While there was no jurisdiction under V#l3-2ll or 13-214 -since 
no agent had been appointed, there was jurisdiction under V#l3-217 supra, and this 
grqund of' jurisdiction had not been negatived. nT.h§_provjsjon of V#l3-217 for the 
sefViCe of process is a co~JjQn_gQQ~~t is allowed to do business, accepted 
by_ it when it e.n:ter tne-Sta.te- a-nd- engages- in-business wi tli]) qt_-Q_omesticat~ing- or 
appointing....s; statutory . ..agento It should no the..r.SLaf..t_er,_ by:_ t}1!L_s~ le expedient of 
cl.ru;.ing its offj c d leaving th-is 'urisdiction, be a:llowed ~o wi thdr_aw -that assent 
so a_s_ t..Q._def eat al!_ ~ction which_ greJ'!__Q.U.t of_bus.i~ness_ done here. 11 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 195 Va.784. 
In an equity case none of the testimony was presented to the tria~ court for 
certification within the time allowed by law and hence did not become a part of the 
record and could not be considened an appeal~ However nQffierous exhibits offered in 
evidence when ... the testimony was being heard were marked for identification and 
initialed by the judge. Rule 5:1 #3(d~ provides that when so marked and initialed 
the exhibit becomes part of the record. Defendant wishes to rely on the exhibits in 
the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Held: "It carmot do so in spite of the l anguage of Rule 5(supra). Evidential valge 
canna be iven t o that which constitutes only a part of the evidenc~. "The oral 
testimony not made a part oTthe r ecord may -have weakened or totally destroyed· the 
evidential value of any or all of the exhibits now relied upon by the appellants. 
If a litigant without consent of other interes t ed parties, were allowed to present 
his cause in this court upon only a part of the evidenc e , the inevitable result 
would be that the merits of the case "1-JOU.ld be determined on appeal upon evidence 
materially different from that considered by the trial court. That cannot be per-
mitted..11 
PLEADING AND Pf~CTICE Statute ~f Limitations 195 Va .827. 
S a sub-contractor in 1943 p11t in a defective union in a eas pipe which l ed into a 
house which was being built by D, a contractor, for P who accepted the house in 1944. 
Because of the defect(l)the union broke,(2) gas followed the pipeline beneath the 
building,(3)collected in the basement, and(4) was i gnited by a flame or spark causing 
an explosion in 1948 which destroyed tho hous e . P sued D claiming that the statut e 
of limitations was five years and that it did not start to run until the def ect was 
discover ed as a r esult of tho explosion. 
Held: ( l)~.rong rr3sulted in c ons8qwm:t.~ · · ~ ct_ gamag_e_ t o pro erty rather 
truw :irect · ·ur:y thereto, and hence would not survive at common l aw . Therefore 
the statute of limitations is one yeg,r . This is to be contrasted with 185 Va.?l8 
w~e E relie~ on o. fals e stat ement t hat a_ f_11rn ;;t.ce w:::ts of sufficient capac1ty to 
heat the house as the wrong in tln t case was a direct damage t('l E 1 s property. (2 )The 
st atujJ o~J.~;tn;io~ -_ s arts t run e.s soon ·'lS the wro ng is done r egardless __9f the 
cl,;i.ffi __ lt_ o.f__ '--scn :t.:Uning Ju:Lf.act~unll.!s s defend-:m fr~u Ll C;n y conc~als _ facts ; 
and not from th8 t i me it is asc 0rtain~:.;d that dam"Lge h:~.s been sustained. The fraud 
must be actual and not cor;structiv(; . In tho inst .:~.nt case tb c::re was no actu<1l fraud 
on p' s part o.s D had only constructive noti ce of the defect /Jhen D told P in 1944 
that all lvork had been prop(crly done . This r epres ent ation >-ras m~"ldo not for the purpos 
of concealing ::1. fraud, but for tt:11-:; purpose of coll0cting the bal anc e D actually 
thought was due him. St atutes o.f l i mitations nr c st atut e.:: s of r epvse and that purpose 
would be def eat ed if one might bo held liabl e mG.ny y8.:.t r s l at e; r . (Note : The court di d 
r;ot commi t itself as t o under gr ound trespasses . It mer ely st 'lt (;d that there was no 
trespass in this cas o.) 
PLEADING AND PRACT ICE ~[;S A@ ttj..i :)l.fl t c.. I 195 Va . 86l. 
Mrs. P while drivine her husband ' s car was in :m <J.Cciuent vrith X who sued her in a 
civil and police court f or :ip252 d:uni1.ges Llone 1'\1-S c:).r. Mrs . P counterclaimed f or $207 
damages dr ne her husband 1s . car. The trial judge r efus 0C:l t o dismiss the counterclaim 
but donieu r ecbver y t o e;ith,.; r pn.rt y on tht.; ground t h"l.t each was negligent. That is 
X l ust his suit agaj_nst Mrs. P bee ~ usc he was m;glig0nt, and Hrs . P l ost her suit 
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on the counterclaim becau~ she was negligent. Later Mrs. P brought an action -for 
.;~ : 1 0, 000 against X for personal injuries incurred in the accident. X contends that H 
h:~s already been adjudicated that she was negligent and hence recovery should be 
d.:;nfed. ' / 
Held: On rehearing (196 Va.322) Contention upheld. A gratuitous bailee can su.ef a 
th:Lrd party for injuries dona_the-Gai-1ed-prop.er_ty.. He~ce we had the same p.§;.rlies and 
tho same issu.es and the matter is .s..._adjUdicata. (Two judges dissented on the ground 
t h5 a en 1.ssue was not made at the trial, and one cannot raise a new 
issue for the first time on appeal) 
PLEADING AND PRACTTC~~ --Equi_ty · 196 Va.l9$. 
A bill in equity was f~fo~~OFmatiRn of a fire insurance policy. De-
fendant answered. The parties __ ?:greed that the prlbci:pal..,..c-on:tr()_yersy was whether or 
not defendant was guilty of fraud or other inequitable conduct a nd----that-mat.ter was 
submitted to a jury 11 pursuant to Code 8-213 11 which provides that in a case of ·-a:----------
plea . in equity the parties are entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. The 
evidence showed no fraud but it did show a mutual mistake. Nevertheless the jury 
found for complainant and the trial court refused to set the verdict aside. 
Defendant appealed. 
Held: V#,8-2l3 a:QJ21ies only to a Q).ea, ..and...._no~ to ' Hence the v diet of 
the jury in this case would at best"'"tie advisory only. Since there was no evidence to 
support the verdict it should have been disregarded. ~ this error is harmless as 
r eformation should have been granted on the ground of mutual mistake of fact-.----
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 196 Va.247. 
C by his will directed that his executors create several trust funds out of his 
total estate and gave them the power to sell his realty for this purpose. The 
executors claim that K holds an undivided 49/ 100 interest in the Grand Caverns as a 
r esulting trustee for C and brought this suit to est~blish such a trust. The 
executors did not make C•s devisees parties. K demurred on the ground that at C\s 
death title to the r eal estat e pass0d to his devisees and that this suit could only 
be maintained by them. What ruling? 
Held: Demurrer overruled. I<' s claim overlooks the f act that tho executors were ex-
pressly given the power to sell the r ealty. In such _a case the executors take the 
title to realty for the purpose indicated and are the proper parties plaintiff. 
PLEADING AND Pf~CTICE Creditors Rights Mechanics Lien 196 Va.295. 
_ b p, a sub-contractor, furnished C, a contractor , witn ready mixed concrete for M 
Ji ~· from June 23 to August 3. There was evidence that if the bill had been paid by (pe-t' August 25 there would h;we been a discount of 25 cents per cubic yard. The memoran-
• --~ dum claiming the lien was duly filed and suit was instituted to enforc0 the lien on 
~ · the following February 21st. The statute(V//43-17 ) r equires the suit to .be instituted 
within six months after the whole 'Q';;bt becomes payable. lvas the suit instituted in 
time? 
Held: Yes. The debt becomes "payable11 as soon as suit caul · be successfully in-
stituted and when interest at the l egal r at e would c;Jmmence if unpaid. Since there 
was a discount i f paidt58Tor e ugust:-25tn no inter est would- start to run and no 
action coulibe m:arnt:a:i:I' - oeTo:i'G"t"ha't- dat e . T1'1e- ru -e-that- t1TEr d'8b-t H; payable when 
the l ast of a series of services ren or ca- pursuant to contract is performed has no 
application if a l onger time is allow~d for payment as it was in the instant case . 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Contempt of Court 
The Circuit Court of N. County ordered a Ferry Co. 
Co . to continue ferry s ervic e. They r efus ed t o do so 
court. They appealed . What r esult? 
196 Va .428 
and the Pennsylvania Railroad 
and were fined for cont empt of 
Hel d: The Circuit Court had no jurisdiction t o issua such an order. In the absence 
of statute the oper at or of a ferry can C C:·'lS e his cper ations. He may f orfeit his 
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franchise if he does so, but he cannot be forced to continue. Since the Court had no 
n ~ •.thority to issue the order such order was' absolutely void and hence could be 
7iolated with impunity. Note: If the Court had had jurisdiction, disobedience of i t3 
order would hav:e been contempt of court even though it was later determined that t he 
l m1 violated was unconstitutional. 
PLEADI NG AND PRACTICE I~vited Error Torts 196 Va.469. 
P was driving his car. His wife was his passenger. D was driving at an excessive 
speed and ran into P•s car as P was making a left turn. P•s wife was killed. She was 
the mother of nine children. P qualified as her personai representative and recover-
ed a verdict of· ) 10,000 11 payable to P, the personal representative." D's attorney 
suggested that the verdict be changed, if that was what the jury intended, to make 
the . ,~10,000 payable to P. The jury were then told they could make it all payable to 
P, or all payable to any one of the children,or divide it up between them. The jury 
stated they wanted it all to go to P. The Court then asked the attorneys if that was 
all right with them, and they answered affirmatively ~ D noH contends that P was 
guilty.of contributory negligence, that at least there was a jury question on that 
point, that a beneficiary who was to blame in causing the death cannot share in the 
proceeds, and hence that the verdict is contrary to la~. 
Held: While a beneficiary whose negligence proximately contributes to the death of 
the deceased cannot take, D, in this case is now estopped to claim that D was guilty 
of such negligence. He himself, through his attor ney, strgges ted to the jury that p 
be made the beneficiary and told the Court he had no objection to such a verdict, 
l!_aving invited the error, if any, he gannot now take advantage thereof. 
PlEADING AND PHACTICE Pleas in abatement 196 Va.59D. 
D, a railroad, ordered a lar ge amount of coal from P. Preliminary negotiations 
were ~n Wise County but the contract was accepted in WiJmington,N.C ~ The coal was to 
be delivered to D F.O.B. mine in Wise County. D refused to send in orders from its 
Wilmington office as it had done in the past. The principal office of D l-Ias in 
Richmond. P tendered coal to D in Wi se County which was r efused. D was s erved with 
process in Richmond, though sued in Wise County . D filed a plea in abatement which 
~ the trial court sustai ned and this appeal followed. Note the followi ng points: J~ (l) ' Wise County is not the proper venue unless all or part of P1s cause of action 
~ - arose there. If this condition is satisfied then process will issue out because D 
is a corporation. . 
(2) The cause of action in case of breach of contract ar i s es ei t her where the 
contract i s made or where it is breached. The contract in this case was made in 
Wilmi ngton. It was also breached there when no orders were given. But it was also 
breached in Wise County when D refused to acc ept coal t here. Hence part of the cause 
of action arose in ~vise County and that county is a proper venue. Reversed and 
remanded. fli"1iJU Where defendant files a lea in abatement the burden .QL pr..oo£... is 
on him to establish a e alleg~ in sai d plea . 
PLI~ADING AND .PRACTICE I~.ns.istent Positions 196 Va,)49, 
P sued D for :ijill,589 and. for ~ p 9, 533 allegec:lto be due on two separate construction 
contracts. D defended on the ground t hat the contract was illegal because P had con-
tracted for work in excess of :;r20 , 000 in violat i on of V#54-113 et seq. as he had no 
state license . P contended that tl1e statute was inapplicable where t here were 
·s eparate jobs each under •a>20, 0CO. D then wi thdr ew his plea of illegality andsa.itild 
that the part ies had made a compromise set tlement. Thi s compr omise pr ovided that D 
would pay P :1pll,500 t-Jithin sixty days , and t hat if he fai l ed to do so t hen judgment 
for the whole amount sued fo r should be enter ed. Thi s agr eement was entered of 
record. D f ailed to pay withi n t ne s ixt y days, and obj ected to t he Court entering 
j udgment for the full amount sued for because the original contracts wero illegal. 
Held: D cannot play f ast and loose with t he Court . HavJng withdrawn t he plea of 
illegality, and entered a compr on1ise agreement of record, he cannot now ass ume an 
i nconsistent posi t i on. Were it otherwise t here could not be orderli ness ,regular i ty, 
and expediti on, all of which are required in order to do just i ce. 
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE . .r._L\dicial ~ales 0 ( .z._ J..._, :Pv J _:f96!J.a-2/J:X:· 
Twas trustee under a deed of trust of ~e 1iotel ~erson in Clitt~rl~rge , The 
O''mer died and his widow filed a bill in. equity for the settlement of his estateu 
:eJl d.le this case was pendillg default was made in paying the debt secured by the deed 
of trust. T informally moved the court for permission to sell the property as per 
the terms of the deed of trust, and an order was entered authorizing him to do so. 
I>rer;y one agreed to this procedure. The hotel was sold and brought $90,000. T's 
commission would be :~4500 if this be ·regarded as a sale under an ordinary deed of 
trust but only · 1~2100 if this be regarded as a judicial sale. To which commission 
is T entitled? 
Held. to :$4500. It is not a .1udici'aL sale becausetrthe CO\.li't appointed no commi§.sion-
e~ to hold the sale, required no bond, and made no provision for its confirmation 
all of which are required in the case of a judicial sale. The order was to sell as 
per the terms of the deed of trust, so the sale is an ordinary sale by a trustee 
of a deed of trust after default and request by a creditor secured by the deed of 
trust to sell. 
PLEADING AND PHACTICE ~s adiudi~ata 196 Va .597. 
C maintained a barrica e in a high1...ray where it abruptly narro1...red from four lanes 
to three. B drove his car into the barricade, lost control of his car, and went on 
into M's house damaging the house and himself. M sued Band C. M won as to B but 
lost as to C and the j~dgments becarne final. Then B sued C who entered a plea of 
res judicata. Is this a good plea? 
Held: No, for three r easons. (l)The ,parties are not the same(2)The issues are not 
necessarily the same for even if C were negligent as to B this was not necessarily 
negligence as to M as questions of proximate cause and ambit of duty would be in-
volved in the controversy between M and C that would not necessarily be involved 
as between M and B or between B and C. (3) Estoppel by judgment must be mutual to 
give rise to the defense of res judicata. There is no such mutuality here for if C 
were to sue B for damage done to the barricade the judgment in M v. B would be no 
bar as the parties and issues would be different. Note: The fact that neither B nor 
C filed a cross claim against the other when they were sued by M when either could 
have done so under Rule 3:9 was also persuasive that the i:csu.es were different. 
PLEADING AND PHAGriCE lmm~ity f rom Ci til Process 196 Va.651. 
vl drove his c.ar from his home u1 Tennessee 'tb testify in the case of Comm. v. D. 
at the request of the Commonwealth, W owed D ::p2,000 past due. D attached W's car 
(for which the :lp2 ,000 was due to D) and served trim with process. The Unifonn Act with 
reference to out-of-state witnesses(V#l9-242 et seq) was not followed. Should the 
service of process be quashed? 
Held: Yes. Both the attachment and personal service on tv should be quashed. The 
statute is in aid of the common law and does not prevent a simpler method where a 
will come voluntarily. Th . rivile e from being served with process extends 
ro o · ss r so ecessary ance as we~his 
person. 11This immunity works no injustice to anyone, or he.w~tness comes 
with~n the State, there would be no opportunity to serve process upon him11 • The 
courts of Tennessee are open to· D if he wishes to sue w. 'rhe advantage to the Common-
wealth is too important to yield to the personal advantage or disadvantage of · 
individual suitors. 
Pleading and Practice Equity Pleading Cr~ditors Suit 196 Va. 790 at 796. 
Ten creditors appeared before a commissioner in chancery to prove their claims as 
per an order of r eference frvm the chancellor. ~.ne of the ten cl~ims were allowed. 
The owner of the disallowed e;laim appealed. There is not enough f«;>r all. Are the nine 
creditors whose claims were allowej necessary parties in the appellate proceedings? 
t/ Held: Yes as their rights may be adversely affected. Her!ce their · counsel should 
.\ { .';/ordinarily be served with copies of the notice of appeal and assignments of error, ~~ designation of parts of the record to be prtnted., and petitions of appeal as required 
. by the rules of court. But where a receiver is contesting all claims in order to con-
serve funds available and the creditors acquiesce in his actions notice tothe receiver 
or his counsel satisfies the requirement that such notice must be ' given "opposing 
counsel." 
:1 : ~r,EAIHNG AND P}(AC'J.'ICE 5h" 196 Va.360 , 
A, the grandmother of X, and B and C, the parents of X who was three years pf age, 
formed a partnership . and borrowed 4~4, 000 of X t s money. X attached A's personal prop-
e:cty after the partnership had been dissolved but failed to furnish an attachment 
bond. Does the failure to furnish the bond end the case? 
(1) No. 1tJhile the attachment is dissolved, .the case then proceeds as one at law. 
On the above facts are A, B, and C jointly and severally liable? 
(2) Probably yes as it was wrong for the parents of X who stood in a fiduciary 
r8lat:i.onship to use his money for themselves. Since A acquiesced in this wrong she, 
too, became a party to it • . Tort liability of partners is ordinarily_ jQint_and_sav.eral. 
(3) In the instant case the parties all agreed to an instruction that liability 
was joint and several. They also ag-reed that the case should be tried without joining 
B and C. v,!flen A lost, she appealed o.n the ground that the case should be reversed 
becau.se it was an action against an individual for a partnership liability. Held: 
After acquiescing in the way the case was presented below, she is now estopped. One 
cannot invite error, and then complain of the error. The instructions asked for aoo 
granted as asked for became the la'l-r of the case even if erroneous. 
PLEADINCJ AND PRACTICg R!.!..le 1:8 196 Va.966,969. 
A and B are brothers and heirs or'i' , tr1eir father, who died intestate. A was a' 
fugitive from justice and owed some ·4ti5 ,ooo in debts in Virginia. B was administrator 
of F ' s estate. 'I'he share of each was worth about :iv26,000. A's creditors had attached 
his interest. A received -:~5,000 from B and used it to pay off the debts. A gave B a 
deed absolute on its face conveying to D all his interest in the estate. Later A 
filed a bill in equity for a decree to the effect that the deed was a mortgage. 
When the evidence was taken by deposition A offered testDnony the object of which was 
to invalidate the deed as having been given to one in a fiduciary capacity for a 
grossly inadequate considera~ion. B did not object in the trial court that A's 
evidence did not conform to the allagations of the bill but elected to meet A on the 
evidence introduced. 
Held: This is a ~r, and he ca~nnot now object to the vari ance •. If he had ob-
jected below he could have compelled A to allege lidth more exactness the grounds of 
his claim. Having failed to do this, the objections he could llave made below cannot 
now be considered. Rule 1:8. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE ~~j ~j+ a +i ons in Death by wrongful Act C~s~s 196 Va.l95l. 
P started a suit under the death by wrongful act statute two days before the 
statute of limitations would have run. He failed to prosecute the suit, and took a 
voluntary non-suit some six months later. He then started a new suit on the same day 
for the same thing. Is the second suit barred by the statute of limitations. 
Held: Not barred. The express language of V/18-634 excludes from the · limi-
tation the time that the first action was pending if th:.?.t action 11 for any cause 
abates or is dismissed without determining the merits of said action". The statute 
does not use the vJOrd "nonsuit". Yet its dominant pc1rpose is clearly dl.sclosed. 
Given the liberal construction to which it is entitled, that phrase evinces an in-
t e · t to t 1 laintiff the time the first action was pending. The ~e is 
~~~~~~WL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ction. 
PLEADING AND .PHACTICE Detinu~- C~nge of Venue 197 Va.27 
P, who had been treasurer of A \>unty, ',vas running for re-election. He had received 
~ letter from B, a banker, to t he effect that a check was enclosed in payment of 
Commissions for effecting certain loans . P turn~d this letter over to X. Shortly 
thereafter X and P fell out and X wrongfully gave the letter to D who was P's 
opponent. D prepared a circular in which he printed excerpts from the letter and in 
which he charged that P was misusing his power to put county money in certain banks 
in return for the banks giving him a commission on pri va·~ e transactions. P ran ad-
vertisements in the local n.ewspapers to answer the charges, but lost the election. 
He made an affidavit to the effect that be could not get a fair trial in A County 
so the venue was changed to H County. 'rhe court (l)ordered that the l etter be returned 
to P, (2)allowed ::P)'OO damages to reimLursa him for the advertisements, and(3)dis-
5' 7 ~J. 
allowed damages caused by his failure to be re-elected. Discuss points involved. 
Held: (l)It was error to change the venue to H County on the mere .:;'Worn statement 
.l f' a party that he could not get a fair tr:Lal in A County. Facts and proof thsre0f 
s0. ,indicating must be presented; (2 )The let-:t.er belonged to P and he is entitled to 
it; (3)and (4) T es allowed in detinue e wron ful detention of the prop-
er·i:,;>r must result directly from the detentiono In ..tbe instant case he damages re-
nul'E'ed i"rom the misuse ~rthe IetterCits puoncati.Qn).and not from the deten:tion. If 
3. thief steals your car, and later negligently runs irito you the latter damages can-
:1ot be recovered in an action of detinue, but only in an independent action for 
negligence since t]1ey resulted not directly from the detention, but collaterally 
from the mis~Ee of the property wrongfully detained. 
PLEADING A~TI PRACTICE--Interro,gtories-Short v. Long 197 Va.l04. 
Short attempted to pass Long s \ ruck and a coll:llion result,ed. The evidence as to 
who was to blame was in conflict. Short sought by interrogatories to ascertain what 
quantity of alcoholic beverages Long had consumed during the eighteen hours immediatE 
ly preceding the mishap and at what hours he had consumed them. He could have 
elicit~d the same information from a number of witnesses, but did not do so. V#8-32G 
provides that in a case at law a party may file in the clerkts office interroga~orieE 
to any adverse party. The trial judge quashed the said interrogatories. Was this 
proper? 
Held: Yes. The time covered was so long that the questions asked were irrelevant. 
Besides it is not an abuse of judicial discretion to refuse to allow interrogatories 
where the party wishing them has ample opportunity to inquire into such matters 
before and at the trial. Note also ti1at the rule against self-incrimination might 
be applicable. 
In this case the evidence indicated that Long had been damaged some :1~900. The jury 
only allowed him ~p400 on his cross-claim. Short contended that this was error and 
hence a new trial should be awarded. 
Held: Even if it is error only Long can take advantage thereof as Short has not 
been injured thereby. And that, said the court, is the ulong" and the 11 short11 of it. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 89 S.E. 2d4 197Va • .: Lft) 
(1) In a complicated automobile collision case in which there were five lawyers, 
four cars, and five parties involved the jury was having difficulty in coming to an 
agreement. The trial judge talked to the jury telling them that the case had already 
taken much t~e and expense, that if they disagreed there would have to be another 
trial before another jury no more capable than the present one, and that while no 
juryman was under a duty to surrender his conscience he hoped that they could come 
to some kind of reasonable conclusion. 
(2) It also developed that one of the jury was a first cousin of one of the 
attorney:s;, 
Held: As to(l)above that the judge's remarks were proper as stating the truth, 
and since he stated that no one tvas expected to surrender his conscience; were un-
objectionable. As to(2)relationship to an attorney is not a common law or statutory 
ground to challenge a juror for cause except in Georgia when the attorney has the 
case on a contingent basis. In the instant case the fe e was not contingent, and 
besides the objection came too late. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 19~ Va.l36 
Complainants filed a bill of complaint in 19.52 to set aside a decree entered in 
1919 on the ground that such decree was void,(a)because a proper party was not join-
ed though none of complainants claimed through him,(b)because a deposition of an 
important witness was prematurely taken and admitted in evidence 9 (c)and because the 
allegations in the 1919 bill were false and perpetrated a fraud on toe court. 
Held: As to(a)Nonjoinder of a proper party will not authorize equitable relief 
from a decree to other defendants who were properly joined and served, as to(b)the 
only result of taking the depvsition prematurely would be to make it inadmissible 
and if the result of this were to l eave the decree unsupported by sufficient evidence 
579· 
the remedy was by appeal; as(c)that the 1952 bill. af complaint ·· only-alleges-intrinsic 
f: ·e:md relating to matters expressly 'disposed of by the 1919 case, and that equity v7il::' 
e;nl;y relieve for extrinsic fraud practiced on the court on collateral matters which 
p!'evented a fair submission to the court, and(d}that complainants were ba:ned by 
t :·1eir laches in that · they w~- 33 years unt.il after numerous witnesses had died 
without alleging_any-reason for the long delay. 
£)LEADING AJ)JD P:'1ACTICE 11/r.- J. b ·~t:.~~t ~;-h1'U-c:-- 89 S.E.2d 320, 197 Va.367. 
P sued D for injuriJ~~·~er b~ck arising out of an automobile accident. At the 
trial she testified that she had never been in any other · automobile accident(except · 
a minor one about which she was not asked)and that she had never before hurt her back. 
She also testified in such a way as to show that D vlas negligent. After the trial an 
anonymous phone caller told D that P was a liar, and for him to contact X. D contactec 
X and found out from him that he had settled a case out of court for $800 as a result 
of P 1s claiming her back was badly hurt in an automobile accident in which X(who was 
uninsured)had been involved. Is D entitled to a new trial(P having obtained a verdict 
and judgment for :ipl5,000) and proper aff idavits having been filed? 
Held: Yes. D could not have obtained this evidence before or during the trial by due 
diligence, it is material on the question of damages as eome of her present dis- ' 
ability may have been due in part to the former injuries, it is not merely cumulative ~ 
it bears on P's credibility as a principal witness, and probably would change .the 
result of the case. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Consti1rutione.J T . .<~w.. 89 S.E.2d 329, 197 Va.395. 
P was convicted of reckl ess-driving in October 1953 before the mandatory require-
ment of revocation of a driv8r's license in case of two convictions of reckless 
driving within any 12 months period went into effect, and again in Hay 1954 when such 
a law was in effect. By statute V#46-424 there is no appeal from a mandatorl revoca-
tion by the Commia~ione:r e.xc.e.p.t.....f..or- mi.s:take f _iden.tit;y-_ wher e_the_judgments- OT.con-
vic~~· P appealed to the proper Circuit Court on the ground that the 
act was ex post facto as applied to the 1953 conviction. The Commissioner demurred. 
Held: Demurrer should have been sustained for by statute no appeal is allowed except 
on the question of identity. Hence the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to determine 
any other matter. 
PlEADING AND PHACTICE 197 Va.471 . 
P was under contract to erect a smokestack at X's factory. He sublet this job to D. 
Because of D's negligence X1s factory was injur ed, and so was the smokestacik. As a 
result of court action P paid X for the damage done to X1s factory and recovered the 
amount from D by way of re-imbursement. P is now suing D for the damage done to the 
s1nokestack and D claims that P had only one cause of action for all the damage done 
when the smokestack fell, that this cause of action cannot be split, and that having 
recovered on one portion thereof he cannot now vex him twice for the same thing. 
Held: While the principle stated above is sound, it is not applicable to the facts 
of this case for pr s cause·s of act.ion(plural)~ere separate causes of action. The 
moment the smokestack was damaged P had a cause of action, but P1s separate cause of 
action for re-imbursement for money paid X for damages done his factory did not arise 
until later after P had paid wbat, as betvreen P and D, D should have paid. 
PLEADING AND PllACTICE 197 Va. 457. 
By his .wl._of complaint P sought ~o gu~t t~tle to his mineral rights in thirty 
acres of land, to r equire defendants to account to him for his share of profits ob-
tained from mining said minerals, and for statutory penalties for mining within five 
feet of the boundaries of his la.nd without his consent. No survey was filed and it is 
impossible from the allegations to asc ertain the boundaries of the thirty acres. The 
demurrers of the defendants were sustained and P r efus ed to amend. 
HeJd: Affirmed on appeal. Defendants are entitled to know from P•s bill of com-
plaint just what he is complaining ab01lt o Unles3 the thirty acres is precisely locat-
ed defendants have no wa'./ of knowing j ust what acts on their part are alleged to be 
t ' 
56v. 
;,rrongful. It is impossible to trespas-s on, or to quiet title to "thirty acres of 
Jand "11 P' s bill of c~rnplaint is .baci!f.o~ir.de£ini.tene8s. 
PLi~ADH'G AND PRACTICE ~trial Conferenc&-summary Judgment 197 Va.589. 
P billed. D for poultry~od soi d by 'it"'\ o D.-u- cialllled w e food was d:::fective, tho.t 
he had · lost some ~~1575 worth of poults because of the defects and deducted that 
.: :nOlli1t, from a check sent to P marked, "Payment in fu11. 11 D notified P it was not 
a~cepting the check in full payment, and later had it certified, after which P 
notified D that its only purpose in certifying the check was to protect itself in 
case jud~nent was obtained. At a pre-trial conference the court, after see~ng the 
letters and a photostat of the check rendered summary judgment for p on the ground 
that the check had been accepted in full payment. 1 
Held: Error. The re-trial onference and summary judgment provisions of the rules 
are desi ned to prevent clear cases from . oin o r~a • u w erever t ere is a 
bona fide dispute a out the facts the parties are entitled to a jury trial. Here 
ther~ are at least two disputed facts·' (l)Whether or not the check was acceptedih 
full ·payment pursuant to an express agreement, a.nd(2)whether or not the poultry food 
was defMtive. Pre-trial conference is not a substitute for a jury trial where facts 
are in dispute. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 197 Va.736. 
p was injured in a collision with D, an infant. The jury· viewed the scene with 
court and law-Jers absent, and at the trial found for D. P moved for a new trial on 
the ground that the jury had improperly taken measurementr> and made time c.hecks while 
at the scene of the view. He introduced an affidavit by his counsel that four of the 
jurors had made admissions to that effect. No hearing was had on the motion. The 
Court, without notice to D's guardi1.p ad litem, inquired of the officers in charge 
of the jury whether or not the alle~ed acts had been committed, and, receiving an 
affirmative reply·, set aside the V6:!"dict : and awarded a new trial. Wast his proper? 
Held: No. D's guardian ad litem was entitled to_ notice so he cou.ld cross eJ:amine 
the officers. The affidavit of P 1s counsel was hearsay, which, while justifying the 
Court in making an inquiry, was inadmissible in evidence at such an inquiry. Case 
reversed and remanced so the 1notion for a new trial may be properly presented and 
argued • 
. · I _, .. , 
PLEADING Al'iD PRACTICE 197 Va.807. 
D sold a building to P for ~P150,000 cash. D warranted that the freight elevator 
was in good condition Hhen he knew it had been condemned by the municipal authorities 
Three years later P sued D who relied on the defense of the one year statute of 
limitations. 
Held: The five ear statu . ' ¥- X-e.St.~a(even if the 
result of fraud s.urvive under Wt'64-1~ . By V//8·-24 if .no other time is stated the 
statute of limitations is five years on ac t i ons that survive and one . year on actions 
tha 
PL&ADING AND PRACTICE 197 Va. 
Appellant requested Supreme Court of Appeals to set aside finding of the trial 
court on the ground t hat it was not sustained by the evidence. In ~m1tiag the 
pa~ts of the record that should be printed she indicated only the portions thereof 
that were favorable to her. 
Held: This is a failure to comply with the rules as the court cannot tell whether 
such an assignment of error is good unless it has before it a transcript of all the 
evidence germane to the point. 
Held, also, that copying a p.?rtion of the evidence into one t s brief is not an 
acceptable substitute for-a designation of parts of record that should be printed. 
FJ).:'..;J)ING lUi.J P,"LJ~C '~.'Ic;E; ) 01.. ]_)1.3 Va,37 
P1 s car and D's car collided. The only fae:t in dispute was whether P or D was on 
·i·hz tvrong side of the road. While the jury was recessed one F informed the jury that 
i i.:> insurance company carried the insurance 'for both P' and D and he volunteered full 
infqrmation about attempted settlements. F 1s conduct was not known to the Court~D, or 
the Insurance Co. until after verdict in favor of P. When the presiding judge heard 
c1f the matter he summoned the jurors and F to appear before him. He finally held 
there toras no prejudicial error. 
Held: Reversed and remanded. 11 \ve are mindful of the rule that generally the teotri.-
mor\)': of jurors is inadmissible to impeach their yerdic~ that exceptions to the 
rule are rare. 1rJe, ho-..1ever, subscribe to the exsreotion that p_ri vate communications, 
possibly pre;judicia4 bet we.en_jurors and thi rd partill_ are forbidden and ;:i.JWalidate 
the verdic t---11 • In this case __ apy evidenc.e .. .o.£ insurance was· irrelevant. Ther·e- i s -;;o 
presumption that the .. error was harmless. Note: It was also held that the argument 
that the insurance company should not profit from the wrong of its agent was 
fallacious as F had no authority to do what he did and his actions in so doing were 
outside the scope of his employment. 
PLEADING AND PflACTICE Ivl?-ndamus Prohi_bition 0e~ i)t ~b.  Va.lOO 
The State Water Control Board filed a petition for mandamus against X of X Cou,nty 
to force X to comply with certain anti-pollution orders. The petition was not filed 
in X County but in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. V#B-42 reads in part, 
"Jurisdiction of writs of mandamus, except such as may be issued from the Supreme 
Court of Appeals, shall be in the circuit court. of the county-:~-::-:;- to which the writ 
relates." Defendants filed a timely plea in abatemen:. and Petitioners demurred there-
to incorporating into the demurrer f p_cts not apparent on the face of the pleadings. 
The Court sustained the demurrer and ordered X to reply to the merits. X then sought 
an original writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Appealso 
Held: (1) The ;y:_ord 11 Jurisdiction11 in Vf/8-42 is used in the sense of venue and not 
in t e tee nical sense of ·ur, sdlch.on. Henc-e-the---Ri-e-hmo·nd=<Zottrt{-being a court of 
general jurisdiction had potentia: jurisdiction. This being so the writ of prohibi-
tion should be dismissea . Prohibition cannot be used to test venue, or to correct 
errQ.r of a court having the po;,rer to adjudicate. (2 )The demurrer to the plea in abate-
ment should not have included facts not a part of the r ecord f or a demurrer lies only 
for error of law apparent from the re~ord itself. (3 )Even though the case has been 
tried on its merits X may still insist on a decision as to whether or not the 
Richmond Court was proper venue since Sec.3:6 of the rules r eads in part, 11A plea in 
abatement or motion to quash is not waived by the simultaneous or subsequent filing 
of other pleadings,~ by trial~ the merits. 11 (Emphasis added). 
PLEiilliNG AND PRACTICE R~le 3:21 h~ u! 198 Va~213. 
The final order of the court overruling plain£iff 1 s notice to set aside the verdict 
and pronuuncing judgment thereon was ente':red on March 1'7. Or.. the following April 7 
pla-intiff filed with the clerk a paper, designated a motion to set aside the vercil.dl.ct 
because a witness summoned by defendants, ·but not called, had made improper remarks 
to members of the jury. Four days later he served notice on the defendant that he 
would present his motion to the court and ask for a hearing thereon. 
Held: Under Ilule 3:21 the judgment became final on April 7th(21 days after entry of 
final judgment). The mere flling of a motion with the clerk within the 21 day period 
does not extend the period. Since the trial judge did not vacate or modify the 
judgment within the 21 day period, it has become final, and t he trial judge no longer 
has jurisdiction to deal with it further. 
PLEADING AND PFU-~CTICE 198 Va.231. 
D County constructed a s ewage disposal plant across f rom P1s Hotel. He filed a 
claim with the board of supervisor-s f or ~ !i35, 000. This cJ.a im was disallowed in his 
absence. Under tbe Code written notice of its disallowance must be served upon him. 
Instead of serving SllCh notice as ·p3 1 tlce ten11~ of vt/8=5T1 it \<Ias mailed to his 
attorney who actually received it. 
502 .> 
Held: By V#8-53, if the notice is actually received, then it is immaterial that, it 
w11 not served as per the terms of V#B-51.. l:leld, also, that the deposit of a ~~50 
G.1eck is not an appeal bond, since a check is not a bond. (An appeal bond i s r eq_Llired 
by statute where one appeals to a court of record from a decision of a county boar·d 
of super'risiors . (Rule 5:1(11) has no application since that rule applies only to 
eppeal s to the Supreme Court of Appe~ls.) 
FIJ:"!;ADING AND P ~?ACTICE 
':'hese cases state that in tructions iven to a jury 
l aw of that case whether right or wrong. It would o 
cass_the Supreme Court of A~P.eals does not decide one 
gtyen in the inst~atiens. 
198 Va.237 and 198 Va.242. 
without ob · · n become the 
ow that ~n affirming such a 
way or another Qn_the law 
PLli;ADI NG Al\lD PRACTICE 198 Va.2?4. 
In this case Appellant's appeal was dismissed because;(l)the printed record includ-
ed the pleadings when no objections had been made thereto in violation of Rule 5:1 
#6(e);(2) the printed record failed to include the opinion of the judge in violation 
of Rul e· 5:1 #6(d);(3) only a small portion bf the record that was germane to the 
assigmr1ent of er rors was printed when Rule 5:1 1/6(f) stat 8s that "It will be assumed 
that the printed r ecord contains everything germane to the errors assigned.'! Subs-
stant i al compliance with the rules of agpen ate;:}2J:P~Sl~ure is necessa,n: fo£ the 
or~erly and expedi tious administration of justice _ 
PLEADING Al\m PRACTICE Parties 198 Va.277. 
X mmed Blackacre . He conveyed it to Y. Through an error the land books . continued 
to show that X was the owner and Blackacre continued to be assessed in X' s name. 
After some twenty years had gone by the city i n which the land was lo~ated instituted 
proceedings against X 1 s devis ee and parties unkno>-rn to f oreclose its lien for taxes. 
Y's successor in interest claims t hese proceedings were voi d on the ground that a 
publication that X's devisee's lanct(describing i~is t.o be sold for taxes and not 
otherwise identifyi ng the parties ur~nown was not l egal not ice to him. 
Held: Y's successor i n interest is right. X had no inter est in the land when he 
died, and his devisee took no interest. The proceedings should have been against Y, 
andY's successor in interest, and t hey were necessary parties. 
PLEADING AND P~CTICE 198 Va.288. 
X wu.s convicted of r ape and sentenc9d to life i.r:lprison:nent. Four years later he 
sought his r el ease on the ground t hat the r ecord showed that he was convicted by a 
jury of eleven. It can be shown by the t estimony of a deputy clerk that a juror's 
name (Emerson Macon) was inadvertently omitted. This is corroborated by papers filed 
i n the case by t he clerk to aid hlm in the performance of his duties--in this case 
a jury list and his minute book. 
Three analyses were made in this cas e and a venerable Virginia rule in forc e over 
130 years was expressly over-ruled to t he horror of Justi ces Miller and Buchanan . 
(1) The old rule . After a ,iudgment i s no longer in the breast of the court, the 
record cannot be changed nunc pro t c;,nc unless the basis for the change appears in the 
record.;itself . The record-o:.f""the court imports, absolute verity. It should not be at 
the mercy of the vagaries of othe r s ' memories and r ecords. 
(2) Th e Att orney-Gener al did not ask the .':.i upreme Court of Appeals to overrule this 
principl e, but mer el y to hold t hat memoranda made by the clerk f or his use, and f iled 
in t he case , are quas i records,i. e. r ecords f or s ome purposes, one of which should 
be to correct errors-nll1~ pro ~u~~ in the r ecord itself . 
(3) But t he Supr eme C ourt of Appeal s stated the old Virginia Rule was the minority 
r ul e and was law in only seven st at es . It expr essly overruled the old rule and held 
\) i n this case t hat any compet en:. e"[idence ev · ·. out side of an r ecord was ad-
~ \L m~ssible fo r t he ,pUr pose o{ recordin~ci.uallrv:--l:t~ad-a.n~ o~ng 
· ~.,r epr or s in t he r ecord nunc ro ·::.u_n£ when t h_e evi dencemad.eft clear_th§.t the ~ord 
~It emphasi zed that no such order should ever be issued to make it appear 
that t he right thing was done at t he right time when it wan not actually so done . 
r'LLADll~U Ai1i.O F.li.AC';.'h';l!.: :)Cj .. J..)'o lic.., ;:,U5 , 
; Criminal Procedur~Go.ns-'I.A.i tutio.nal L.:::.w. 
Sec·c:Lon 6 of the ~~rg1nia Constitution reads, 11 In criminal cases, the accused mo.y 
r.~lead guilty; and, if the accused plead not guilty, with the consent and the con-· 
·-ur.:renc.e of the Commonwealth's Attorney and of the Court entered of record, he may bE 
tried by a smaller 'number of jurors, or waive a jury. In case of sucha waiver, or 
plea of guilty, the Court shall__ try the case.n (Underlining added). D was tried for 
rape ·with the consent of the Court and of the Cormnonwealth 1 s Attorney, but such 
consent was not entered of record. He was found guilty and · sentenced to 30 years. 
The trial court later entered a nunc pro tunc orderw cure the defect. Is the defect 
cured thereby? - --
Held: No. Entry of the. consent of record was a condition precedent to the court's 
having jurisdiction. This case differs from 198 Va.288 in that in that case the panel 
was actually composed of twelve jurors and not of eleven as stated in the order while 
in this case there is no proof whatever that the consent was entered of record as 
required by the Virginia Constitution. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--D~ath by Wrongful Act Statute of Limitations 198 Va.612. 
X was, killed by D in Virginia. X's personal represent at 1ve of Nevada sued D in 
Virginia. The case was properly dismissed because a foreign personal representa~ive 
.,j 1 by statute has no standing in a Virginia court unless a . Virginia appointed personal 
~~~ • representative joins with him. In the meantime the one year statute of limitations 
~ ~::>ha n. However our statute of limitatious (V#8-6J4) has a savings clause, "bU.t if 
S,~ ~ uch action is brought within such period of one year after such person's death,and 
for any cause abates or is dismissed without determining the merits of such action, 
the time such action is pending shall not be counted as any part of such period of 
one year *-:H~11 • P, of Virginia, then qualified as X 1 s personal representative and 
sued D. (Statute of limitations in death cases r.ow two years) 
Held: The savings clause should be interpreted liberally as it is remedial in 
nature. The instant case is governed by this clause. The new a~tion by P is for the 
same wrong, the issues are the sam0, and the parties are substantially the same. 
Since the new action was brought within a year, if the time the old action was pend-
ing is not counted, it is not barred by the statute of limitations. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE S~atute of Limitations 198 Va.653. 
A son lent his mother ~P4,000 with tfie understanding that she could pay it back at 
her convenience whenever she wished. Six years later the mother died. The son filed 
a claim for $h·,OOO. The executor contended the statuta of limitations had run. 
Held: The statute has not run. There was no cause of action by the son against the 
mother until she wished to pay. Hence the statute had not even started to run at 
the time of her death. And since it was a loan and not a gift the son is entitled 
to collect. 
PJJ8ADING AND PRACTICE 198 Va.586. 
Golf Club filed a bill in equity against D seeking to enjoin D from collecting 
surface water in large quantities by means of a storm sewer and dumping it on Golf 
Club's property to its damage. The trial court enjoined D from discharging water 
from any premises it owned onto Golf Club's property but refused to award damages. 
D turned the storm sev:er over to the public authorities and sold all the land to 
v~rious individuals. The evidence as to the amount of damages was in sharp conflict. 
What should the Supreme Court of Appeals do? 
Held: The lower court cormnitted error when it refused to allow damages. Since thes 
damages are unliquidated they canno·t be ascertained by the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Nor can the case be transferred to the law side of the trial court s~ that there 
can be a common law jury, as that can only be done when the case is originally 
brought on the wrong side of the court, and this case ,.,as originally brought proper-
ly on the equity side. So the Supreme Court of Appeals remanded the case to the tria~ 
court for a new trial limited to the issue of dama~es and l-Iith directions to order 
an issue out of chancery and impa.nel a jury to determine the quantum of damages. 
1-•r B.\DJ.NG AND :?RACTJ:CE 58~. 198 V8. o 66~ .• 
P, whi le a passenger in X Is car, was inju.red when X 1 s car and D 1 s car collided at 
a.n i ntersection. P sued D who test:Lfied that . his speedometer showed that he was 
c:;o ing five miles an hour at the time of the accident, and that his view was obstruct-
·;d by trees and bushes. D had the right of way. There was a verdict for D. The Court, 
!:i<:t the verdict aside and granted P a new trial. At the second trial D testified that 
his speedometer was broken sometime before the accident. On this trial there >tias a 
Yu dict for P for :1~20,000 which VQrdict the trial court refused to set aside. 
~ J'nat r esult on appeal? 
Held: Case reversed and dismissed. The Supreme ·Court of Appeals will examine 
alleged errors in the order i~ which they took place. It was reversible error to set 
, aside the verdi~t rendered at the first trial for D's lack of negligence was found 
as a fact by the jury in that trial. All subsequent proceedings should be annulled 
so it is immaterial how D testified in later proceedings that should not have taken 
place. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Ru)e 3;2l(Q. ) 198 Va.700. 
P was injured in an automobile wreck as n result of D's negligence and sued D for a 
large s~~. She alleged that she had suffered serious brain injuries. D asked the 
Court to designate a competent disinterested physician to examine her. Should the 
Court grant such a request? 
Held: No. While statutes authorize the Industrial Commission to follow such pro-
cedure in Workmen's Compensation cases, there is no such general statute. The matter 
is covered by Rule 3:23(d) in actions at la~1. Under this rule the Court may reqnir:e 
the la·· · · to a medical ex.::1mination by a doctor of defendant'S choice. 
T.fuether it will or 1=1ot i s wi thin the d1scret1on o t 1e Cour.!:_. The report of the 
examining doctor is for the guidance of the person who made the motion for th~ 
examination and the written report is not admissible in evidence ur.less offered by 
the party submitting to the exdmination. The doctor may testify as to his findings 
subject to cross examination. Disputed questions of f act are still for the jury and 
there is no presumption that the examiner's report is correct. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 198 Va. 727. 
Is a sheriff's salary subject to set-~ff or 1 V#S-449.2 provides that 
the sa ar1es o coun y offlcers are subject t o garnisl~ent but VdS-449.3 limits the 
appllcation 0f the above section to offices created by the legislature and the 
bcalities. 
Held: The first statute is not applicable as the office of sheriff is created by 
the St ate Constitution. Hence the common law.applies and at common law the salaries 
of blic officers of al ds are exempt f :rom garmsrunen - .f.Or r.caSOJ1S-O.L_public 
poiic • hat is, if a public officer was not sure of his salary he might not be 
willing to perform his duties.) · 
of jury verdict where plaintiff' s evide ~ is stricken 198Va ~ 737. 
In 171 a. , ucc plaintiffs evidence because it clearly 
failed to prove his case. He then dischar ged the Jur y and entered judgment for the 
def endant. It was held on appeal that a jury verdict was indi spensable. The case was 
. • remanded for a new trial. 
Held in the J..nstant. case t hat tb~ 1950 1\!!les of Court . have changed the law, for 
under Rule 3:20 a s~ry .Judgment;Tna proper case, may be gi:v..e~ime-after 
the- par t i es ar e at issn e . I n moving to strike pl aintiff 1 s av:ide.oo·e-tf're-cl..af.endant is, 
~effect 1 asking f or a summar y judmment. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Misnomer--Rule 3: 13 198 Va . 813. 
The A Co., Inc. was-afssolved in 1950 and i ts bus iness co ntinued by the B Co., 
I nc. under the trade name of The A Co. P l eased some t r ucks to it in the name of 
The A. Co. and when i "':. failed t o pB.y t he agr eed rental inst i tuted this acti on 
against The A Co. The trial court dismissed t he case on the gr ound that there was 
no such l egal person as The A Co . and refused permission to P to amend his pleadi ng . 
Hel d: Error. Jlul~3 : 12 Jirects , "Leave to amend shall be lihenlly: granted in_ 
~rtherance of the end s of justice." V#B-97 pr~vides - that no pl ea in abatement shall 
I 50S. 
be allowed for misnomer but correction shall be made by amendment on motion 
;.:ccompanied by an affidavit! of the right name. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE,..-Statu . itations--Personal Injury 198 Va.824. 
P was injured by D in a co lirion on Nov.23,1951. She became mentally ill on 
Harc:h 31,1952, recovered Feb.3,1954, and filed her motion for judgment on June 9, 
1951.,. . On June 30th D filed his grounds of defense none of which indicated he was 
going to rely on the statute of limitations. The court allowed D to amend under 
Rule 13 tn Nay of 1955 so as to add that defense. V#8-24 provides for a one year 
statute ·of limitations or1 actions that do not survive and a five year one on actions 
that do survive unless some other period is stated. This statute is a very old one 
and was passed at a time when all personal action died with the person. In 1950 
Vf/8-628.1 was enacted. It reads, "No cause of action for injuries to person or 
property shall be lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. No 
cause of a ction for injuries to person or property shall be lost because of the 
death of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed, provided, however, 
in suc{l action no recovery can be had for mental anguish, pain or suffering." Does 
this. statute change the period of limitations from 1 year to 5 years? 
"'Held: No. It was not the intent of the legislature to chanre the statutory period 
of limitations by indirection, but only to provide f or the survival of the cause 
of action. 
Note 1. If P was sui juris after the date of the collision her intervening in-
sanity did not stop the running of the statute of limitations. 
Note 2. Since 1950 the legislature has a nded VhB-628.1 so that the statute of 
limitations' in_Rersonal injury_cases js no~ twQ y~s. It a so now proviaes~ressl~ 
that the statute shall not be construed to extend the time within which an action 
for any other tort shall be brought, nor to give the right to assign a claim for a 
to r t not otherwise assignable . 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 199 Va.32 6. 
P sued D for personal lnJuries. She filed her motion for judgment on May 14,1955 
and process was s erved on D promptly . On J lUle 2 D lodged in the clerk 1 s office a 
written motion for a bill of particulars as to the nature and extent of her injuries, 
but no court order was then entered requiring P to file a bill of particulars or 
extending the time forD to file responsive pleadings. On t he following October both 
of these matters were acted upon affirmatively by the Court . P claimed that she 
should have judgment by default because no responsive pleadings were filed within 
21 days. 
Held: A motion for a bill of particulars is not a r esponsive pleading and hence 
it is true that no responsive pleading was filed within 21 days, but under Rule 3:13 
the time allowed for filing pleadings may be extended by the court in its di~cretion 
except in the case of pleas in abatement. Since the cour t in the instant case exer-
cised its discretion and extended the time fo r ~ng .. of D's responsive ;elead-
ing !> i s not entitled to a default judgment • 
.-
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 
A Has awarded an appeal on March 7,1957. 
Appeals mail ed A a letter notHyi ng hi m of 
and petiti on f or ·.a.ppea.l. V#8- 482 provides 
be pJdd-: · 0 da s o e 
shall be dismiss ed . A paid on Apr i l 17th. 
199 Va.368. 
On March 15 the cler k of t he Court of 
the estimated cos t of pr inting the record 
that tha estimated cost of r i nting shall 
, t hat if not s o paid the appeal 
Held: Too l at e . Appeal di smissed. The pr ovision in t he Code i s mandatory. It says 
"date of noti ce" and t he noti ce 1,ras dat ed March 15. This does not mean date of 
r eceipt of the notice . Such a date would be t oo i ndefinii:.e. In fact, i n t his case, 
A di d not know when he r eceived the no~ic e . 
, P:"EADD!G AND PPAC'l' I CE Statute of 586 . Lj_mitations 199 Va.444 . 
F and D were father and daughter and vl was his second wife. D, when under 21 years 
'J, age, received an award of $5,000 damages as a result of an automobile accident. 
Tins money was paid to F a:; guardian for D. F borrowed $4500 oftlis mom~y at 4% 
interest from D giving her a note which was lost. F paid the interest to D regularly 
after her marriage, and wrote o, an officer of a trust compa11U which was named as 
e~:e '~u.tor of his will, acknowledging the debt to 0 and telling 0 the date to which 
ir~t erest was p;>.id o F died and the statute of limitations has run unless this 
acknowledgment of the debt. to 0 started the period running over again as from that 
date . 
Held: Wnile a casual written acknowled ment to a stran cr(as distinguished from a 
written one to the creditor himself is not ordinarily sufficient to revive the 
obligation, here. 0 is not a tota stra'.n er as the letter was writt en t o 0 to influ .. 
en e lS ac lon, and a new promise on F's part to pay will be imp e : Hence the 
debt was held to 7be a proper one and sufficiently proved. 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 199 Va.453. 
In an automobile accident case in which D's car struck P, a pedestrian, as P was 
crossing a street, the court instructed the jury that if it believed from the evidencf 
that D drove his car through the traffic red light, then this was negligence. There 
was no evidence offered to the effect that D had driven his car through a red light. 
Held: Reversed and remanded. It is error to give an instructio ~aad_on_a_hypo­
t not su orted b any evidence. The Jury-s·notrl:d- no be invited to return a 
verdict not based on evidenceo 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE _Rule 3:J3 199 Va. 472. 
P filed a motion for judgment against Don Dec.7,19SS. Process was duly served 0n D: 
and the purport thereof explained. No responsive pleading was filed and on April 10, 
1956 a default judgment was entered. D appeared by counsel l ater on in the day and 
claimed he had had no notice of the suit and that he had a valid defense in that he 
did not own or control the pr~perty on which P was injurad. D made an affidavit to 
this effect and moved that the original process be quashed. The evidence indicated 
that D was a man of intelligence and that he had been personally served. The court 
denied the motion. 
Held: That under Rule 3:13 it is within the sound discretion of the court as to 
whether or not such a motion may be grantod(cxcept as to pleas in abatement). Since P 
has willfully or at least very negligently failed to file any responsive pleading~ 
wi thin the twenty one day period it w.:ts not an abuse of discretion to deny his motion, 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Habeas Qorpus 199 Va.727. 
P was tried and ccnvict.ed of eight felonies and sentenced to serve two years for 
each one successively .. While serving these sentences he attempted to c;scape and was 
sentenced to an additional year for such an attempt. He applied f~r a writ of habeas 
corpus on the ground that the eight sentonces were void because of serious irregular-
ities in his trial. It is admitted that the additi onal year for attempted escape is 
valid, b~t credit on that year is sought for the time s~rved on the void sentences 
which is more than a year. 
Held: Against P. ~{_he is being valid) ~ held ~~abeas corp1~iilJ not lie. One 
cannot use habeas cor us s ~ubstitute for a writ of error. It is immaterial 
w ether or not the f irst sentences are valld or vola~S: he- ls not now entitled to 
his freedom even if t hey would have been held void had they been properly atta:'J.tl.ed. 
